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ABSTRACT 
Urban planners continue to explore various ways of influencing the 
type, rate, location, quality and timing of urban development. The need 
for such influence is evidenced by the compounding of urban environ-
mental and energy concerns with local government fiscal difficulties. 
This study examines two of the tools frequently identified as being 
useful in efforts to effectively manage urban development: consolidated 
urban government and the controlled extension of certain urban services, 
especially water service, sewerage service, fire protection and police 
protection. 
These two tools are explored through a case study of the urban and 
general services district concept as it has evolved in Metropolitan 
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee. The decision, with the 
establishment of consolidated government in 1963, to divide Metropolitan 
Nashville-Davidson County into two service districts provides a setting 
for the examination of past, present and potential impact of these 
service arrangements upon Nashville's urban development. The following 
four research questions provide the focus of the study: 
1. Was the creation of the service districts based upon a planning 
concern for the coordination of service provision with 
development objectives? 
2. Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as 




3. Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have 
potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future 
development objectives? 
4. Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and 
the service district concept provide planners with evidence of 
the validity of such arrangements for the imp1ementati'on of 
development objectives in metropolitan areas? 
Organized around these central questions, the study employs interviews 
with past and present planning officials, reviews of planning documents, 
and searches of literature on Metro Nashville to find its answers. 
The principle findings of the study are: 
~ 1. A continuing group of professional planners and Nashville 
citizens were instrumental in the design and implementation of 
consolidated government in Nashville and Davidson County. 
2. The creation of the Urban Services District and General 
Services District concept was a response to service delivery, 
political, fiscal and legal problems in Nashville; developmental 
concerns were secondary. 
3. Since 1963, the continuing need to provide urban services to 
a1\eadY-Urban~zed areas has precluded active consideration of 
~ng service policies to guide development; this fact has been 
reinforced by the general Metro political environment which 
supports the view that public planning for development should 
be limited to the maintenance of "minimum standards" of public 
health, safety and welfare. 
4. The potential for use of Urban Services District expansion 
5. 
policies as developmental tools has been moderated by the 
erosion of the distinction between the Urban Services District 
and the General Services District. 
Although Metro is currently reviewing three "general plan" 
alternatives, there 1s little evidence to suggest that a 
political climate is emerging which will support .the use of 
service policies to influence urban development beyond the 
"minimum standard" level. 
The expansion of the Nashville metropolitan area beyond the 
boundaries of Davidson County, the dominance of state and 
federal decision-makers in transportation decision-making, and 
the lack of consistent coordination between Metro agencies and 
v 
departments seriously inhibits any effort to use Urban Services 
District extension to influence urban development. 
The conclusions of the study are based upon these findings and are 
phrased as messages to planners who are interested in the potential 
impact consolidated government and the management or urban services 
~might have upon urban development. The messages suggest caution in 
listing the virtues of consolidated government, particularly where such 
government is not truly metropolitan. It is further suggested that the 
use of urban service policies to influence development is dependent upon 
both the political capacity and the political will to effectively 
achieve development goals. Planners are encouraged to seek the 
development of each of these. 
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URBAN DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND METROPOLITAN 
NASHVILLE: AN INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a case study of the evolution of the Urban and 
General Services Districts from their conception prior to the birth of 
Metropolitan Nashville until the present. This evolution is discussed 
with the view that management of urban service policies can be an 
important component in the overall management of urban development. 
Equally important is the examination of the role played by a consoli-
dated form of urban government in furthering such management. The 
existence, since 1963, of consolidated government in Nashville-Davidson 
County makes this unique inquiry possible. 
Influencing the pattern of urban development continues to be at the 
heart of most urban planning efforts. Planners, in their attempt to 
assist urban areas in meeting established development goals, continue to 
explore various ways of channeling development pressures into actions 
consistent with such goals. Prominent among such methods are the 
controlled extension of urban services, the programmed expansion of 
urban boundaries, and the consolidation of government units throughout 
the metropolitan area. Although many other methods exist, these three 
offer an interesting package of potential development management 
strategies, particularly in a setting where some degree of metropolitan 
1 
2 
government consolidation has occurred or is, likely to occur. 1 
Commonly known as "growth management, II the process of managing 
development through programs and policies "intended to influence the 
rate, amount, type, location and/or quality of future development" has 
captured the widespread interest of planners and other local officials. 2 
Since the term II growth " implies a rather limited concern for the 
accommodation of new urban residents and enterprises, the concept of 
"development," rather than growth, management perhaps better reflects 
the planner's concern for all forms of urban evolution, particularly 
those leading to changes in the physical environment and those placing 
new demands on the delivery of local government services. 
One significant discussion of the management of development 
suggests that the primary characteristics of such management include all 
efforts to influence the types, rate, location and quality of urban 
development. 3 The secondary characteristics of such efforts include the 
impacts of resulting development patterns on the environmental, fiscal, 
societal, and regional traits of the urban area. 4 These secondary 
lThere are many reviews of the range of devices available for 
implementing development objectives. A concise summary is presented in 
Robert Einsweiler, Urban Growth Management: Summary Evaluation of 
Research (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 1-10. 
More extensive discussion is found in Randall W. Scott et al. (eds.) 
Management and Control of Growth (Washington: The Urban Land Institute, 
1975) . 
2navid R. Godschalk et al. Constitutional Issues of Growth 
Management (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials Press, 1977), 
p. 9. 
3 Godschalk et al., p. 161. 
3 
characteristics underscore the dependence of any development management 
effort upon a statement of development goals and objectives. Although 
the explicitness and sequence of such statements may vary, the 
management of development, as an organized urban activity, is premised 
upon some form of public expression of urban development goals and 
objectives. 
Various reasons are given by cities and towns for wishing to engage 
in some form of development management. The declining capacity of 
cities to meet their fiscal needs, the growing concern for protection of 
the urban environment, the increased need for energy conservation, the 
raising of questions of equal opportunity in housing, and new patterns 
of urban growth have all, in varying mixtures of emphasis~ prompted some 
local governments to move from a general posture of "following" to one 
of "guiding" development. S Although the shift may seem subtle, the 
change can be dramatic, particularly where a local government in the 
past has only paid lip service to long-range development goals and 
uncritically serviced the needs of development-oriented interests. 6 
~ This is probably the case with a great number of American local 
governments. Only with" environmental crises, losses of inner-city 
revenues, inadequate housing opportunities, costly service extensions 
and other urban problems of major consequences has there been a growing 
SGodschalk et al., pp. 187-9. See also the seminal study on many 
of the benefits to be gained from such a shift: Anthony Downs, The Costs 
of Sprawl (Washington: The Real Estate Corporation, 1974). 
6A useful case study of one such change, Fairfax County, Virginia, 




interest in developing urban goals, policies and programs aimed at more 
carefUlly managing urban development. It is in the context of this· 
growing interest in managing urban development and the resulting search 
for effective management strategies that this study is prepared. 
These management strategies must take into consideration both the 
establishment of urban development goals and the selection of appropriate 
implementation tools. The former can range from absolute population 
"caps" to a directing of high rates of growth into specified areas. 
Implementation decisions involve choices made from a number of 
regulatory, fiscal, cooperative and other devices geared toward the 
. 7 
management of development pressures. Service policies, urban boundary 
modifications and urban government consolidation are implementation 
devices chosen for review in the case of Nashville. 
I. CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT 
Although the consolidation of governments in the urban area has 
been considered a type of urban reform for reasons extending far beyond 
a concern for management of development, it is nevertheless important to 
include consolidation as a possible means for implementing urban 
development objectives. Consolidated government, it has been argued, 
permits a regional, or at least county-wide, approach to the problems of 
metropolitan growth. According to many theories of urban reform, the 
"extremely atomized" urban areas suffer from governmental fragmentation 
which is dysfunctional to: 
7Einswei1er, pp. 10-31. 
1. the efficient and economical delivery of public goods and 
services on an area-wide basis; 
2. the elimination of social and economic disparities in the 
urban area; and, 
3. the development of regional community and citizenship.8 
The consolidation of governments in an urban area theoretically leads 
toward amelioration of these conditions by providing a structure for 
unified long-range planning, "rational" provision of urban services, 
coordinated capital investments, area-wide revenue mechanisms, singular 
focus of political identity, and so on. 9 Ultimately, the pro-
consolidation argument includes the claim that by merging the many 
5 
governments in the metropolitan area into a single government, a vehicle 
is created for coherently preparing and implementing policies designed 
to encourage the development of the entire metropolitan area in a 
planned, rather than random, fashion. lO 
Against this optimistic view of urban government consolidation, 
found throughout urban reform literature, must be raised at least three 
important questions. Each challenges the capacity for consolidation to 
be an effective means for implementing public development goals in the 
8See : Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regional 
Decision-Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts (Washington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 2-11; Thomas P. Murphy and John 
Rehfuss, Urban Politics In the Suburban Era (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey 
Press, 1976), pp. 236-7; Thomas A. Flinn, Local Government and Politics 
(Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman & Co.), pp. 143 ff.; Charles R. Adrian, 
State and Local Governments, 4th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), 
pp. 203-209. 
9 Murphy and Rehfuss, pp. 236-7. 
10"Consolidation" is used here to include city-county merger and 
absorption of city by county or vica versa; it does not include the 
"urban federation" pattern of intergovernmental relations such as found 
in Miami-Dade County, Florida, or Toronto, Ontario. 
6 
in the metropolitan area. Each question must be asked in any review of 
an existing consolidated government or in any consideration of potential 
consolidation by a metropolitan area. The questions deal with the 
political feasibility of consolidation, the issue of metropolitan and 
governmental boundaries, and the link between consolidation and 
efficiency in providing urban services. 
There are relatively few consolidated urban governments in the 
United States. Since 1947, only 15 successful consolidations have 
occurred. II About twice that number are estimated to have been under 
some form of consideration in the early 1970's.12 There is a strong 
argument that the infrequence of consolidation stems from the inverse 
relationship between "political feasibility" and the potential 
effectiveness of a proposed consolidated government in dealing with 
13 area-wide problems. Proposals for consolidation not only threaten 
entrenched political interests, but also often run counter to citizen 
preferences for the status quo, particularly in the suburban areas. 
Reformers tend to forget that the symbols--efficiency, a 
bigger and better Zilchville, and the like--that they respond 
to with enthusiasm ring no bells for "hoi polloi." It is the 
latter, of course, which dominate the decision when a 
proposal is put to a popular referendum. Ordinary citizens 
are characteristically apathetic. If water flows from the tap 
and the toilet flushes today, they are not likely to ask 
whether it will do so tomorrow. 14 
llMurphy and Rehfuss, pp. 237-8. l2Ibid . 
l3Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 11-15. 
l4Adrian, pp. 220-1. 
Although the number of such studies is limited, reviews of 
consolidation successes and failures agree that voter opposition and/or 
apathy is usually only overcome by "abnormal, unusual, or special" 
circumstances which lend a "crisis atmosphere!' to the consolidation 
issue. 15 Consolidation of urban governments has not been received by 
7 
the urban citizenry as the simple, rational, long-term solution to their 
problems suggested by many reformers. 
The second limitation of the consolidation solution to metropolitan 
problems centers on the usual lack of coincidence of such a government's 
boundaries with those of the metropolitan area. 
Not only is city-county consolidation almost impossible 
politically, but it does not guarantee that the city-county 
will have sufficient powers to meet all metropolitan problems, 
and it causes even greater political difficulties if the 
metropolitan area expands beyond the county limits. 16 
Whereas in 1960, over two-thirds of the Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas consisted of only one county, the 1980 census will 
17 indicate that less than half of all SMSA's consist of a single county. 
There is very little assurance that the boundaries of a consolidated 
government will coincide with those of the metropolitan area, however 
such an area is defined. This is particularly true given the fact that 
l5See Thomas M. Scott, "Metropolitan Governmental Reorganization 
Proposals," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2 (June, 1968), 
and Walter Rosenbaum and Thomas Henderson, "Explaining Comprehensive 
Governmental Consolidation: Toward a Preliminary Theory," Journal of 
Politics, vol. 34, (May, 1972). 
l6Ad . 214 rlan, p. • 
17prank I. Michelman and Terrance Sandalow, Materials on Government 
in Urban Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1970), p. 963. 
consolidation involving more than one county is even less likely than 
the traditional single county-city form. 
This criticism of consolidation does not detract from the 
advantages gained within the consolidated government's jurisdiction, it 
simply points out that many problems of urban development are 
metropolitan in nature and cannot be dealt with in a unified way when 
significant independent local government units remain in the metropoli-
tan fringe of an existing or proposed consolidated government. The 
strengthening of regional governments and growing interest in 
"two-tiered" metropolitan federations are partial responses to this, as 
well as the previous, limitation of consolidated government in coping 
with metropolitan problems. 18 
Perhaps the deepest questioning of the capacities of consolidated 
8 
government occurs when "the needed distinction is made between 'problems 
which exist in metropolitan areas' and fproblems which exist by virtue 
of the inadequacies of government structure in metropolitan areas lll and 
the latter are deemed to be relatively few. 19 Two critiques of 
consolidation can be extracted from this general view. The first builds 
20 on the descriptions of suburbia by Robert Wood, Thomas Dye and others. 
l8The best example of the regional approach is the Metropolitan 
Council in Minnesota. See Peggy A. Reichert, Growth Management In the 
Twin Cities Metropolitan Areas (St. Paul: Metropolitan Council of the 
Twin Cities Area, 1976). 
19Morton Grodzins and Edward Banfield, Government and Housing in 
Metropolitan Areas (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 156. 
20For a review of these classic theories see: Murphy and Rehfuss, 
pp. 139-42, and, Brett W. Hawkins and Thomas R. Dye, f~etropo1itan 
Fragmentation: A Research Note," Midwest Review of Public Administration 
(Feb. 1970), pp. 17-24. 
This view holds that the continued existence of many governments in the 
urban area properly reflects existing patterns of urban social 
integration. In addition, these many governments meet the American 
pub1ic's need for accessible, personal and localized government. In 
short, the "po1ycentric ll nature of urban government reflects the 
polycentric nature of urban scciety. 
Coupled with the challenge to the social validity of consolidated 
urban government is the challenge to the economic validity of such 
government. Ostrom and others have argued that a host of local 
governments and service districts are not necessarily less efficient in 
21 providing many urban services than are consolidated governments. 
Although this argument is conditioned by the type of service and the 
setting studied, it should be seen as a warning against uncritical 
acceptance of the conventional wisdom which suggests that in spite of 
all its other shortcomings, consolidated government certainly is more 
efficient and responsive in providing such urban services as sewers, 
22 water supply and public safety. A service-by-service analysis within 
specific urban settings is required before any conclusions can be 
reached on the lIefficiency" pillar of the reformists I argument in favor 
23 of consolidated government. Likewise, the "polycentristic" 
2lSee: Elinor Ostrom, ed. The Delivery of Urban Services (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1976) and Robert L. Bish and Robert Warren, 
IISca1e and Monopoly Problems in Urban Government Services," Urban 
Affairs Quarterly (Sept. 1972), pp. 97-122. 
22Robert B. Hawkins, Jr. "Special Districts and Urban Services," 
in Ostrom, The Delivery of Urban Services, pp. 171-88. 
23Ibid . 
9 
alternative to consolidated government should not be discounted until 
the results of such studies are in. 
The metropolitan area, feudal and balkanized as it may be, 
consti tutes a viable social and political system in which 
interaction takes place among its parts and in which public 
policy emerges in one fashion or another . . . a metropolitan 
political system, functioning almost always within a 
governmentally fragmented structure, does exist here and now. 
Decisions do get made, local governments continue to operate, 
services and goods are provided, problems are solved or 
mitigated, expansion and development takes place, and the day 
to day life of the residents goes on. The process may be 
inefficient and costly and may rationally demand change to 
maximize output and citizen satisfaction ..•. 24 
10 
Consolidated government, when established, may certainly provide a 
vehicle for coherently preparing and implementing policies designed to 
encourage the development of the metropolitan area in a planned, rather 
than random, fashion. Enthusiasm over such a prospect, however, should 
be tempered first by consideration of the likelihood that such a 
government can even be brought into being. An affirmative answer here 
still leaves the serious questions regarding the extent to which 
consolidated government would be truly "metropoli tan 11 and whether such a 
government could more efficiently provide local government services than 
the existing matrix of local government structures. Any study of a 
consolidated government structure as a contributor to effective 
metropolitan management of development must consider each of these 
issues. 
24John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 184. 
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II. URBAN SERVICE POLICIES AND BOUNDARY EXTENSIONS 
A significant fact of urban development is the dependence of nearly 
all forms of development upon minimal levels of urban service provision. 
Such dependence can form the cornerstone of a management strategy when 
urban governments require substantial service levels as a prerequisite 
for development to occur. An example is the commitment to the policy of 
"no sewers-no subdivisions." Where such regulatory-service policies are 
used to reinforce the commercial attractiveness of well-serviced land 
consistent with area development goals, undeniable incentives for proper 
development exist. 
It has been widely accepted by planners that certain urban services 
can have a primary shaping influence upon urban development. The 
provision of accessibility, water, waste disposal and energy supply 
influence all forms of development. School facilities, police and fire 
protection, and other services have additional impacts upon specific 
types of development. Proper management of such services to implement 
existing development goals requires that local governments at least 
have: 
1. the technical competence to understand and manage the linkages 
between services and urban development; 
2. the political will and capacity to employ this knowledge in 
implementing development policies; 
3. the financial skills and resources necessary to fund the 
appropriate service patterns; and 
12 
4. a governmental-organizational framework capable of supporting 
the resolution of these technical, political and financial 
questions. 
These requirements are obviously interrelated, but each makes up a 
distinctive consideration in the evolution of a development management 
strategy based on service provision policies. Taken together, the four 
requirements, if successfully met, represent a definite shift from 
"accommodative" or "catch-up" planning to that of management and 
guidance. 
Although urban service management strategies can take many forms, 
in general a distinction can be made between strategies including 
accessibility variables and strategies limited to the common "municipal 
service" package of water, sewerage, fire and police protection and so 
on. This distinction is required by the fact that transportation 
decisions, particularly interstate highway, freeway, and primary 
arterial location, are made and have been made by state and federal 
officials, often with little consideration of local developmental 
concerns. 25 The likelihood that education facility and energy supply 
planning can be a part of either strategy depends as well upon local 
decision-making arrangements. Energy provision is often a private-
sector activity while school location is frequently determined by 
autonomous school boards, many times under the guidelines established by 
court rulings on racial balances. 26 In the case study which follows, 
25E, 'I lnswel er, pp. 12-13. 26 Godschalk et al., p. 193. 
13 
decisions on the location of major transportation corridors, schools and 
energy services are not seen to be within the general authority of local 
government. Such a limitation upon the potential impact of even an 
aggressive local strategy for managing development needs to be kept in 
mind. 
Within the limitations set forth above, the programming of both new 
services and improvements to existing services is the critical link 
between urban service policies and urban area development goals and 
objectives. The consistency of such programming with development 
objectives is dependent on the technical, political, financial and 
organizational resources mentioned earlier and can be quite instrumental 
in making the difference between "simply planning to influence growth 
and actually managing the characteristics of new development. II27 
Closely tied to the question of using urban service policies to 
assist in managing development is the issue of urban governmental 
boundary determination. This has already been somewhat addressed in the 
discussion of consolidated government, but a broader consideration is in 
order. Traditionally, where expansion of urban governmental boundaries 
has occurred, various annexation procedures have led to extension of 
government 'boundaries into areas where substantial urbanization has 
already taken place. Important considerations in such expansion have 
generally been the city's determination of the costs of service 
extension and potential revenues in the annexed area. Where annexation 
27 Godschalk et al., p. 195. 
14 
requires the concurrent approval of both annexor and annexee the 
conclusions of those in the area to be annexed often conflict with those 
of the annexing city.28 In such annexation disputes, the debate 
generally centers on the relative "costs ll and "qualities" of services-be 
they measured in terms of the city's "fiscal health" or the taxpayer's 
perception of burdens on himself. 
The possibility of the city extending extraterritorial service 
controls beyond its boundaries provides one means for resolving some of 
these issues without full annexation. The extent to which such a policy 
will meet development needs depends upon the package of services 
included in extraterritorial arrangements and the degree to which the 
city would have exclusive rights to provide such services in the 
specified areas beyond the city's boundaries. 
The present concern for the management of urban development places 
a new light on this type of boundary dispute. The territory over which 
the city exercises control of service policies, if service policy 
management is to be a part of an urban development strategy, must include 
areas of potential as well as current urban development. Both unified 
planning and service authority need to exist throughout a metropolitan 
area if service policies are to be an effective tool for guiding 
29 development. The inclusion within a city's jurisdiction of areas 
28A review of these issues is found in Adjusting Municipal 
Boundaries (Washington: National League of Cities, 1966). 
29For a summary of this conclusion see Marion Clawson, Suburban 
Land Conversion in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1971), pp. 342-76. 
IS 
which might be limited in their capacity for urban development suggests 
that service policy determination needs to include provision for "urban" 
and "non-urban" service areas within the city's boundaries. 30 The basis 
for boundary extension, therefore, must be broadened from the "service 
to urbanized areas" of traditional annexation campaigns to include areas 
of potential development throughout the metropolitan region. 31 
The service distinctions between "urbanI! and "non-urban" service 
areas and the manner in which the areas can be expanded or reduced in 
size are important considerations in tying urban boundary procedures 
with development management strategies. The determination of what urban 
services will be denied the IInon-urban" service area involves both 
technical analysis of the impact of service denial on development and 
the legal requirements for services to developments already in such 
areas. Hovering above such concerns are the additional issues of equal 
protection (nondiscrimination) and the regional impact of metropolitan 
development policies. 32 Obviously, the more the boundaries between the 
two areas become blurred, the less significant are service policies in 
limiting urban development. The allocation of the types and quality of 
services to these two areas is therefore an extremely important question. 
30E, 'I 28 31 lnswel er, pp. - . 
31This "traditional" view is typified by the similar treatment 
given service extension studies and annexation studies in William 
Goodman and Eric Freund. ed. Principles and Practices of Urban Planning 
(Washington: International City Managers Association. 1968). pp. 398-9. 
32The primary focus of Godscha1k et al. is on these issues. 
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The scale of possible transition from "non-urban" to "urban" 
service areas raises another issue of boundary modification. Technical, 
political, financial and organizational considerations have already been 
suggested as being the basis for determining the link between service 
policies and urban development objectives. The flexibility to add very 
small areas to the urban service area might very well minimize many of 
the conflicts emerging from such considerations. On the other hand, 
technical considerations may suggest that addition of large areas is 
required. Although the distinction between "urban" and "non-urban" 
services needs to be substantial, the scale of transition from one 
category to the other needs to remain flexible, subject to technical, 
political, financial and organizational consistency with development 
ob j ecti ves. 
The preceeding comments on urban service areas and urban boundaries 
make it clear that questions of annexation and/or urban government 
consolidation are important considerations in any effort to use service 
policies to manage urban development. Inherent in the argument favoring 
the use of service policies as one tool to implement development goals 
is the position that urban boundaries and governmental arrangements must 
permit consistent and coordinated actions throughout the metropolitan 
area. 
III. THE NASHVILLE CASE STUDY 
The birth and growth of the Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, provides an experience and 
17 
opportunity for examining many of the preceeding arguments about 
consolidated government and the management of urban services. Not only 
has Metropolitan Nashville experienced nearly 15 years of consolidated 
government, but it has also gone through a relatively recent period of 
significant suburban growth. Between 1940 and 1970, the population of 
Nashville-Davidson County grew by some 75% (from 257,000 to 448,000).33 
Nearly 75 % of all suburban housing stock in the county has been 
constructed since 1950. 34 Current projections suggest that this growth 
will continue, but primarily in the metropolitan counties surrounding 
35 Davidson County. Many of the problems of regional metropolitan 
development continue to be experienced in the Nashville area. 
Nashville offers an excellent opportunity to examine the issues 
emerging from the expansion of metropolitan problems beyond the 
boundaries of the consolidated government of Nashville-Davidson County. 
Table 1.1 clearly shows the extent of metropolitan population growth 
beyond Davidson County. 
There is a more specific rationale for examining Metro Nashville's 
experience. The decision, with the establishment of consolidated 
government, to divide Nashville-Davidson County into two service 
33 Census data taken from Lester Salaman and Gary Wamsley, "The 
Politics of Urban Land Policy: Zoning and Urban Land Development in 
Nashville," in Blumstein and Walter, eds. Growing Metropolis, pp. 143-4. 
34Analyzing Suburban Development (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1973), p. 8. 
35proposed General Plan For Nashville (Nashville: Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, 1976), p. 4. 
TABLE 1.1 
POPULATION TRENDS, 1960-1970, MID-CUMBERLAND DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT 
1960 1970 
Number of Percent of Percent Increase Number of Percent of Percent Increase 
Persons Region 1950-1960 Persons Region 1960-1970 
Davidson County 399,743 58.6 24.2 447,877 56.4 12.0 
Six Adjacent 
Counties 178,283 26.2 10.7 229,435 28.9 28.7 
Remaining Six 
Counties 103,554 15.2 10.1 116,585 14.7 12.6 
Region 681,580 100.0 18.2 793,897 100.0 16.5 




districts (the Urban Services District and the General Services 
District) addresses clearly the capacity for Metro Nashville to use 
service provision as a development management device. The formation of 
these two districts permitted not only different levels of service 
delivery within the metropolitan government's boundaries, but allowed 
different tax and fee schedules as well. 
The existence of these two service districts in the context of 
consolidated government coupled with Nashville's recent and current 
growth pressures lead to a series of research questions which form the 
basis for this case study: 
1. Was the creation of these service districts based upon (to any 
extent) a planning concern for the coordination of service 
provision with development objectives? 
2. Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as a 
vehicle for coordinated service delivery consistent with 
development objectives? 
3. Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have 
potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future 
development objectives? 
4. Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and 
the service district concept provide planners with evidence of 
the validity of such arrangements for the implementation of 
development objectives in metropolitan areas? 
The study of Metro Nashville which follows is a search for answers to 
these questions. Those answers will comment on the Nashville experience 
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in view of the general arguments just put forward which suggest that 
consolidated government and urban service policy management can, under 
certain conditions, become useful mechanisms for achieving metropolitan 
development objectives. 
The study casts a highly rational, idealized view of planning and 
the management of development against the experiences of an American 
city which is in many ways typical of other moderately-sized and growing 
communities. It might be said that the study is unfair in that it 
probes Nashville's experience, or lack of experience, with the management 
of development during a history which preceeded active consideration of 
this issue by the planning profession. Several responses to this view 
are appropriate. First, the study is not intended to be a criticism of 
any city, regime, or individual. It is an effort to compare a limited 
part of city activities--service planning and management--with an 
idealized planning and governing process. Nashville may well provide 
planners with many valuable lessons in these areas. 
Secondly, the founders and early officials of Metro Nashville 
should not be denied potential credit for linking service policies with 
development objectives simply because significant professional attention 
to this relationship did not develop until the mid-1960's.36 Finally, 
even if it is found that the motives behind the establishment of Metro 
Nashville's urban service framework were not directly tied to the 
36An ... 1 ff ~n~t~a e ort was 
Techniques for Shaping Urban 
of Planners (May, 1963), pp. 
F. Stuart Chapin, "Taking Stock of 







management of future urban development, these arrangements may well form 
the basis for such ties in the future. 
The organization of the study follows both the historical 
development of the service districts in Metro Nashville and the 
relevence of this evolution to the theories of managed urban development. 
Chapter II explores the origins of the service district concept during 
the early thinking on consolidated government in Nashville and Davidson 
County. Commentary is offered on urban development objectives and 
provisions for urban services during two phases of this thinking. The 
first centers on the formulation of proposals for consolidated 
government (1951-1956) while the second deals with the two struggles for 
public acceptance (1956-1962), The chapter is developed as a response 
to the first of the research questions stated above. 
Chapters III and IV outline Metro Nashville's experience with the 
service districts since the inception of consolidated government (1963). 
Chapter III surveys Metro's development goals and objectives during this 
period. Chapter IV compares the use of the Urban and General Services 
Districts with these objectives. Of particular importance in this 
chapter are service extensions which do not fit service district 
boundaries and efforts to modify the boundaries themselves. Both issues 
relate closely to the connection between service policies and develop-
ment objectives. These two chapters combined respond to the second 
research question and provide a basis for the responses to the third and 
fourth questions. 
The final chapter draws the Metro Nashville service district 
experience together with the theories of the management of urban 
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development. In responding to the final two research questions, the 
chapter offers conclusions on Metro Nashville's past and potential 
performance in using the service district structure, in the context of 
consolidated government, to meet its development goals. A very general 
extension of these findings to other urban areas completes the study. 
The early portions of the study are based upon both interviews with 
several important actors during the evolution of Metro Nashville as well 
as the many documents and commentaries cited in the notes. Metropolitan 
Planning Commission documents and studies form the basis for the data 
presented in the latter part of the study. The conclusions reflect the 
interpretations of material from each of these sources in the light of 
the theories and research questions presented in this introduction. 
CHAPTER II 
ORIGINS OF THE URBAN AND GENERAL SERVICES DISTRICTS 
It is impossible to discuss the creation of the Urban and General 
Services Districts without first reviewing the birth of consolidated 
government in Nashville and Davidson County. The origins of the urban 
services district concept are deeply imbedded in the planning which led 
to the establishment of Metro Nashville in 1963. Although the history 
of this planning and its ultimate impact have been told elsewhere, it is 
important to recount significant events in the tale in order to explore 
the forces behind the creation of the service districts. l As introduced 
in the preceding chapter, this question emerges from the research 
interest in the ties between development management strategies and the 
evolution of the service districts. 
As will be seen, the "service district concept" in Metro Nashville 
gave birth to two important features of Metro government. The first was 
the organization of all metropolitan area services into two packages: 
"general services" and "urban services.,,2 The second was the 
incorporation of urban services into an expandable lIUrban Services 
Districtlf and extension of general services into a countywide "General 
Services District." The initial boundary of the Urban Services District 
I A number of sources have been used to prepare the historical 
material in this chapter. They will be cited where specifically used; 
all are listed in the Bibliography. 





was the same as the old City of Nashville, at the time of the 
consolidation. 3 The "service district concept," as outlined in the 
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following historical review therefore includes both the packaging of all 
metro area services and the creation of two service districts, one 
areawide and one expandable. 
A number of trends can be traced through the decision and events 
which ultimately came together to create Metro Nashville. These trends 
can be specifically tied in varying mixtures to specific features of the 
new government. including the creation of two service districts. Six of 
these factors have been chosen for particular attention. It is 
suggested that creation of the service districts can be attributed to a 
mixture of these factors, not necessarily a single one, thus permitting 
an answer to the question regarding the relative significance of 
development management concerns. The six influences on the decision 
leading to the service district features of consolidated government are: 
1. political considerations--concern for the acceptability of 
consolidated government to those whose approval was required 
for its implementation; 
2. administrative considerations--concern for the administrative 
feasibility of the proposed plan for service delivery 
governance; 
3. legal considerations--concern for the constitutionality of the 
service districts, including the likelihood of drawn-out court 
challenges; 
3 See p. 36. 
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4. fiscal considerations--concern for the impact of service 
districts on the new government's revenue, cost, and debt 
structure; 
5. environmental-technical considerations--concern for the 
consistency of proposed service-provision arrangements with 
technical capacities for service provisions in the Davidson 
County environment; 
6. developmental considerations-concern for the capacity of 
service provision arrangements to guide urban development. 
Obviously, it is the degree to which the sixth consideration can be 
linked to the package of forces leading to the creation of the two 
service districts that will determine the response to the research 
interests underlying the study. 
The interactions of these forces can be examined productively by 
reviewing the birth of Metro Nashville through two particular periods. 
The Itproposal" period ends with the publication of the "Plan for 
Metropoli tan Government,,4 by the combined planning staff of the Davidson 
county and City of Nashvil~e Planning Commissions in October 1956. The 
"acceptance" period ends with the final establishment of the Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville-Davidson County on January 1, 1963. Within each 
period are found important contributions to the emerging service 
district concept. 
4Plan of Metropolitan Government for Nashville and Davidson County 
(Nashville: Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 1956). 
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I. THE PROPOSAL PERIOD: 1950-1956 
Nashville and Davidson County experienced an increased expansion of 
suburban development after World War II, as did many other American 
cities. This growth accompanied the release of pent-up housing demand 
accumulated during the war years and then was reinforced by the 
expansion of the national economy and the impact of the increase in the 
birthrate upon the continuing American preferences for single-family, 
detached homes. The availability of land for residential development 
within the City of Nashville was limited. Hence, in the early 1950's 
city growth rates began to stabilize while county and regional rates 
continued upward. As county growth rates increased and city rates 
stabilized, the accompanying problems of servicing new areas of growth 
with limited county service capabilities grew in significance. This 
area of urban development beyond the city's boundaries grew in 
significance due to the lack of any extension of the City of Nashville's 
boundaries since 1927. 5 Additionally, Davidson County is characterized 
by layers of limestone on or near the surface of the land. This led to 
a near absence of sanitary sewers and the resulting continuing problems 
with septic tank performance. 6 One estimate suggested that in 1950, 
5Nashvi11e's annexation problems are outlined in the opening 
chapter of A Future For Nashville (Nashville: Community Services 
Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville, 1952). 
6Brett Hawkins, Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County 
Consolidation (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), p. 23; 
Daniel R. Grant, "Urban and Suburban Nashville: A Case Study in 
Metropolitanism," Journal of Politics (February, 1955), p. 85. 
27 
some 10% of all septic tanks in Davidson County had surface discharging 
and another 15% exhibited some additional "danger to public health. ,,7 
Both the lack of expansion of city boundaries and the sewerage problem 
presented a unique environment of pressures faced by both the county and 
city as the 1950's began. 
Politically, the city and county engaged in the typical 
"buckpassing" which effecti vely permitted the avoidance of many 
responsibilities for dealing with such suburban growth problems. Having 
not been reapportioned since 1905, the Davidson County Quarterly Court 
was not representative of the city's population. According to one 
study, the magistrates reflected "a 'rotten borough' system with a 
8 vengeance. " The absence of county or city home rule further compounded 
problems of political responsibility. Many local policy decisions 
required favorable action by the county delegation to the state 
legislature. 
Administrative confusion was typified by the existence of dual 
public health agencies, hospitals, and welfare systems. 9 Attempts to 
clarify the proper health services due non-city and city residents and 
then compute appropriate payment systems led to many complicated and 
controversial arrangements. The provision of other services was equally 
confusing and inefficient. Outside the City of Nashville, fire 
protection was provided by eight private subscription companies and a 
7Grant, p. 85. 8A Future For Nashville, p. 15. 
9Grant, p. 90; A Future For Nashville, pp. 151-178. 
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f o • d' . 10 ~re protectlon lstrlct. Where water lines were available in these 
areas. they were generally two-inch and four-inch lines. While the city 
had a Class 3 fire rating, the non-city county had the lowest rating, 
Class 10. 11 The mixture of utility districts and private companies 
supplying water to the county areas was described as a system 
"resembling scrambled eggs.,,12 
The financial arrangements for such service patterns were just as 
confusing. Both city and county residents suffered from the various 
inequities brought on by the existence of a growing area requiring urban 
services but without an urban government. These financial problems were 





City subsidization of services to non-city residents 
Inequitable city share of county and state tax revenues 
County expenditures primarily benefitting the city area 
13 Duplicate expenditures by city and county governments 
Probably the greatest public outcry came from city residents who 
saw their taxes supporting county residents. The use of city streets 
maintained by the city's Public Works Department, the use of city parks 
(70% of the acreage was located outside the city with the county having 
no parks of its own) and the use of a proposed city auditorium by county 
14 residents particularly rankled city taxpayers. 
10 A Future For Nashville, p. 86. 11 Grant, p. 90. 
l2 Ibid . 13 Based on Grant, Ibid. 
l4Grant, pp. 93-95. 
The city's share of state collected, locally shared taxes (beer, 
h 1 1 k d b d d ) 11 d' , 'h' 15 alco 0 , sa es, stoc s an on s procee s was actua y lmlnlS lng. 
The allocation formula was based on the census and the city had not 
annexed any new areas in decades. Additionally, there was continued 
criticism of the formula whereby state aid-to-education funds 
appropriated to the county were passed on to the city.16 
From the county's view, there was the charge that county services 
many times benefited only city residents. Common arguments pointed to 
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the county's investment in the bridges over the Cumberland River and the 
fact that two-thirds of the patients in the county hospital were city 
'd 17 reSl ents. 
There was little doubt that city and county governments duplicated 
many services and functions. Dual systems of tax assessment and 
collection, funds investment, purchasing, training, personnel management, 
and so on existed. Problems of personnel duplication were particularly 
evident in the operation of two school systems. Although not the cause 
of the same level of outcry as the issues of taxes and services, this 
type of issue remained important. 
Issues of land development patterns were made significant by the 
rapid growth of the urban fringes within the county. Although zoning, 
subdivision regulations and building codes existed in both city and 
county areas, lack of enforcement, ease of amendment and the absence of a 
l5A Future For Nashville, p. 180. 
16 Grant, p. 94. l7Ibid . 
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countywide comprehensive plan for development led to a virtual absence 
18 of planning and controlled urban growth. Although the planning staffs 
of city and county merged in 1939, there still existed City and County 
Planning Commissions as well as the separate legislative bodies. The 
absence of any countywide planning policy entity was a serious 
inhibition on any possibility for properly influencing the quality, 
location and rate of new development. 
Mention has already been made of Nashville's sewerage problem caused 
by existence of extensive limestone deposits throughout the county. This 
environmental condition overshadowed other technical considerations 
related to urban service delivery. The very limestone deposits which made 
septic tank performance questionable also made the potential cost of 
sewer installation extremely high. A solution to the sewer problem was 
therefore seen as requiring the firmest of financial bases. The city 
was the only entity capable of such construction--and it would need 
jurisdiction over an area broader than its 1950 boundaries both to 
finance the project and to include all appropriate drainage areas. 
The growing failure rate of septic tanks coupled with rapid 
suburban development beyond the city's boundaries prompted a number of 
city businessmen to approach the County legislative delegation about the 
establishment of some type of commission to investigate the multitude of 
problems associated with urban growth and service delivery in Davidson 
18A Future For Nashville, pp. 27-37; Imogine Wright Bolin, IlPlanning 
in Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee: Before and 
After Consolidation" (unpublished Masters thesis, University of 
Tennessee, 1968), pp. 42-50. 
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19 County. Encouraged by the unified staff of both the county and city 
planning commissions, the 1951 State legislature, at the request of the 
Davidson County delegation, passed private legislation which established 
the Community Services Commission. 20 The first section of the act made 
a summary reference to the broad array of political, administrative, 
financial, developmental and environmental problems facing the county 
and city and just reviewed: 
. it is hereby found and declared that the great 
concentration of people and their homes, institutions and 
enterprises occupying the central portion of Davidson County 
constitute substantially one community and have a common need 
for those services and facilities customarily sUpplied by a 
local government formed for such purposes; that- less than 
half of the area and less than two-thirds of the population 
comprising this community are served by such a local govern-
ment, the remaining area and population being dependent upon 
the County Government which is not constituted nor intended 
to render such services; that there are many proposals and 
wide differences of opinion as to how a local government may 
be formed as existing government changed so as to most 
effectively, efficiently and economically provide for the 
convenience, health and prosperity of the people; that, in 
order to understand and solve these problems, the people are 
in need of the facts, analyses, and proposals which can be 
obtained only through specialized study; and that the creation 
of the Commission and the carrying out of its purposes as 
provided herein is in all respects for the benefit of the 
people of Davidson County and municipalities located therein, 
and is a public purpose, and the Commission will be performing 
an essential governmental function in the exercise of the 
power conferred upon it by this Act .... 21 
The act went on to provide for 15 Commissioners, including a 
permanent chairman. In order to guarantee a "blUe ribbon" nature for 
19Interview with Dr. Lee S. Greene, January, 1978. 
20 Tennessee, Private Acts of 1951, Chapter 241. 
2l Ibid . 
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the commission, 11 commissioners were specified by name with membership 
evenly divided between city and county residents. The chairman was a 
Nashville attorney, Edwin Hunt. Highly respected, both as a person and 
a legal professional, Hunt's firm hand guided first the Commission and 
later the legal work on the actual proposals for consolidation. 22 The 
Commission itself was funded by equal contributions of $25,000 from the 
city and county. 
Recognizing the dominance of political, administrative and financial 
factors contributing to the service problems of the county and city, the 
Commissioners turned to two highly regarded experts in these areas for 
staff leadership. Dr. Lee S. Greene, political scientist and public 
administration expert from University of Tennessee-Knoxville was asked 
to become the Executive Director of the Commission. He accepted the 
position, took a leave from his university responsibilities, and arrived 
for work in the fall of 1951. 23 Joining him as Assistant Director was 
another political scientist, Dr. Daniel Grant, of Vanderbilt University. 
With the, appointments of Greene and Grant, it was apparent that the 
Commission, from the very outset saw governmental modification as the 
heart of any strategy for dealing with host of problems it was under 
mandate to investigate. 
24 In June 1952, the Commission issued its final report. Given the 
ultimate impact which the report had in the formation of metropolitan 
22G I . reene nterv1ew. 23Ibid . 
24A Future For Nashville. 
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government, it is useful to spell out first the major recommendations 
made and then outline the research topics investigated during the course 
f h C .. d 25 Th .. 1 d . o t e ommlSSlon stu y. e prlnclp e recommen atlons were: 
1. Annexation of approximately 69 square miles and 90,000 
persons by the City of Nashville 
2. Assumption of full County responsibility for the countywide 
functions of public health, hospital care for indigents, 
public education, and public welfare 
3. Establishment of City and County horne rule 
4. Redistricting of Davidson County to equalize representation 
on Davidson County Quarterly Court. 
5. Massive improvements in City services, once annexation 
completed (i.e., Class 3 fire protection, uniform water 
service and rates, sanitary sewer construction) 
6. Unification of planning commission; requirement of 
unanimous Councilor Court vote to override Planning 
Commission rezone recommendation; completion of countywide 
comprehensive plan; zoning of entire county 
Study topics, upon which the recommendations were based, included 
1. populat1on patterns 
2. governmental structures 
3. urban planning 
4. the Nashville Electric Service 
5. water supply 
6. sewers 
7. refuge collection and disposal 
8. public transportation 
9. streets and roads 
10. schools 




13. public recreation 
14. public housing 
15. health services and hospitals 
16. public welfare 
17. local government finance 
In many ways, the Commission's activities and report marked the 
beginning of the move toward government consolidation and the birth of 
Metro Nashville. The study was comprehensive, competent and remarkably 
free from political influence. It represented a statement on city and 
county problems by a group of planning-oriented citizens and academic 
resource persons. The Commission itself reflected a Nashville elite 
with the time to commit to such activities. According to the executive 
director, the Commission worked well together, clearly perceived its 
mission, and was productive to the point that the work was completed 
before the deadline imposed by the legislature and without spending all 
of the allocated funds. 26 The Commission's work was carefully and 
positIvely reported in the Nashville press, particularly the Nashville 
Banner. County Judge Beverly Briley actively supported the work of the 
Commission while Mayor West, although more "standoffish" than Briley, 
d 'd . d C .. t" t' 27 ~ not ~mpe e omm~ss~on ac ~v~ ~es. 
The principle recommendation that the city should engage in a 
massive annexation of county territory was recognition of the serious 
26G I . reene nterv~ew. 27Ibid . 
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service deficiencies in the urban areas outside the city. It was a 
further testimony to the view that a solution to these problems lay only 
in a consolidation of service functions under a single government 
permitting efficient planning and administration as well as equitable 
financing. It should be noted that in recommending annexation the 
Commission did not pursue consolidation of city and county governments. 
At the time of the study there was no legal mechanism under Tennessee 
law for such government. In particular, the state constitution forbade 
28 the establishment of separate tax rates under a single government. 
This prohibition would have mandated a single tax-rate throughout a 
consolidated city area, therefore raising serious issues of equity 
should this area have included properties where service extension was a 
short-term impossibility.29 This tax problem was compounded by the 
absence of consolidation enabling legislation, therefore leaving the 
Commission with annexation as the only practical way to consolidate 
urban services under the City of Nashville. 
The Commission's proposed annexation is presented in Figure 2.1. 
The primary method used by the Commission in drawing the boundaries for 
the proposed annexation was one of matching the need for providing urban 
services to urbanized areas within reasonable city cost-revenue 
guidelines. A summary of the general technique used in this process is 
outlined in Figure 2.2. Greene and Grant drew up the basic annexation 
28See David H. Grubbs, "Legal Aspects of City-County Consolidation 
in Tennessee," Tennessee Law Review (Summer, 1963), pp. 499-516. 
29G I . reene ntervlew. 
_ Annexation 
Proposal 
Figure 2.1. Annexation Proposal, Community 
Services Commission, 1952. 












Population; Density; Growth Rate 
City-County Department Projections 
Property tax projections and 
locally distributed state revenue 
projection 
Contiguity; relationship to 
existing municipalities; "blend" 
with evolving "package" 
Figure 2.2. Procedure for Decision to Include Area 
in Annexation Proposal, Community 
Services Commission, 1951-1952. 
Source: A Future For Nashville. 
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boundaries, using this method relying heavily on the: cost-revenue 
projections prepared by William Snodgrass of the Municipal Technical 
Ad . S' 30 vl.sory erVl.ce. 
Accompanying this description of the proposed annexation boundary 
was the recommendation that "upon the affirmative vote of a majority of 
those voting in the entire area, consisting of the City of Nashville and 
the suburban area taken together, the delegation should proceed to 
extend the city limits of Nashville by special act of the 1953 General 
31 Assembly." This was obviously intended to stack the deck in favor of 
annexation, taking the legislative delegation somewhat off the political 
hook. Annexation could only occur by act of the state legislature, the 
present procedure of city initiative not being established until 1955,32 
Under the legislative determination procedure, there was no requirement 
for any guarantee of a schedule of city service provision to the annexed 
area. Although the Commission staff foresaw little tlfootdragging11 by 
the City in providing services, the joint referendum was seen as a way 
to overcome suburban opinions which did not share such optimism,33 
Table 2.1 indicates the Commission's estimates of the financial 
impact of the annexation proposal, assuming their recommendations on 
transferring health, school, hospital and welfare functions to the 
county were followed. The property tax consequences included a slight 
30Ibid . 3lA Future For Nashville, p. 3. 
32 Tennessee, Public Acts of Tennessee, 1955, Chapter 113. 
33G I . reene nterVl.ew. 
TABLE 2.1 
·FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANNEXATION PROPOSAL AND SERVICE 







Tax Rate Impact 
$1,594,500 
($ per $100 assessed) Reduce .41 Increase .68 
Source: A Future For Nashville. 
reduction for city residents (due to the transfer of four functions to a 
countywide basis) and a slight increase for county residents. Residents 
of the annexed territory, of course, would have experienced a sharp 
increase in taxes. Assuming the Commission's estimates were correct, 
the annexation would have paid its way, given the transfer of health, 
hospital, school and welfare functions to the County. 
Absent from the annexation proposal was any attempt to include 
"non-urban" territory. Both Greene and Grant would "like to have seen 
the City reach out and take areas which were not developed" thus giving 
34 better control over future development. Politically, however, such a 
recommendation would probably not have been accepted by the Commission 
itself. The Commission did not generally share the staff view that 
annexation could move from "following" to a "leading" relationship with 
34Ibid . 
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urban growth. A legal obstacle was also present. in that the 
requirement of a uniform city tax rate would have placed unreasonable 
stress on the farmland which would have been included in such an 
annexation strategy. The staff wish to use the report of the Commission 
as a means for better guiding urban development was therefore concen-
trated on the recommendation for a unified planning commission, 
preparation of a comprehensive plan for the entire county. and tightened 
I f . d" . 35 contro 0 zonlng a mlnlstratlon. 
At the time the Commission's report was presented to the public. 
h d f .36 Bh d dh t ere were many warm wor s 0 pralse. ot newspapers en orse t e 
recommendations. as did the Mayor and County Judge. The key recornrnen-
dation of annexation, however, required the support of the county 
legislative delegation. The report was issued only two months prior to 
the 1952 legislative elections. The delegation finally elected that 
fall was committed to all of the report's recommendations except that of 
annexation. Although supportive of the proposed annexation in principle. 
the political risks were dominant when the proposal was blocked by at 
least one senator's unwillingness to engage in "any annexation by state 
legislation. 11 37 Even though the Commission had carefully and thoroughly 
documented the case for annexation. there were few political incentives 
to mount a campaign once the legislature failed to act. 38 It's ironic 
35A Future For Nashville. pp. 27-37. 
36 37 Grant. pp. 98-99. Grant, p. 98. 
38Interview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December. 1977. 
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that opposition to the principle of legislative annexation blocked 
probably one of the most thoroughly prepared local annexation plans in 
the State's history. 
Several other recommendations made by the Commission did lead to 
action. The City and County Health Departments were merged into a 
single County Department and certain welfare functions were transferred 
to the County. In general, however, Commission members and staff became 
quite gloomy over lack of action following the report's pub1ication. 39 
This feeling was enhanced by the lack of any serious criticism or 
controversy over the data and conclusions upon which the recommendations 
were based. The Commission clearly had "told it like it was" and "like 
it would be" if the recommendations were not followed. As will be seen, 
subsequent impacts of their work erased much of this early disappoint-
ment, clearly underscoring the accuracy and extent of their vision of 
the future. As the Assistant Director of the Commission wrote two years 
later, "an opportunity still remains for a combination of vision and 
action. ,,40 As a contribution to the "vision" portion of this mixture, 
the Commission's report was a monument. It was the first effort to 
spell out Nashville's development objectives and a specific means for 
achieving them. 
It is important to keep in mind that the Community Service 
Commission, directed by two political scientists, had seen inadequate 
39Daniel R. Grant and Lee S. Greene, "Surveys, Dust, Action, If 
National Civic Review (October, 1961). 
40Grant, "Urban and Suburban Nashville: A Case Study in 
Metropolitanism," p. 99. 
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service delivery as a symptom of the deeper problem of inappropriate 
governmental organization and boundaries in the Nashville area. Unable 
to deal significantly with-the organizational problem, the Commission 
had placed its major emphasis on boundary adjustment. The subsequent 
failure to implement the annexation recommendation was perhaps a 
blessing in disguise for Commission members who shared in the vision of 
a need for some form of metropolitan consolidated government. A year 
after the report was published, a State Constitutional Convention was 
held and a recommendation to amend the Constitution to permit consoli-
dated government was placed before the voters and subsequently ratified. 
This single event opened the doorway for a realistic consideration of 
consolidated government. 
There are various accounts of how the 1953 Constitutional 
41 Convention came to recommend "Amendment 8" to the voters. In general, 
it is agreed that a prominent Nashville attorney, who had lost the 
Convention presidency by a single vote, placed the substance of a 
proposed article to permit consolidation before the body in its final 
42 days. With the significant amendment which required that any 
consolidation must be approved by referendums in both the city and 
county areas, Amendment B became Article XI, Sec. 9, of the Tennessee 
41prank I. Michelman and Terrence Sandalow, Materials on Government 
in Urban Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1970), p. 966; Lee S. 
Greene, David Grubbs and Victor Hobday, Government in Tennessee, 3rd ed. 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975), pp. 224-225; Grant and 
Greene. 
42G I . reene ntervlew. 
State Constitution following its ratification by the voters on 
November 3, 1953 . 
. The General Assembly may provide for the consolidation 
of any or all of the governmental and corporate functions now 
or hereafter vested in municipal corporations with the 
governmental and corporate functions, now or hereafter vested 
in the Counties in which such municipal corporations are 
located; provided such consolidations shall not become 
effective until submitted to the qualified voters residing 
within the municipal corporation and in the County outside 
thereof, and approved by a majority of those voting within the 
municipal corporation and by a majority of those voting in the 
County outside the municipal corporation. (As amended: 
Adopted in Convention--June 4, 1953; Approved at election 
November 3, 1953; Proclaimed by Governor, November 19, 1953). 
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Although no direct reference is made in the Article to the question 
of uniform taxation under consolidated government, most observers at the 
time assumed that a dual level of services and taxes was implied. 43 In 
a subsequent court case the validity of this assumption was upheld: 
To hold that the local taxes must be equal and uniform 
throughout Davidson County including the urban areas, would 
have the practical effect of rendering inoperative the 
consolidation of all city functions with county functions 
provided by the Eighth Amendment. This interpretation must 
necessarily have such crippling effect upon the "consolidation 
of functions" as to render meaningl ess . . . this amendment. 44 
This amendment made consolidated government legally possible and 
financially feasible in Tennessee. At the same time it raised two 
political hurdles. First, it required the General Assembly to pass the 
appropriate enabling legislation. Second, and moore significantly, it 
mandated that any proposed consolidation be approved by separate 
43Brett Hawkins, p. 37. 
44Lewis Frazier et al. v. Joe C. Carr et al., as discussed in Brett 
Hawkins, p. 143. 
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majorities voting in the city and county are~s. This political 
constraint was made a part of the Amendment to allay the fears of both 
, 
convention delegates and voters who saw threats to rural and suburban 
areas in the consolidation option. 45 
The first phase of proposing consolidated government ended with the 
publication of the Community Services Commission report and the 
ratification of Amendment 8. As 1954 began, planning officials and 
community business leaders interested in consolidated government had at 
their disposal two important new resources: 
1. A careful documentation of the city and county's service 
deficiencies, both present and future (Future of Nashville); 
and 
2. A constitutional means for bringing consolidation about. 
The continuing pressure to deal with the sewer problem coupled with 
suburban growth beyond the City's boundaries led the joint staff of the 
two planning commissions to propose the creation of an "Advanced 
Planning and Research Division" early in 1954. 46 The division was 
created with the explicit task of forging recommendations to deal with 
the array of service and financial problems facing both the county and 
city, as documented in the Community Service Commission report. The 
division's first-year work program included: 
45G I . reene ntervlew. 
46Brett Hawkins, p. 38; Planning Activities--1954 (Nashville: City 
of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions), p. 2. 
financial structure study; analysis of City and County 
revenues and expenditures; outstanding debt; scope and cost of 
services; capital improvements programmin§1 fiscal relation-
ships with State and Federal Governments. 
Priority was given to the financial studies in order to prepare a 
recommendation for new governmental arrangements which would meet the 
pressing service needs on an equitable and sound financial basis. The 
options first spelled out for such arrangements included for the first 
time city-county consolidation, made possible by the recent constitu-
tional amendment: 
On the basis of that (financial study) information, 
consideration will be given to the financial implication and 
evaluation of each of the following and their possible 
application in meeting present and future needs: 
1. bring the area of the urban community under one urban 
government by expanding the central city, 
2. application of one metropolitan government within the 
limits of Davidson County through City-County 
consolidation, 
45 
3. transfer of specific governmental functions between the 
City and County, resulting in a consolidation of a 
particular function at one of the other level of 
government, 
4. metropolitan utility district for specific functions; 
for example, water supply and distribution and sewage 
collection and disposal. 
A primary objective of this work also is the formulation and 
application of an annual capital budget and long-range 
financial program for public improvements. 48 
The investigation of these options was undertaken by a rather 
remarkable team on the joint planning commission staff. Put together by 
the Executive Director, Charles Hawkins, the team was headed by the new 
director of the Division of Advance Planning and Research, Irving Hand. 
47planning Activities--1954, pp. 13-34. 
48H k' I ' PI ' A ' ,. 1954 20 aw lns ntervlew; annlng ctlvltles-- , p. . 
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Brought in as a staff researcher was Robert Horton, who was completing 
graduate work in economics and political science at Vanderbilt 
University. A political scientist at Vanderbilt, Professor Dan Grant, 
was retained as a staff consultant. This team, which was to remain 
intact for the next nine years, quickly began to assemble material on 
the various options for dealing with metropolitan service problems. 
Hawkins arranged for federal planning grant funds to support the groupts 
work and attempted to insulate the division from political pressures. 49 
Hand directed the day-to-day work program while Horton undertook a 
number of research projects, including reviews of governmental arrange-
'h I' 50 ments ~n ot er metropo 1tan areas. Grant provided commentary and 
advice throughout the entire range of discussions. 
It is important to note that this group did not initiate any 
substantial new technical analyses of service provision in the city and 
county. They relied heavily on the work of the Community Services 
C . . f h 'f t' 51 omm1SS1on or suc ~n orma 10n, The pressing sewer problem, however, 
did lead to a concurrent staff study of sewer extension into the 
urbanized areas adjacent to the City of Nashville. The extent of the 
need for sewers and the failure to extend the City's boundaries can be 
49HawkinsInterview; Planning Activities--1957-l960 (Nashville: 
City of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 1960), 
pp. 40-42. 
50Hawkins Interview; Interview with Robert Horton, January, 1978; 
Correspondence with Irving Hand, January, 1978. 
51Daniel R. Grant, "Metropolitics and Professional Political 
Leadership: The Case of Nashville," Annals of American Academy of 
Political and Social Science (May, 1964), pp. 73-74. 
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seen in Table 2.2. The study focused closely on the unsewered suburban 
area adjacent to the city. Just as the Community Services Commission 
had done, the planners made early reference to the reform of govern-
mental organization needed to implement the engineering-based 
recommendations. 
Courses of action available under existing laws and in terms 
of existing levels of governmental organization indicate that 
the two principle possibilities for dealing with this problem 
are annexation and contractual arrangements between the City 
of Nashville and Davidson County. 52 
In their report, the planners recommended that a program of sewer 
construction in the suburban area be undertaken by the county "in 
cooperation with the city." The plan involved contracting for sewage 
disposal with the City of Nashville and using both general obligation 
d f f · . 53 an revenue means 0 1nanc1ng. Keeping in mind that Hand's Division 
was also investigating new forms of urban government, the sewer report 
was significant for two reasons: 
1. It provided technical documentation of the sewer problem with a 
proposed program of sewer construction prepared by engineers and 
planners who were relatively free from political restraints; and 
2. The soundness of the technical recommendation contrasted 
greatly with the complicated governmental arrangements required 
. 54 
to finance, construct and administer the plan. 
52proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Nashville 
Metropolitan Area (Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County 
Planning Commissions, 1956). p. 12 




ESTIMATED POPULATION USING VARIOUS FACILITIES FOR DISPOSAL 
OF SEWAGE--DAVIDSON COUNTY, 1955 
Number of PeoE1e 
Using 
Area Using Septic 
(S9' Miles) Total Sewers Tanks 
City of Nashville 22.7 178,000 174,000 500 
Sewered Area Outside 
of Nashville 5.8 17,000 17,000 
Unsewered Suburban 
Area Adjacent to City 34.5 130,000 129,000 
Unsewered Potentially 
Suburban Area 90.0 19,000 17,000 
Rural Area 380.0 16,000 10,000 
Total 533.0 360,000 191,000 156,000 











The engineer's response to this latter problem was the creation of a 
special sewer district--a prospect which Hand's group saw as only 
further complicating the problem of coordinated urban service 
provisions. 55 The stage was therefore set for the publication of the 
second major report from the Advance Planning and Research Division. 
A Plan for Metropolitan Government. 
In March 1956. after nearly two years of intensive staff 
49 
preparation. the preliminary draft of A Plan for Metropolitan Government 
was presented to the two planning commissions for action. As the 
product of Hawkins, Hand, Horton and Grant's combin~d efforts, the draft 
was the first formal outline of consolidated government for Nashville 
56 and Davidson County. The document began with a statement of "our 
metropoli tan problems" which followed the general approach of the 
earlier Community Services Commission: 
1. A large part of the Nashville Metropolitan Area is 
provided with none of the customary urban services, or, at 
best. has an unsatisfactory makeshift arrangement for 
partial service; 
2. There is no existing government able to cope with area-wide 
problems; 
3. The existence of separate City and County governments is 
not only wasteful to the extent that there is duplication 
of government but it also tends to divide the loyalties of 
community leadership and the authority of local government 
at times when unity of action is urgently needed; 
4. The dispersion and dissipation of citizens' control of 
their government is perhaps the most serious result of the 
existing governmental structure in the Nashville Metro-
poli tan Area. 
The plan went on to point out that while these problems were common to 
most urban areas of the United States, Nashville and Davidson County are 
55Brett Hawkins, pp. 38-39. 56H k' I . aw lns ntervlew. 
so 
now only in the "early stages of this metropolitan disease. IIS7 What 
followed was a rejection of annexation, functional service consolidation, 
special utility districts formation, municipal federation, extension of 
extraterritorial municipal powers, expansion of county functions, 
establishment of contractual agreements and city-county separation as . 
solution to the problem. S8 
The research of Robert Horton had generally bolstered Hand and 
Grant's view that city-county consolidation was the only workable 
solution. Annexation, even under Tennessee's recently enacted 
procedure for annexation by ordinance, did not solve the problems of 
governmental overlays and duplication. In a more threatening way there 
was the fear that the potential for unilateral annexation would force 
the incorporation of many "unviable" towns around Nashville's periphery. 
The other "less than comprehensive" alternatives were rejected on 
the grounds that they would be stop-gap in nature and, in some cases, 
might even impede future consolidation efforts. Expansion of county 
services in the suburban area, for instance, was seen as permanently 
separating the government of the central city from that of the rest of 
the urban area; the "federation" model (typified by Toronto) was 
rejected due to the absence in Davidson County of any significant city 
government other than that of Nashville. 
Following the discussion of lithe metropolitan problem" and the 
rejection of non-consolidation solutions, the Plan presented both a 
S7plan of Metropolitan Government, p. i. 
S8plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 13. 
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detailed recommendation for consolidation of Nashville and Davidson 
County as well as a proposed schedule for" bringing such a government 
into existence. This latter proposal reflected both legal and political 
realities. Legally, it was sho~n that nearly two years would be 
required to implement consolidated government under the constitutionally 
appropriate process. The general schedule outlined was: 
October 1956--Publication of Plan for Metropolitan Government; 
Early 1957--passage of required enabling act by Tennessee General 
Assembly; 
May 1957--creation of Metropolitan Government Charter Commission, 
as authorized by enabling act; 
February 1958--completion of draft of consolidated government 
charter; 
May 1958--referendum on adoption of charter; 
August 1958--election of officers for new Metropolitan Government; 
September 1958--installation of new Metropolitan Government. 59 
Politically, the planning staff recognized that active support by 
both Mayor Ben West and County Judge Beverly Briley was required if 
Metropolitan Government were to come into being. Each official was 
closely tied to one of Nashville I s two newspapers--~Vest with the 
Nashville Banner and Briley with the Tennessean. In order to accommo-
date West's assumed preferences for annexation (and to also allow 
certain service extensions to get underway prior to 1958), the planners 
59Plan of Metropolitan Government, pp. 68-69. 
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devised the strategy of recommending that annexation of highly urbanized 
areas take place first, to be fOflowed by the consolidation of county 
60 and city as per schedule. It was anticipated that this two-step 
implementation of governmental reform would satisfy both the Mayor and 
the Judge (each hoping, no doubt, that the "other half" of the plan 
would never be carried outl), 
The plan for consolidated government itself was highlighted by the 
abolishment of both city and county governments and the creation of an 
entirely new government-the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 
Davidson Coun,ty. Only several constitutionally-required county offices 
remained. The basic structure of the proposed new government was 
briefly outlined in the plan. It consisted of "a representative" 
metropolitan council to serve as the single legislative body for the 
entire area. The issues of size and constituencies were left open with 
the suggestion that some members represent wards and others be chosen 
at-large. A single "elective chief executive'· with "administrative 
authority commonly possessed by a mayor" was recommended. This person 
would sit atop an executive structure of merged departments and agencies 
with only a few "independent authorities, boards, commissions, and 
committees. 1f61 The organization charts which accompanied the text 
outlined a streamlined form of government, one which obviously would 
have to be reviewed by the careful eyes of the proposed Charter 
60Hawkins Interview; Brett Hawkins, pp. 39-40. 
6lPlan of Metropolitan Government, pp. 29-30. 
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Commission which would have to undertake the delicate task of merging 
city and county functions, officials, and employees. 
Following the overview of the structure of the proposed government, 
the staff presented a critical feature of the new government; the 
creation of two "service districts." These districts would outline both 
the provision and financing of public services throughout the county. 
The entire county would comprise the "General Services District." This 
district would receive "all of those general services which are required 
on an area-wide basis . . A second district "the Urban Services 
District, I! was created to initially include the "urban areal! of the City 
of Nashville at the time of the creation of consolidated government. 
This district would receive additional services "normally required in 
urban areas. 1I63 Tax levies in each district would reflect the unique 
package of services delivered. An important feature of the Urban 
Services District proposal was the "expandable" nature of -the District: 
As areas within the General Services District come to need 
urban services and the new government becomes able to provide 
such services in a reasonable period, the Urban Services 
District would be expanded to include such areas. Such 
expansion would be accomplished through action of the t<Ietro-
politan Council, either by petition and referendum or on its 
own initiative in accordance with specified criteria and 
policies. 64 
The plan proposed the following allocation of services between the 
two districts: 
62Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 31. 
63Ibid . 
64Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 33. 
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General Services District (countywide) 














Urban Services District 
Police (Class I) 

















Refuse Collection and Disposal 
Wine and ~niskey·Supervision 
Taxicab Regulation65 
Three important features of the proposed government were closely 
tied to the method of delivering and financing urban services: (1) the 
creation of the two service districts, (2) the allocation of services 
between the districts, and (3) the expandable character of the Urban 
Services District. Given the research interest outlined in the opening 
chapter, the origins of each of these features require elaboration and 
examination. 
The Origin of the Service-District Concept Itself 
The fact that the members of the Community Services Commission had 
rejected a recommendation for consolidated government underscored their 
view that since all public services could not be delivered countywide 
and since the constitution required a countywide tax rate, annexation 
65plan of Metropolitan Government, Appendix D. 
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was the only way to preserve an urban service-and-tax area (the City of 
Nashville). As previously discussed, the 1953 Constitutional amendment 
permitting consolidated government implied the legality of a dual 
tax-rate under such a government. After considerable discussion, 
planning staff members, in 1955, also rejected any effort to extend all 
bl"" "d 66 pu 1C serV1ces countyw1 e. The staff also rejected the possibility 
of financing "high-density!! services purely through service charges and 
user fees. Such an alternative raised serious questions of long-term 
financial stability. Staff analysts had difficulty in predicting the 
67 long-term consequences of such a fee system. Instead, they decided to 
take advantage of the apparent legality of a dual-tax rate in a 
consolidated area and create an "urban service area" overlaid on a 
portion of the county. This area would provide a "service package of 
all things which cannot be done with general, countywide taxes.,,68 It 
was clear that such services would be those normally provided by cities 
but not by counties, especially those containing a significant rural 
area. This view was primarily based upon the financial and administra-
tive considerations of providing urban services to urban areas. The 
creation of an urban services district, complete with its own tax rate, 
permitted urban service planning and financing within consolidated 
government. It did not raise the problems of responsibility and 
coordination associatied with "special service districts" which would 
have remained autonomous from consolidated government control. It is 
66Hawkins Interview. 68Ibid • 
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significant to note that the planners specifically mentioned their 
concerns with such service districts. They addressed head-on the need 
for an ultimate elimination of these districts, first in the Urban 
Services District and then in the General Services District. 
A second rationale was also used for the creation of the urban 
services district. The Constitutional amendment permitting conso1ida-
tion required a separate referendum on consolidation in both city and 
county areas. It took little imagination to see the political need for 
a way of assuring voters in county areas that their taxes would not be 
raised to pay for services they felt they would not receive in a short 
period of time. The recent (1955) passage of the annexation by 
ordinance law tended to heighten these concerns. Although they cite 
financial consideration as the prime rationale, planning staff members 
of the time readily concede that creation of two service districts with 
two tax-rates had the potential for placating suburbanite and rural 
'd 69 reS1 ents. In the four-page review of the Plan carried in the 
Tennessean, the political attractiveness of the service-district concept 
was highlighted. 
1. Question: How is it possible to avoid taxing parts of the 
metropolitan area for urban services long before such 
services are received? 
Answer: By creating two service districts . • .. The tax 
levy in the two service districts would be in direct 
ratio of the cost of the urban services to the cost of 
general services, taking into consideration all sources of 
revenue and their application. 70 
69Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview; Hand Correspondence. 
70The Tennessean, October 30, 1956. 
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Although reference to a "timetable" of Urban Services District 
expansion in the Plan related to the proqlems of taxes paid and services 
received, it also suggested a third rationale of the service district 
concept. As highlighted in the first chapter of this study, the 
scheduled extension of urban services can be a mechanism for managing 
urban development. Interviews with several members of the planning 
staff who developed the service district concept suggest that this 
consideration was present in their discussions, but the issues it raised 
were considered to be nearly moot given the vast service deficiencies in 
areas already urbanized. 7l The thought of managing new urban develop-
ment with service extension policies was academic at best and irrelevant 
at worst. The Executive Director of the joint planning staff at the 
time pointed out that subdivision controls were actively used to control 
the quality of residential developments, but that any thought of tying 
residential growth in the county to the provision of such urban services 
as sanitary sewers was ridiculous when one considered the 130,000 
suburban residents who were already dependent on potentially hazardous 
septic tank sewage systems. 72 In a way analogous to Dr. Greene's 
feelings four years earlier, the planners could dream of their service 
district creation as a device for managing development, but, in practical 
terms, it was devised to serve financial, administrative and political 
ends within a framework of consolidated government. 
7lHawkins Interview; Horton Interview. 
72Hawkins Interview. 
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The Allocation of Services 
As previously stated, the primary function of the Urban Services 
District was to provide and finance those services required in the more 
densely populated urban area. Staff studies, based mainly on the 
earlier Community Services Commission report, were conducted to 
determine those services which could be "reasonably financed and 
administeredt! on a countywide basis. The services remaining were then 
allocated to the Urban Services District. Certain services presented no 
real problem once the assumption of a single metropolitan government was 
made. The obvious candidates for the General Services District were; 
health, welfare, hospitals, courts, jails, streets and roads, schools, 
parks and recreation, auditorium, planning and zoning, codes enforcement. 
Likewise, there was little debate over the "urban services" nature of 
street lighting, street cleaning, and storm sewer provision. The issues 
emerged over the allocation of police, fire, refuse collection, water 
and sanitary sewers provision. In the case of sanitary sewers, there 
was Ii ttl e debate over the need for an lIurban service" classification. 
The difficult issue became the means of financing their construction, 
given the tremendous backlog of needs in the suburban areas. The 
existence of a maze of water systems in the suburban area raised a 
similar issue for water service. The combined response was to classify 
each as an urban service and leave open the issue of financing for 
future determination. In the case of water service, it was anticipated 
that water districts existing within the G.S.D. could contract with or 
be taken over by the consolidated government. 
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Police and fire protection raised the more fundamental issue: 
exactly what is meant by "urban service"? The existence of an 
over-extended sheriff's office and subscription security forces in the 
county area had been often cited as a major deficiency of county 
73 C I'd' "d f f "d' government. onso 1 atlon requlre some orm 0 countywl e pollce 
protection, but staff studies by Robert Horton revealed that the cost of 
countywide police protection equal to that required in the urban areas 
would be prohibitive. 74 The staff finally recommended the splitting of 
police protection into two levels- IIClass II! (U.S.D.) and "generalll 
(General Services District). Factors such as patrol intensity and 
reaction time were used to make the distinction. 
The fire protection issue also was reflected in a confused pattern 
of private subscription companies and districts in the county area. The 
existence of few water lines greater than 2" in diameter throughout the 
county compounded the issue and linked it to the consideration of water 
supply. The staff finally recommended that Class 3 fire protection be 
considered in the Urban Services District while General Services 
District fire protection be provided on a "rural" level (generally 
Clas.s 10). 
Refuse collection and disposal was made an urban services function. 
Although there were extensive private garbage collection firms in the 
county it was decided to maintain garbage disposal as an Urban Services 
73See A Future For Nashville, pp. 97-108. 
74Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview. 
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District function, allowing the private collectors to use government 
facilities on a fee basis. 
It is important to note that the Plan, in allocating these services, 
stressed the need to "package" all services ultimately deemed as 
"urban." Only in the case of water supply was there provision for 
extension of anyone urban service beyond the U.S.D. boundary. The 
planners emphasized that the financial and administrative soundness of 
the service district concept depended on the maintenance of two distinct 
service levels the boundaries of which would be determined by the level 
of urbanization. 75 
U.S.D. Boundaries and Provision for Extension 
The 1956 Plan stressed that the boundaries of the Urban Services 
District should IIconsi{t of that part of the General Services District 
that requires urban services.,,76 Although the planning staff 
theoretically included in this area not only the City of Nashville but 
also the urbanized area around the city, they realized the practicality 
in defining the initial U.S.D. boundaries as being identical with those 
of the city at the time of consolidation. They anticipated that some 
annexation would occur between the publication of the Plan and the 
77 installation of consolidated government. Further, they assumed that 
75 Ibid . 
76P1an of Metropolitan Government, p. 31. 
77Brett Hawkins, pp. 39-40. 
extension of the Urban Services District would occur as rapidly as the 
new government could provide the appropriate services. 78 
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Although the initial Plan left the actual method open, it suggested 
that extension of U.S.D. boundaries would occur "through the action of 
the Metropolitan Council either by petition and referendum or on its own 
initiative in accordance with specified criteria and pOlicies. 1I79 As 
has already been suggested, the rationale for expansion of the U.S.D. 
was anticipated to be the need for servicing existing urban development. 
Such services would be provided according t'o a "timetable" made clear at 
the time of U.S.D. expansion. Although legal requirement for the 
implementation of such a "timetable" was later attached to the proposal 
for consolidated government, the Plan followed the flavor of the new 
Tennessee annexation law in remaining vague on the precise requirements 
for tying urban service delivery schedules to expansion of the U.S.D. 
Nevertheless, the authors of the Plan, in providing for an expandable 
district receiving a distinctive package of urban services originated a 
concept which "was rational, made sense, seemed fair and was expected to 
be cost-effective. II8D Their judgment seems correct in view of the fact 
that during the seven years following the publication of the Plan, the 
U.S.D.-G.S.D. scheme remained basically intact while consolidated 
government was debated and finally implemented. 
78Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview. 
79Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 33. 
80 Hand Correspondence. 
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II. IMPLEMENTATION: 1956-1963 
Most accounts of the consolid~tion of Nashville and Davidson County 
place greatest emphasis on the period following the publication of the 
Plan in 1956. This study, in focusing on the service district concept, 
deviates from that pattern. After the publication of the Plan, the 
service district idea remained at the heart of the proposed form of 
government. Although the questions of services and taxes were central 
in the two referendum campaigns, the governmental mechanism for handling 
them was repeated in both proposed Charters with little change. The 
dynamics of the two campaigns were provided by the behavior and 
alignment of the Mayor, the County Judge, the two newspapers land various 
voting groups. The proposed structure of the new government remained 
remarkably intact. 
1957 Enabling Legislation 
Some debate exists regarding the reactions of Mayor West and Judge 
Briley to the 1956 Plan. The Executive Director of the Joint Planning 
Commission staff described the initial response of each as positive. 8l 
He recalled that West, after his first exposure to the Plan, waited 
until the publisher of the Banner indicated his support to give a 
positive response. At the same session, Briley and the Tennessean 
expressed their long-standing commitment to consolidated government. 
Dan Grant, in reviewing the same period, pointed out that although the 
8lH k' I . aw 1ns nterv1ew. 
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Mayor and Judge weren't exhuberant in their support for the Plan, they 
d . d . t 82 H h . h . W 1 not oppose 1 . e went on to suggest t at e1t er Br1ley or est, 
at this point, could have blocked the move to consolidated government by 
obstructing the process of obtaining and implementing the required 
enabling legislation. That they did not, he claimed, was IIsomething of 
a political miracle," proving the success of the planners r strategy for 
including both annexation and consolidation in the Plan. 83 It should 
also be noted that both Briley and West, at this time, had reason to 
believe that they might become the Mayor of the new consolidated 
government. 
In order to secure the appropriate enabling legislation, the 
planning staff retained the highly regarded attorney who had headed the 
Community Services Commission, Edwin Hunt, to draft the required bill. 
Hunt, together with Charles Hawkins and other planners then met with the 
Davidson County delegation in November 1956. The legislators presented 
"good objective questions" but raised "no serious objections" to the 
proposed legislation. 84 Since the enabling legislation had to be 
general, not private, it was necessary to engage in some logrolling to 
secure passage in the legislature. This done, the 1957 Tennessee 
General Assembly passed legislation implementing the 1953 Constitutional 
82 Grant, "Professional Political Leadership: The Case of Nashville, If 
p. 77. 
83Ibid • 
84Hawkins Interview; Daniel J. Elazar, A Case Study of 
Failure in Attempted Metropolitan Integration: Nashville and Davidson 
County, Tennessee (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1961), 
pp. 23-25; Brett Hawkins, p. 42. 
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85 amendment provision permitting consolidated government. The Act 
specified a procedure for creating a charter commission through action 
by the county and city legislative bodies in passing identical 
resolutions. The Act then went on to spell out certain features which 
were required in any proposed charter, including the provision for two 
service districts as first outlined in the 1956 Plan. The Act provided: 
(e) For two (2) service districts within the geographical 
limits of the metropolitan government, to wit, a general 
services district and an urban services district, as to both 
of which districts the metropolitan government shall have 
jurisdiction and authority. The general services district 
shall consist of the total area of the county. The urban 
services district shall consist originally of the total area 
of the principal city at the time of the filing of the 
proposed charter with the county commissioners of election • 
(f) That the area of the urban services district may be 
expanded and its territorial limits extended by annexation 
whenever particular areas of the general services district 
come to need urban services and the metropolitan government 
becomes able to provide such service within a reasonable 
period. Such annexation shall be under provisions and 
limitations specified in the charter, consistent with those 
provided by §§6-308--6-3l2. 
(g) For the functions of the metropolitan government which 
shall be performed throughout the entire general services 
district and the government services which shall be rendered 
in said district. 
(h) That the tax levy for the general services district 
shall be set so as to be sufficient, with other available 
funds and grants, to defray the cost of all governmental 
services which are provided generally throughout or on behalf 
of said district. 
(i) For the functions of the metropolitan government which 
shall be performed within the urban services district and the 
governmental services which shall be rendered in said district. 
(j) That the tax levy for the urban services district 
shall be set so as to be sufficient, with other available 
funds and grants, to defray the cost of municipal-type 
governmental services which are provided within said district. 
85 Tennessee, Public Acts of Tennessee, 1957, Chapter 120. 
(k) For a metropolitan council. which shall be the 
legislative body of the metropolitan government and shall be 
given all the authority and functions of the governing bodies 
of the county and cities being consolidated. with such 
exceptions and with such additional authority as may be 
specified elsewhere in this charter. 86 
In drafting this enabling legislation. Hunt presented the General 
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Assembly a carefully prepared expression of the Plan's service district 
concept which was consistent with existing state law and acceptable to 
most legislators. The creation of an "Urban Council." for instance. 
retained the "municipal corporation" for purposes of establishing the 
U.S.D. tax rate and insured that allocation of state-collected taxes. 
such as the gasoline tax. would distinguish between" the urban and 
non-urban areas of any consolidated metropolitan government. 
1958 Charter Commission and Referendum 
Both the County Quarterly Court and the City Council moved swiftly 
to establish a Metropolitan Charter Commission. 87 It has generally 
concluded that the Commission they created was representative of most 
area interests. including blacks. It has also been accepted that the 
Commission was hardworking and attempted to avoid petty political 
concern. S8 Staff assistance was provided to the Commission by the 
Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint Planning Commissions 
(the same staff who had prepared the 1956 Plan). This support was 
S6Miche1man and Sandalow, pp. 966-967. 
87 From this point on in the text, "Metro" refers to either the 
proposed or actual consolidated government of Nashville and Davidson 
County. 
88Brett Hawkins, p. 44. 
underwritten with federal urban planning assistance funds, as had been 
the preparation of the 1956 Plan. 89 Edwin Hunt, who became legal 
consultant to the Charter Commission, oversaw the drafting of the 
pr.oposed charter itself. He, along with the planners under Charles 
Hawkins and Irving Hand and with the continuing advice of Dan Grant, 
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guided the Commission into the preparation of the proposed charter which 
differed very little from the 1956 Plan. Changes were in the nature of 
refinement, not substantive revision. 
One issue faced by the Commission and not dealt with in the Plan 
was the size and districting of the proposed Metropolitan Council. The 
1958 Commission emphasized the need for a "workable size" and the 
guarantee of black representation. They proposed a Council of 21 
members (6 at-large, 15 from districts) with district boundaries 
90 guaranteeing at least two black seats. The fact that the size of this 
proposed Council was less than one-third that of the combined Quarterly 
Court-City Council became an issue in subsequent events. In addition, 
a considerable amount of the Commission's time was devoted to the 
tedious but critical question of civil service and pensions, realloca-
tion of city and county bonded indebtedness, the merger of the city and 
county school systems and so on. As two close observers concluded, "the 
Charter seemed to be free of flagrant pitfalls of the type that might 
h d d f th b .. f' l'd . ,,91 ave etracte rom e aS1C lssue 0 CltY-COunty canso 1 atlon. 
89Planning Activities--1957-1960, pp. 40-42. 
90Brett Hawkins, p. 45. 91 Grant and Greene, p. 6. 
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The proposed charter's provisions for two service districts 
remained basically identical to those presented in the 1956 Plan. An 
important refinement included the requirement that expansion of the 
U.S.D. not only be tied to the need of particular areas for urban 
services, but also to the capability of Metro "to provide such service 
within a reasonable period, which shall not be greater than one year after 
92 ad valorem taxes in the annexed area became due" (Sec. 1.04 Proposed 
Metropolitan Government Charter). 
With the exception of fire protection and solid waste services, the 
allocation of services between the two service districts remained the 
same as that presented in the 1956 Plan. The Charter Commission 
resolved the continuing dilemma over urban and rural fire service levels 
by simply omitting fire protection as a G.S.D. function. This, in 
effect, left G.S.D. residents dependent on the private and fire-district 
fire services already present in the area. Similarly, refuse collection 
was made a U.S.D. function while refuse disposal was made a G.S.D. 
function. Private garbage collectors were therefore left as the primary 
means for refuse collection outside the U.S.D. Table 2.3 indicates the 
full allocation of functions and services described in Section 1.05 of 
the Proposed Charter. The Commission left open the possibility of 
shifting this allocation: 
Nothing in the section shall be deemed to limit the power of 
Metropolitan Government to exercise other governmental 
functions in either U.S.D. or the G.S.D., or to provide new 
92"Proposed Metropolitan Government Charter," (unpublished document 
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and additional governmental services in either the U.S.D. or 
the G.S.D.93 (Proposed Charter, Sec. 1.05, p. 3) 
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The politics of the 1958 referendum on the proposed charter have 
been told elsewhere. 94 Following a campaign led by both Mayor West and 
Judge Briley together with business leaders, planners and other 
community elites, the voters of the city voted in favor of Metro while 
the county voters rejected it. Although a number of theories have been 
advanced to explain this outcome, it seems clear that the proponents of 
Metro were not able to overcome the. fear of "higher taxes without better 
• II • d 95 serV1ces among county reS1 ents. These fears were encouraged by 
private service companies, county employees and others who perceived a 
threat to their position by the proposed metropolitan government. 
A review of all available accounts of the 1958 referendum finds no 
evidence of substantial structural criticism of the proposed arrangement 
for the two service districts. Opponents simply ignored the protection 
against inappropriate urban taxation provided by the service district 
concept and preyed upon the fears of higher taxes imposed by a 
"dictatorial city regime." Although the plan for Metro nurtured by the 
planning staff since its origin with the Community Services Commission 
report was supported by a broad cross-section of city and county elites 
and organizations, its promotion failed to overcome the typical fears of 
93Ibid . 
94Brett Hawkins; Elazar; David Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville 
Consolidation (East Lansing: Michigan University, 1963). 
95 Elazar, p. 100. 
! 
residents outside the city. The 1958 vote seemed consistent with the 
fate of such proposals in other cities during the same period. 96 · 
The Annexation Period 
The events of the four years following the 1958 referendum were 
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significant both in that they set the stage for .the success of the 1962 
proposal for consolidated government and that during this period the 
boundaries of the City of Nashville changed dramatically. The former 
relates to the politics of Metro's birth, while the latter is of 
significance in that the size of the U.S.D. proposed in the 1962 Metro 
Charter was much larger than that of 1958. 
Immediately after the defeat of the Metro proposal in June 1958, 
Mayor West and the City Council utilized Tennessee's 1955 annexation law 
to bring into the city some seven square miles of primarily industrial 
territory (with a population of 2,000). Two years later the city 
annexed another 42 square miles of primarily residential areas 
containing 80,000 residents (see Figure 2.3). The effect of these two 
annexations was a tripling of the area of the city and an increase in 
population from 173,000 to 254,000. West's own comments on these two 
annexations reflect the city's continuing concern for the failure to 
expand city boundaries as urban growth occurred: 
That question (proposed Metro Charter) had been submitted to 
the people by vote in 1958 . . . and the people of the commu-
nity turned it down .... Following that, this was the first 
annexation, it being anticipated as part of the Metropolitan 
Government Plan that the Urban Services District would be the 





Figure 2.3. Annexations, City of Nashville, 
1958-1962. 
Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission. 
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present City and that annexations would proceed immediately to 
encompass in the U.S.D. all that is developed and urban. We 
have a principle in municipal government, which we think has 
been accepted generally, that everything that's urban should 
be municipal. 97 
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In the same statement, West went on to outline and defend his annexation 
scheme: 
• it was thought by the Executive Branch of the Government 
and members of the Legislative Branch, after the failure of the 
Metropolitan Plan proposal, that the existence of this City, 
future existence, its health and welfare depended on an orderly 
program of annexation, and that the first . . . being commer-
cial and industrial . . . should precede any residential 
annexation. Furthermore, it was thought that in order to have 
a properly balanced community, this should proceed without a 
vote of the few residents who were in the industrial area, 
because we didn't feel the future of the whole 'community 
should depend upon the vote of a few who lived in the indus-
trial area. It was also thought that subsequently the 
residential area should be annexed and that is where the City 
Council and I had a division of opinion as to the method of 
procedure. It has been my opinion as to the people should, 
and in my opinion, would have voted themselves in if the 
matter had been explained to them. . . . The Council, 
however, felt that the matter was so urgent that they pro-
ceeded on a second step of annexation and annexed 42 square 
miles and 80,000 residents ... essentially residential. 98 
There has been much discussion of the depth of West's sincerity in 
wanting a referendum in the residential area, but the outcome was clear: 
82,000 persons, whether they liked it or not, were brought into the city. 
Probably the most important consequence of these two annexations 
was the reversal of suburban attitudes toward Metro--especially in the 
areas annexed. The anger at being brought into the city without any 
vote contributed to significant "anti-West" sentiment. Likewise, county 
97Planned Progress Through Annexation (Nashville: Public Relations 
Department, City of Nashville, n.d.), p. 6. 
98Planned Progress Through Annexation, p. 15. 
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residents feared that the city would "reach out again" and bring them 
into the city without any guarantee of urban services. Supported by the 
continuing pro-Metro orientation of Judge Briley and The Tennessean, 
this sentiment, many observers have argued, added county voices, 
previously anti-Metro, to the pro-Metro cause. It should also be noted 
that Mayor West and the City Council had further angered suburban 
residents through the strict implementation of a IIgreen sticker" law 
which required all motor vehicles using Nashville's streets for thirty 
days Or more to pay what amounted to an auto tax. West again justified 
the act on the basis of the city's expensive "subsidizing" of suburban 
residents who commuted into the city. 
Committed to annexation rather than consolidation, West, a majority 
of the City Council, and the Nashville Banner therefore focused 
primarily on the problem of extending city services to the urbanized 
areas of the county. Although planning staff members recognized the 
validity of annexation as one means for dealing with the service needs 
of these areas, they still were committed to a long-term policy of 
consolidation which would not only better SSrve urbanized areas but also 
deal with city-county friction, duplicate services and functions, complex 
city-county financial relationships, control over potential growth areas, 
and so on. The planning staff was in an awkward position. The Mayor 
needed staff support to develop an annexation strategy while the staff. 
along with Judge Briley and others, were still committed to the creation 
of Metro. The Executive Director was frequently placed in extremely 
74 
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, , 99 
stress u s1tuat10ns. In spite of the annexations, it was clear that 
the Metro issue was not dead. 
The second consequence of the annexation period was the dramatic 
change in the boundaries of the City of Nashville. Relying heavily on 
planning staff data (much of which originated with the Community Service 
Commission report of 1952) the Mayor himself helped draw the boundaries 
included in the two annexation resolutions. lOO The 1958 resolution 
brought in extremely valuable industrial territory, particularly on 
Cockrill Bend, the current Metro-Center area, and the commercial areas 
near Murfreesboro Pike and Spence Lane. Each of these areas have 
subsequently become well-developed, contributing significant urban 
service taxes. Not only did the Mayor claim that these areas were 
already developed to the point that they should be included in the city, 
but he also stressed the city's need to replace the tax losses created 
by the conversion of over 6,000 parcels of land into the area's 
interstate highway system, the extensive urban renewal program, and the 
growth of governmental, religious and educational institutions in the 
't 101 C1 y. Politically, it is obvious that annexation of the commercial 
and industrial areas first was intended to ease the pain expected with 
any residential annexation by ordinance. 
The boundaries of the second annexation drew heavily on residential 
density, service patterns and likelihood for immediate development. 
99Hawkins Interview. 
100H k' It' HI' aw 1ns n erv1ew; orton nterv1ew. 
101 Planned Progress Through Annexation, p. 7. 
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Most of the area annexed had also been included in the earlier 
annexation recommendation made in the Community Services Commission 
report. (It is important to note that the Tennessee State Supreme 
Court. in upholding the validity of the City annexation. cited the 1952 
C . S . C . . 102) ommun1ty erV1ce omm1SS10n report. With the exception of the 
remainder of Cockrill Bend, the City Airport. the Radnor Railroad Yards, 
Tennessee State University. and the Cornelia Fort Airport-East Nashville 
areas, the second annexation drew in well-developed suburban neighbor-
hoods, most without sanitary sewers. In March 1961, the city extended 
police, fire and garbage collection services to the entire annexed area. 
During the same year. some $5.5 million worth of general obligation 
b d ld b · . f k I' 103 on s were so to eg1n construct1on 0 trun sewer 1nes. Still • 
there remained bitter issues of proper tax rates, school zoning. and 
water system consolidation. While Judge Briley, The Tennessean. and 
other pro-Metro forces used these issues to point out the absence of a 
"plan of services ll for the newly annexed areas. it remained that any new 
attempt to install consolidated government would face a much-expanded 
city with a commitment to provide urban services to an under-serviced 
area of some 40 square miles and 80,000 people. 
The 1962 Charter Commission and Referendum 
The commitment of Mayor West and the city to a strategy of 
annexation rather than consolidation altered drastically the alignment 
102Michelman and Sandalow, pp. 967-969. 
l03Brett Hawkins. p. 65. 
of forces in the second attempt to install Metro. Judge Briley, The 
Tennessean~ a majority of the County Quarterly Court~ and most of the 
community business leaders pressed for consolidation. Blocked by the 
refusal of the City Council to participate in the formation of a new 
Charter Commission~ pro-Metro forces were able to convince the County 
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Legislative Delegation to secure passage of a private act permitting the 
formation of a charter commission by referendum in both the city and 
county areas. In August 1961~ voters in both areas easily approved the 
formation of a new charter commission. 
The 1962 charter commission consisted of almost the same membership 
as the 1958 commission. Staff assistance was again provided by the 
Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint Planning Commissions. 
Edwin Hunt again provided his valued legal leadership. An important 
issue quickly addressed by the Commission was that of the proposed Metro 
Council's size and districting. There was strong feeling that the first 
Metro proposal sharply limited the political opportunities of the many 
members of the City Council and County Quarterly Court. Sensitive to 
the political implications, the second commission proposed a 41-member 
104 Metropolitan Council, with six members being elected at-large. 
This recommendation for a larger council coupled with the greatly 
enlarged population and area of the city offered the commission an 
opportunity to inhibit the development of a "we-they" U.S.D.-G.S.D. 
schism on the proposed new Council. In preparing the proposed 
l04H I .. orton nterv1ew. 
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councilmanic districts, the staff not only again preserved black 
representation but they also created a majority of districts to include 
105 both U.S.D. and G.S.D. areas. The proposal was also intended to give 
a majority of councilmen a significant constituency of U.S.D. residents 
in the newly annexed area--a move designed to prompt Council support for 
rapid servicing of this area. The enlargement of the city through the 
West annexations made this arrangement quite feasible and necessary, 
from the planners' perspective. l06 
The Charter Commission made other minor changes, but none which 
affected the urban services provisions or general planning arrangements. 
Again, the soundness of the original conceptualization coupled with the 
consistency of staff advice was significant. Although the method for 
expanding the U.S.D. provided in the 1962 Proposed Charter was the same 
as that of 1958, the entire procedure received much more attention during 
the second referendum campaign. This was the obvious consequence of the 
issues raised by the 1958 and 1960 annexations. l07 The commission felt 
that the provision requiring service deliveries "within one year after 
ad valorem taxes in the annexed area became due" was far more protective 
of suburban interests than the current annexation law which, at that 
time, did not require even a plan of services for the area to be 
108 annexed. It was common knowledge that the city had prepared no plan 
of services prior to the 1958 and 1960 annexations. l09 
105Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview. 
106Ibid . 107Brett Hawkins, p. 75. 
108Brett Hawkins, p. 63. 109Ibid .; Hawkins Interview. 
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The 1962 referendum campaign differed from the 1958 campaign in at 
least three significant ways. First, there existed some 82,000 
residents brought into the city through annexation by ordinance. 
Second. the Mayor and a major newspaper, the Nashville Banner, now 
opposed consolidation. Third, the pro-Metro forces, remembering the 
failure of 1958, more carefully and intensively organized a grassroots 
campaign in favor of the proposed charter. 
The impact of the West annexations served to provide a new, active 
group of Metro supporters within the city. It also heightened the fears 
in the county of future unilateral annexations. The Metro proposal was 
perceived by many as the only way to lfhave a voice lf in the extension of 
both urban services and taxes to these areas. The proponents' strategy, 
developed by the Nashville Tennessean and a group of community leaders, 
the Citizens for Better Government, stressed the fact that under Metro, 
decisions on service extension and the accompanying urban service 
district taxes would be made by the Metropolitan Council, representative 
of 35 districts and an at-large constituency. lID 
The op~osition of Mayor West prompted the proponents to charge that 
he was indulging in politics due to the fact that he probably had little 
III chance of being elected Metro Mayor. This charge was given some 
validity by virtue of the minor differences between the 1962 proposed 
charter and that of 1958, which West had supported. West, in turn, 
l10B H k' 78 80 rett aw lns, pp. - . 
IllIbid.: Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview. 
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focused his campaign on the city. His alleged use of city employees in 
this effort further contributed to charges of politics in the campaign. 
Ultimately, the campaign boiled down to the West-dominated city 
political machine supported by the Banner, versus the well-organized 
pro-Metro forces, led by the Citizens for Better Government, community 
elites, the Tennessean, supported by Judge Briley and the planning group 
112 who originally designed the Metro proposal. 
The outcome of both referenda is presented in Table 2.4. The anger 




VOTES IN 1958 AND 1962 REFERENDA ON METROPOLITAN 















Although there have been various minor differences in interpreting the 
outcome of the 1962 referendum, there is little doubt that Metro came 
into existence because of fears of "taxation without representation" and 
"services promised but not delivered.,,1l4 The irony is that these same 
ll2See Daniel R. Grant, "Metropoli tics and Professional Political 
Leadership: The Case of Nashville," pp. 72-83. 
l13Brett Hawkins, pp. 78-80. 
ll4Grant, "Metropolitics and Professional Political Leadership:" The 
Case of Nash vi lle,!t pp. 80-8 L 
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fears led to the defeat of Metro in 1958! It seems clear that many 
voters who had accepted the general arguments favoring Metro in 1958 
continued to support Metro in 1962. What the aUIhors and proponents of 
Metro had failed to do in 1958--mobilize apathetic voters and moderate 
votes of fear--was done in 1962, both by their own campaign and by the 
reaction to the annexations of 1958 and 1960. 
In Chapter I, reference was made to the general view that 
sufficient votes in favor of consolidation could not be mustered through 
appeals to the "rationality" of consolidation alone. "Unusual 
circumstances" were generally required to foster a posi ti ve vote. 115 In 
the case of Nashville, it seems clear that the impact of anger and worry 
over city taxes and urban services provided. the "unusual circumstance" 
in 1962. To the extent that this "reactive" vote supplemented the base 
of those positively committed to Metro, the theory seems confirmed. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
The rationale for this retracing of Metro's birth was presented at 
the outset of the chapter: what led to the creation of the service 
district concept, and more specifically, what were the developmental 
dimensions of these origins? The history just reviewed suggests several 
responses to the questions. 
1. The service district concept originated not through political 
or technical evolution but came from an early and consistent 
ll5See Walter Rosenbaum and Thomas Henderson, "Explaining 
Comprehensive Governmental Consolidation: Toward a Preliminary Theory," 
Journal of PoU tics, (May, 1972). 
conceptualization held by a cohesive group of governmental 
planners. 
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2. The primary rationale for the service district concept was a 
clustering of financial, administrative and legal considerations 
bolstered by an absence of political ignorance. Although 
present in the hearts of most of these planners, long-term 
deveiopmental concerns were of secondary significance. 
Environmental-technical considerations likewise were supportive, 
but not primary. 
3. Al though lip service was paid to "long-range management of 
urban development," the prevailing development environment 
throughout Metro birth was one of "catching up and keeping up" 
with urban growth. This orientation prompted the very idea of 
a consolidated government and guided the implementation of the 
urban services concept. 
Any reading of the previous pages and accounts of the events they 
describe makes it clear that the planning group associated with the 
Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint planning staff 
fathered the services district concept. Building on the service patterns 
outlined in the 1952 Community Services Commission report, Charles 
Hawkins, Irving Hand, Robert Horton, Dan Grant and their legal facili~ 
tator, Edwin Hunt, created the proposal for an expandable U.S.D. and a 
countywide G.S.D. This proposal, first appearing in the 1956 Plan, 
remained intact through both charter commissions and was implemented 
with the installation of Metro in 1963. The positive ties between these 
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planners and area elites facilitated the continued integrity of their 
scheme. The unity of their commitment was demonstrated by their loyalty 
to consolidation during the 1958 and 1960 annexations when Mayor West 
pressed for an alternative method of supplying and financing urban 
services. 
Interviews with several members of the planning team have drawn the 
feeling that the service district scheme was just plain "comon sense." 
TQ this group that was perhaps the case. Under consolidated government, 
however, there were other options including the continued use of special 
purpose districts, a system of contracting with private service 
providers, extension of all services countywide, creation of several 
urban service areas, and so on. Early staff studies focused on the best 
way to finance and administer services under a consolidated government. 
The early pages of this chapter point out the heavy reliance on the 
financial and administrative findings in Future of Nashville. Once the 
legal hurdle of a required uniform tax rate was overcome, the logic of 
financing a package of urban services with one revenue area (the U.S.D.) 
and financing the remainder on a countywide basis (the G.S.D.) was 
compelling. It is significant that the director of the Advance Planning 
and Research Division cited the "cost-efficiency" of the scheme as a 
. 'd' 116 pr~mary cons~ erat~on. An important part of this financial rationale 
was reflected in the expandable nature of the U.S.D. Although 
administrative convenience suggested drawing the original U.S.D. 
l16Hand Correspondence. 
boundaries consistent with the old City boundaries, there was the 
expectation that these would expand quickly to encompass "the urban 
area.,,117 
The group of planners were well aware of the constitutional 
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requirement that any proposed consolidation be approved both in the city 
and non-city county areas. The service district scheme, with its 
attachment--a package of services with an urban tax rate, made good 
political sense. This link between service improvement and tax increase 
was seen as an attraction particularly to suburbanites who would fear 
consolidation much as they would annexation by ordinance. The history 
reviewed here suggests that this political consideration was seen 
primarily as a bonus flowing from the more important financial and 
administrative rationale. 
The environmental impediments to sanitary sewer construction and the 
existence of steep slopes in much of the northwestern part of the county 
supported the view that urban services be limited to an urban services 
district. The presence of a large, unsewered urban area reinforced the 
significance of financial factors in planning for urban services. The 
growing failure rate of septic tank systems made it imperative that 
planning for urban services give priority to sewer construction, no 
matter how costly. The service district concept. by avoiding 
administrative confusion and unifying revenue sources, met this 
requirement. Likewise. the unified service district concept provided a 
117H k' I . aw lns ntervlew. 
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way of preventing any obligation to provide urban services to areas 
capable of supporting little urban growth. 
Throughout the chapter mention has been made of the overriding 
concern for allowing urban services to "catch up" with urban development. 
In one sense, this view describes the general position taken by many 
planners and other officials toward "the management of development." 
This view held that growth and expansion of the Nashville urban area was 
going to continue as in the recent past therefore requiring a planning 
posture which would properly service new development while at the same 
time attempting to meet the needs of existing areas not yet fully 
serviced. In a preliminary draft of the 1956 Plan, this view was 
reflected in the listing of "standards for extension of urban services"; 
1. areas of "urgent need" 
2. areas likely to be subdivided 
3. more densely populated areas 
4. incorporated suburbs, if they so wich 
5. taxable resources of areas of lesser significance 
6. administrative and engineering. and other technical planning 
criteria. 1I8 
This is clearly a IIcatch up and keep up" view of tying service policies 
to developmental considerations. It should also be pointed out that 
throughout this entire period both the city and the county actively 
sought economic growth through industrial and commercial expansion. 
ll8See "Preliminary Draft, Proposed Plan of Metropolitan 
Government," (unpublished memorandum, City of Nashville and Davidson 
County Planning Commissions, 1956), p. 32. 
As the service district concept emerged under the proposed Metro 
Charters, the criteria suggested for expansion of the U.S.D. continued 
to reflect the "keeping up" orientation. The Metro Charter, as 
installed in 1963, states that U.S.D. expansion: 
As sections of the general services district come to need 
urban services and the new government becomes able to provide 
such services in a reasonable period, the urban services 
district should be expanded to include such areas. Such 
expansion should be accomplished through the action of the 
metropolitan council, on its own initiative and in accordance 
with specified criteria and policies, or by petition and 
referendum. 119 
To support the use of urban service district expansion to keep up 
with urban growth, a strong metropblitan planning mechanism was 
recommended along with the service district concept. Although the 
previous review of the history of Metro has focused on the two service 
districts, it should be pointed out here that both proposed charters 
included strong provisions for mandatory capital budgeting, mandatory 
referral, zoning and subdivision control and long-range comprehensive 
1 . 
120 P ann:mg. Together with the power to expand the U.S.D., these 
provisions tied the Planning Commission and the Council together in a 
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theoretically coherent arrangement to plan for future growth. "Keeping 
up," to put it another way, involved "pre-growth planning" which not 
only would anticipate areas of urban growth, but also facilitate the 
marshalling of public resources to guarantee that such growth would meet 
119"Preliminary Draft, Proposed Plan of Metropolitan Government," 
pp. 20-21 
120 .' Bo11n, pp. 144ff. 
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proper standards of "health, safety and public welfare .11121 The tools, 
as the Executive Director of the Planning Commission staff saw them, 
were a good comprehensive plan and accompanying zoning ordinance, good 
subdivision regulations and design standards, capital budgeting and a 
relationship of trust between public officials and private developers. 122 
Given the proper use of these tools, growth would occur which would then 
become suitable for inclusion in the U.S.D. Perhaps this view of the 
developmental application of the service district concept can best be 
described as "anticipatory keeping up." 
The degree to which such "anticipatory" planning can actually 
modify development pressures is the heart of the "management of 
development" issue raised in the first chapter. The preceding comments 
are intended to suggest that in creating the service district portion of 
Metro's design, the Advance Planning and Research team foresaw changes 
in U.S.D. boundaries as a response to urban growth which had been 
anticipated, monitored and regulated through such traditional planning 
tools as zoning and subdivision controls. That U.S.D.-G.S.D. policies 
were not identified with guiding future development should not seem 
surprising given that Metro faced a 30-year backlog on providing urban 
services to urbanized areas. 
Although more will be said on the subject in the following pages, 
there was also an awareness that control of Metro's development, by 
whatever means, could not deal with growth throughout the region. Dan 
12lH k' I . aw 1ns nterv1ew. 122Ibid • 
Grant, in responding to his own questioning of Metro's development 
objectives, wrote the following just after Metro came into existence: 
The prediction of a If truly progressive" solution to the 
perplexing problem of guiding urban growth in the suburban 
and rural fringe is already being borne out in certain limited 
respects under Metro, but the bulk of evidence pro or con 
still lies well in the future . . . . There is one haunting 
question which needs to be mentioned in any attempt to 
evaluate the prediction . . . . What can Metro do if Nash-
ville's six projected expressway spokes hurl much of the 
City's new population growth out into the six adjoining 
counties?123 
Grant correctly anticipated the impact of interstate construction upon 
urban growth in the Nashville area. Later material will show the 
tremendous growth which has occurred in the counties surrounding 
Davidson, facilitated greatly by the easy access provided between 
non-Davidson suburban residential areas and Davidson County employment 
and retail centers. 
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The remainder of this study certainly does not ignore the extent to 
which issues of development in Metro Nashville are imbedded in the 
developmental pattern of the region. However, in view of the fact that 
Metro's political boundaries are not likely to be changed in the near 
future, the study concentrates on the management of development within 
the unquestioned jurisdiction of the government of Metro Nashville. 
This historical review suggests that the origin of the two service 
districts in Metro lay with a concern by Metro's founders for a workable 
l23Grant, Daniel R., "A Comparison of Predictions and Experience 
With Nashville and Davidson County J If in Regional Governance: Promise and 
Performance (Washington: Advisory Commission in Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1973),pp. 43-44. 
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way to provide urban services to already urbanized areas. The extent to 
which their design has succeeded and the degree to which their vision 
might be expanded is taken up in the pages which follow. Perhaps this 
chapter can be best concluded by suggesting that, at its birth, Metro 
was faced with a heirarchy of frameworks within which urban service 
policies could be employed to guide future growth. At the broadest 
level existed the array of national, state and aforementioned regional 
pressures which could influence both the extent and character or urban 
growth. Metro's impact on these forces was minimal. A second-order 
framework for managing development, however, had been provided by the 
creation of consolidated government and gave Metro unquestioned 
municipal authority throughout Davidson County. Within this context the 
new Metro charter not only provided for an expandable urban service 
district, but also outlined significant Planning Commission authority 
for capital budgeting, mandatory referral of city projects, comprehensive 
. d 1 l' 124 B h h h I f h zonIng an ong-range pannIng. ot t e ome-ru e status 0 t e new 
government and the charter's attention to these planning mechanisms 
make it clear that within Metro's jurisdiction a structure for managed 
development existed. 
For purposes of this study, the narrowest framework for development 
provided Metro in 1963 was the provision for expanding the urban services 
district. Although evidence in previous pages suggests that Metro's 
founders saw U.S.D. expansion as primarily a response to developmental 
l24Bolin, pp. 144ff. 
89 
pressures, they did not preclude that such expansion might ultimately be 
used as one method to guide development. Although it has been argued that 
the initial decisions on service allocations between the G.S.D. and 
U.S.D. were made primarily on financial and political criteria, the 
resul ting significant distinction between the two districts left open 
the following possible courses of action for the new Metro Government: 
1. The absence of U.S.D. services such as sewer, water and fire 
protection could be used as means for limiting development in 
G.S.D. areas. 
2. Capital budgeting in the G.S.D. could emphasize the 
"preparation" of specified areas for inclusion in U.S.D. 
3. The maintenance of a significantly lower tax rate in the G.S.D. 
would contribute to lessened holding costs of G.S.D. properties, 
therefore minimizing pressures for development in G.S.D. areas. 
Each of these possible strategies depended upon two important 
prerequisites: 
1. That Metro executive and legislative decisionmakers saw U.S.D. 
expansion policies as one means for guiding development, and 
2. That service (and tax rate) distinctions between the U.S.D. and 
G.S.D. remained significant to developers and development 
interests. 
The degree to which these prerequisites existed and possibly led to the 
Metro's use of such a framework for managing development (U.S.D. 
expansion) is the subject of the next two chapters. 
CHAPTER III 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOAL FRAMEWORKS IN METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE 
The frameworks for the consideration of the management of urban 
development in Metro, referred to at the end of the preceding chapter, 
require that some attention be given to the existence of development 
goals themselves. As outlined in the initial statement of this study's 
research interests, it is important to determine whether and how goals 
related to Nashville's development were related to service policies. 
Accordingly, this chapter is a broad survey of urban development goals 
present within Metro from its inception through the middle 1970's. The 
following chapter proceeds to consider service district policies in 
light of this survey. 
A simple but useful method for analysis of Metro's development 
goal-setting framework is provided by conceptualizing the broad 
"ideal-type" conditions under which urban development goals might be 
determined. For purposes of such a typology (and for this study) it is 
assumed that "urban development goals" refer to those goals related to 
the physical dimensions or urban development. In this sense "urban 
development" includes patterns of land use, transportation, urban 
service delivery, housing patterns and so on. As mentioned previously, 
urban "development" is considered to be a broader concept than urban 
1 "growth." Growth is a significant component of development, but 
1 See Chapter I, pp. 1-3. 
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development implies change, but without an assumption of the direction 
of change. 
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Probably the easiest two "ideal-type" urban development goal-setting 
scenarios to visualize are those where, on the one hand, there is 
practically ~public (i.e., governmental) involvement whatsoever. The 
development "marketplace" operates without significant public 
intervention. This might be called a pure "laissez faire" setting for 
urban development decision-making. At the opposite extreme is a 
condition where public (i.e., government) intervention is extensive and 
continuing. In such a setting, public officials llmanage" urban 
development with private interests operating within publically 
established development criteria. 
In between these extreme types can be located a "minimum standard 11 
framework, somewhat near the laissez-faire type and a llpartnership" 
framework, closer to the management framework. Although the distinctions 
between the framework-types may be subtle, they provide a basis for 
describing the origination of development goals in Nashville during 
particular periods. 
Three dimensions of the current status of any system of urban 
development goals have been considered in the development of this 
typology: time-orientation, private-public orientation, and 
comprehensive-functional scope. These dimensions are summarized in 
Table 3.1. Time-orientation considers the extent to which short-, 
medium- and long-range development concerns are addressed. Short-range 
goal concerns generally include present to two or three year scenarios. 
TABLE 3.1 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOAL FRAMEWORKS 
Framework Possible Frameworks for Urban Development Goal Formulation 
Attribute "Laissez- "Minimum 
Categories faire" Standard" "Partnership". "Management" 
1. Time-Orientation 































Medium-range moves from three to 10 or 15 year scenarios. Long-range 
goals refer to those with scenarios further in the future. The 
rationale for such categories is based upon observations of the 
time-periods generally important to the individuals, firms, or agencies 
who traditionally formulate urban development goals. Private investors 
in urban development have short-range concerns for cash flow, 
tax-oriented depreciation credits and deductions, market opportunities, 
and so on. Government agencies generally exist within budget-cycle 
constraints which emphasize short-range considerations. Capital 
budgeting and project planning and review, however, push such agencies 
to medium-range time period considerations. Homeowners, as well as 
other private investors, consider medium-range factors of investment 
return along with short-term considerations of convenience and cash 
availability. Long-range goals moving beyond 15 years generally are the 
domain of sellers and investors in long-term securities, especially 
municipal bonds, along with planners, environmentalists and others 
either trained or conditioned to think with such a focus. 
The private-public orientation of an urban development goal 
structure reflects the origins of the goals judged to be most significant 
in influencing developmental patterns. Although a determination of 
significance may be arbitrary, it is fairly easy to determine the source 
of goal articulation: public agencies or private interest groups. The 
fact that many public agency goal statements are simply aggregations of 
certain private interests does not deny the significance, for this 
typology, that public, not private, sources may have authored certain 
urban development goals. 
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The final characteristic accommodated by the typology is the 
comprehensive versus functional nature of articulated urban goals. Such 
a distinction departs little from the planner's normal use of these 
terms: comprehensive goals contain considerations of the interrelated 
facets of urban development while functional goals are concerned with 
specific elements of urban development. Implied in the distinction is 
the assumption that comprehensive goal statements are based upon a 
comprehensive view of urban development while functional goals are 
composed from a specialized, limited vision of urban development. 
As mentioned, the typology extracted from these attributes is one 
of generalized ideal-types. The arbitrary types are not mutually 
exclusive. In a broad sense they should be seen as a continuum. The 
"laissez faire" setting for urban development goals is the least 
conducive to a management of development orientation while the "minimum 
standard," "partnership" and "management" settings are progressively 
more oriented in this direction. The "laissez faire" setting suggests a 
goal-setting scenario where urban development policies emerge from the 
political struggles among private interests over present-day and 
short-term concerns for specific municipal projects. Laissez faire 
urban development "goals lf are simply the summation of daily struggles 
over private, short-term interests. Government officials are, at best, 
frustrated referees or, at worst, proxies for private interests actively 
involved in the fray. 
The "minimum standard" setting suggests a modest public intrusion 
into the urban development policy process under the shield of protection 
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of "public health, safety and welfare." The consequences of "laissez 
faire" development policies many times include direct threats to public 
health and safety, easily perceived and experienced by an urban 
population. Legislatures, courts and executives traditionally have 
responded with laws, judgments and standards influencing the broad 
limits within which urban development can occur. The original rationale 
for zoning, building codes, public health standards, highway construc-
tion standards and so on reflect this orientation. Public intervention 
in the decisions leading to urban development policies is guided by 
enforcement of such standards--primarily a reactive posture. Policies 
are functional and, although short- and middle-range considerations 
obviously underlie the establishment of development standards, remain 
the present and short-range-oriented products of private interest. 
Whereas laissez faire urban goal-setting is rare in American communities, 
especially due to the involvement of federal and many state agencies in 
defining the "public heal th, safety and welfare," minimum standard goal 
determination is quite common. 
An additional expansion of the public role in protecting "public 
health, safety, and welfare tl has given rise to the third scenario, that 
of "partnership. ,,2 This expansion not only reflects new legal 
interpretations of the "public interest" but also growing technical 
comprehension of the interconnected nature of urban social and physical 
2The op1n10n of Justice Douglas in the case of Berman v. Parker is 
illustrative of the origins of this shift. See Charles M. Haar, Land 
Use Planning, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), 
pp. 636-648. 
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environments. Along with legislative and judicial pressures for greater 
public involvement in urban development policies have come the 
recognition of urban systems and sub-systems. Comprehensive urban 
development planning, in such a setting. becomes a means of overcoming 
the many conflicts and costs caused by dissonant and non-reinforcing 
functional plans. Likewise. the goal-setting process becomes more 
~iddle- and even long-range than the the previous two settings. 
The "management" setting for urban development goals represents the 
fullest expression of public participation in the goal formation process. 
Although private interests are certainly not excluded from the process. 
public officials. responding to comprehensive and long-range interpre-
tations of the public interest. dominate the goal-setting process. In 
so far as goal-setting is considered. the maximum form of "management of 
developmen til occurs in this setting. 
Without further expanding the discussions of the four scenarios the 
typology remains rough and suggestive. Not discussed, far example. are 
the v.arious forms and structures for public and private decision-making. 
Missing is a classification of urban development policy issues. Absent 
is a breakdown of functional planning areas. To fill out the presenta-
tion of the typology in these ways would, however. move beyond the 
utility of the typology for this study: a means of analysis of the 
development goal-setting structure in Metro after consolidation. For 
this purpose, the discussion thus far is most useful. 
Table 3.2 depicts an application of the typology to the framework 
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application is based only on the general historical review presented in 
• the preceding chapter. Prior to the establishment of the Community 
Services Commission, Nashville and Davidson County each fit the general 
laissez faire framework for urban goal development. Although a unified 
planning staff was created in 1939 and some functional plans were 
produced particularly for streets and highways, development of the 
Nashville urban area was consistent with the priorities and resources of 
private investors. 3 For purposes of this study's interest in urban 
service policies, the critical movement toward the minimum standard 
framework occurred with the emergence of the forces which led to the 
. fhC . S' C" 4 creat~on 0 t e ommun~ty erv~ces omm~ss~on. The conversion of 
private interests into public action to respond to the functional issue 
of sewerage service provision and ultimately the full range of urban 
service provision was reflective of the recognition that medium- and 
even long-range goals were required to develop the solutions to 
present-day and short-range problems. Although the significance of the 
Commission's early work has generally heen recognized as its analysis of 
government structure and boundaries, it should not be overlooked that 
its technical analyses helped secure broader acceptance for public 
3Imogine Wright Bolin, "Planning in Metropolitan Nashville and 
Davidson County, Tennessee: Before and After Consolidation," (unpublished 
Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1968). 
40thers might argue that the Capitol Hill Urban Renewal Project, 
early thoroughfare planning, or other functional planning efforts were 
earlier indications of this shift; the focus here, however, is upon 
broad urban service and development planning. 
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participation in setting development goals for Nashville and Davidson 
County, albeit at the minimum standard level. 
The creation of the Advance Planning and Research Division in 1954 
provided another indication of Nashville's shift away from the "laissez 
fairel! period. Although their hearts may have felt otherwise, the 
planners who designed Metro operated from the perspective that private 
present-day and short-term interests would continue to dominate 
development goal setting in Nashville. Their process of governmental 
design was in many ways an effort to guarantee that minimum development 
standards would be present throughout the urban area. Their concern for 
providing and financing adequate urban services to urbanized areas or 
"areas likely to be urbanized" clearly dominated their work. The 
attention given in the proposed charters to such planning tools as 
capital budgeting, mandatory referral and land-use regulations reflect 
more their attempt to establish sound methods for servicing rather than 
managing development. The Executive Director of the Planning Commission 
staff clearly summarized the planners' dilemma: "we never lost sight of 
the need to guide development, but the burden of catching up was so 
t 
,,5 grea • . . . 
I. DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 1963-1970 
The need to address the problems of future development as well as 
remedy the deficiencies of the past was expressed by the joint planning 
SInterview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December, 1977. 
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commission staff just prior to the second referendum on governmental 
consolidation. In March 1961, the Advance Planning Division published 
its "Preliminary Land Use Plan for Davidson County, Tennessee.,,6 The 
final paragraphs of that document pointed to the absence of clearly 
articulated development goals for Nashville: 
The Nashville-Davidson County Metropolitan Area needs a 
Metropolitan Policies Plan to guide and coordinate its growth 
and development. This Policies Plan should express the 
intended general goals and objectives of the total community. 
Specific plans and functional programs should be examined 
against a background of a general policy for urban growth and 
change. 
The Policies Plan would involve the bringing together, in 
one place, of the physical plans and schedules, coordinating 
time relationships, financial relationship and 'proposed 
activity programs of each governmental unit within the 
community. Maps, schedules and texts also would set forth 
the physical, economic and social facts, assumptions and goals 
underlying proposed governmental policies within the total 
community. 
The very act of gathering the materials for this 
Metropolitan Policies Plan would identify.~nintended inconsis-
tencies, inadequacies and interferences among the various 
plans. A process of mutual adjustment of unnecessary conflict 
in goals could then be found. 
Decisions about land use, development and control,.as 
well as the design and location of community facilities, must 
relate these environmental aspects to the local government's 
programs of public services and to their operating and 
capital budget. 7 
Contained between the lines of this statement is the obvious hope that 
the probability of such a plan coming into being would be enhanced with 
the adoption of metropolitan government. The coordinative strengths of 
6preliminary Land Use Plan (Nashville: Nashville and Davidson 
County Planning Commissions, 1961). 
7preliminary Land Use Plan, p. 37. 
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such a government were seen as crucial in uniting the various flplans and 
schedules" already in existence. 
The "plans and schedules already in existence" upon Metro's birth 
consisted of functional plans in areas such as transportation, sewerage 
and the aforementioned preliminary land use plan. As suggested earlier, 
Metro inherited the ''minimum standard" goal framework which placed the 
preponderance of development goal-setting in the hands of private 
investment and development interests. As one account has stated, in 
Nashville "while the general public's interest in land-use policy is 
ad hoc and ephemeral, however, that of financiers, developers, realtors 
and builders is constant and pervasive. fl8 F.rom this po li tical 
perspective, the coming of Metro brought very little change. Although 
the charter established a prominant role for the Planning Commission in 
capital budgeting, mandatory referral of public projects, zoning, 
"coordination of urban services" and "long-range planning," Commission 
priorities were diverted elsewhere. 
First, technical staff energies were employed t~ assist the new 
9 administration of Metro Mayor Briley literally set up a new government. 
The Advance Planning and Research Division was called upon to give 
continuous administrative advice. Illustrative of this priority was 
8Lester M. Salamon and Gary L. Wamsley, '7he Politics of Urban Land 
Policy: Zoning and Development in Nashville," in James Blumstein and 
Benjamin Walter, ed., Growing Metropolis (Nashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1975), p. 154. 
9"Executive Order #1," (unpublished memorandum from Mayor Beverly 
Briley to Director, Advance Planning and Research Division, Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, April, 1963). 
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Mayor Briley's very first Executive Memorandum-written to the Director 
of the Division-asking for detailed assistance in organizing the 
10 day-to-day procedures of Metro Government. 
A second limit on the Planning Commission's capacity to respond to 
long-term development goal-setting needs was the staff attention 
required to meet the service needs of the already urbanized area, 
particularly ,the Urban Services District. Table 3.3 broadly summarizes 
the key service deficiencies. particularly those in the portion of the 
U.S .D. annexed following the defeat of the first referendum on 
consolidation. Mayor Briley, in commenting on these ~eficiencies, 
stressed that "need and engineering feasibilitylt must override any other 
planning consideration when such large urban areas were so poorly 
serviced. 11 The Executive Director of the Metropolitan Planning 
Commission reinforced this priority when he established staff responsi-
bilities in functional areas in order to "catch-up and then keep-up" ' 
. h "d d 12 Wlt serVlce eman s. (The following chapter will discuss these 
service problems in more detail.) Even if the Metropolitan Planning 
Commission staff had been able to concentrate on long-term developmental 
issues, no matter how related they might have been to current service 
problems. their recommendations would have been bypassed in favor of the 
more expedient task of servicing residents guaranteed services they 
lOIbid. 
IlThomas P. Murphy and John Rehfuss, Urban Politics in the Suburban 
Era (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1976). p. 247. 
12H k"' . aw lns lntervlew. 
Area 
Urban Services District, 
City of Nashville 
Prior to 1958 
Urban Services District, 
Newly Annexed Areas 
General Services District, 
Outside U.S.D. 
TABLE 3.3 
RELATIVE CONDITION OF CERTAIN URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY, 
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE, 1963 
Services 
Sanitary 
Fire Police Sewer Water 
Satisfactory Satisfactory Poor; Satisfactory 
Construction 
Underway 
Poor; Satisfactory Critical; Poor 
Water Supply Construction 
Problems Needed 
No Metro Poor; No Metro No Metro 




















weren't yet receiving from the government they had voted into existence. 
Both Mayor Briley and the new members of the Metro Council had 
13 substantial constituencies thinking in these terms. 
A final limit on Metropolitan Planning Commission's capacity to 
articulate Metro development goals early in Metro's life has already 
been suggested: private interests dominated the urban development 
process. Although the "minimum standard" framework for development 
planning had included the implementation of city and county zoning 
ordinances, subdivision regulations and building codes, most observers, 
if honest, would probably agree with the essence of the statement that 
"there's probably not an area in the United States where the developers, 
real estate men, and bankers have had greater opportunities than in 
Nashvi lIe. ,,14 Officially, the Mayor spoke of "economic growth and 
development in order to assist Metro in meeting existing service 
15 needs." Little was said about meeting the service needs created by 
growth of the urban area. As will be discussed in the following chapter, 
maintenance of minimum development standards, particularly sewer 
policies, forced acceptance of some future-oriented planning recommen-
dations. In 1964, far more restrictive sewer requirements were made a 
part of the subdivision regulations. As one might expect, however, the 
l3In drawing up Councilmanic Districts, it should be recalled, 
members of the Charter Commission had intended to place just such 
pressure on Metro by including in a majority of districts some territory 
from the 1958-1960 annexations; see Chapter II. 
l4Salamon and Wamsley, p. 141 
l5Murphy and Rehfuss, p. 247. 
105 
"minimum standard" scenario gave birth to ways of circumventing the 
rules. Exceptions to the rules were permitted and, more crucial to the 
argument of this study, the power of Metro to control service extension 
was diluted when special utility districts were allowed to expand within 
th G 1 S 'D' t' 16 e enera erV1ces 1S r1ct. 
Although it is being argued that a framework for the preparation of 
urban development goals in Metro existed only at the "minimum standard" 
level, fldevelopment fl was certainly taking place. From 1960 to 1970, the 
population of Davidson County grew from 399,743 to 447,877. 17 More 
important, this growth took the form of dispersed urban development. 
Figure 3.1, taken from an MPC study, compares the "urbanized" areas of 
the county in 1950 and 1970. If urban development is narrowly limited 
to the process of converting raw land to residential, industrial, 
commercial and community uses, then development in Metro during this 
period (and the following seven-year period as well) was relatively 
unrestrained by public policies. The availability of relatively cheap 
land, suited for development, in the outer fringes of the county (with 
the exception of the northwestern portion) attracted private investment 
interests. The expansion of the interstate highway network within the 
county guaranteed access to the central business district along several 
radial corridors. Where private investors saw fit to maximize these 
l6Analyzing Suburban Development (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1973), p. 12. 
l7proposed General Plan for Nashville (Nashville: Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, 1976), p. 4. 
e Urbanized, 
o Urbanized, 1970 
Figure 3.1. Urbanization of Nashville-Davidson 
County, 1950 and 1970. 
Source: Analyzing Suburban Development. 
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conditions, political interests were supportive of construction of 
public facilities to service such development at -f. Hminimum standard. H18 
Such services in many cases were easier to acquire along Metro's fringe 
where utility districts were operating. The developmental "skip" over 
the areas where service districts did not operate and where Metro's 
19 Urban Services District was not extended was a common occurrence. 
(This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.) 
Partial documentation of the absence of articulated developmental 
goals during this period can be obtained by reviewing the principles 
adhered to in the preparation of various planning studies and procedures 
by the Metropolitan Planning Commission. Of special significance are 
zoning practices, subdivision regulations, capital budgeting and 
functional planning studies. 
Zoning during this early part of Metro's history has been described 
as"primitive Euclidean!! in nature. 20 Although the description was 
primarily aimed at the existence of traditional zoning heirarchy of uses 
found in both the city and county zoning ordinances (each being 
continued after consolidation), the description also applies to the 
development goals underlying the ordinances. These assumed goals dealt 
with general concerns for incompatible uses, not staging or timing of 
21 growth. As is to be expected in the "minimum standard fl environment, 
18 Analping Suburban DeveloEment, pp. 55-63. 
19A 1 . na pmg: Suburban DeveloEment, pp. 12-13 . 
20Salamon and Wamsley, pp. 157-158. 
21A 1 . na z:zmg Suburban Develo:ement , pp. 12-13. 
108 
the impact of the ordinances was to open for development far more land 
. than required in the market place. 22 was 
The breadth of development patterns allowed by the zoning 
ordinances was further extended by the way in which the ordinances were 
implemented. Even the requirement that successful challenges to 
Planning Commission decisions on zoning matters required a two-thirds 
vote of the Metropolitan Council was sidestepped through the emergence 
) 23 
of "councilmanic courtesy" in such matters. The very composition of 
the Council, Board of Zoning Appeals, and Planning Commission suggested 
that development-investment interests would prevail in most zoning 
24 matters. At the risk of belaboring the point, the concluding 
statement of a thorough study· of zoning and urban development during 
Metro's early years is illustrative: 
What this all adds up to so far as the impact of public policy 
on urban development, therefore is inevitably mixed. Urban 
land policy in Nashville, at least as reflected in zoning, 
operates within a relatively narrow range of discretion. 
Private business and household decisions clearly retain the 
initiative in the development process. But within a limited 
range of discretion, public policy does have a tangible effect 
. . . . More than anything else, therefore, land-use policy 
in Nashville resembles a ship with numerous leaks moving 
generally in the right direction, but slowly. When the winds 
and atmospheric conditions are right, everything seems to 
work according to plan. But when severe headwinds and 
turbulence interfere, the vessel has no reserve engines or 
fuel to help hold its course. For the rest, the crew spends 
its time valiantly fending off potential disaster while the 
passengers frolic unawares up on the deck. Until something 
interferes,with their revelry, this pattern is likely to 
persist. 25 
22 Ibid . 
24Ibid • 
23Salamon and Wamsley, p. 177. 
25Salamon and Wamsley, p. 190. 
Equally significant is the statement in the Land Use Policy Plan, 
published in 1970: 
As early as the 1940's, separate Zoning O~dina~ces were 
adopted for the City of Nashville and Davidson County. These 
Ordinances remain in effect today despite the consolidation of 
the two governmental entities. Even more significant is the 
fact that new problems and issues confronting current 
community development have generated the need for developing 
more comprehensive land use policies to resolve these issues. 
Consequently. this Land Use Policy Plan cites specific 
policies which were not applicable in 1940. Therefore, 
adaptation of the current Zoning Ordinance to policies stated 
herein is not entirely possible. 26 
In commenting on the inadequacies of the zoning ordinances in 
facilitating the implementation of even broad development goals, 
officials and observers also point to the "problem" of the seven 
incorporated municipalities within Davidson County recognized by the 
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Metropolitan Charter (see Figure 3.2). The continued existence of these 
"shell-ci ties" was the consequence of compromises made to insure 
favorable support for consolidation from residents of these primarily 
. d . 1 27 reSl entla areas. Each city is a part of the General Services 
District but has the option of contracting for provision of urban 
services. Of importance is the prerogative given these municipalities 
to establish their own zoning ordinances along with other policies with 
potential developmental consequences. fl ••• The municipalities have 
not generally utilized in-depth analytical studies as a basis for 
formulating public policies •.. consequently, issues arise concerning 
26 Land Use Policy Plan (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 
1970), p. 54. 
27Interview with Robert Horton, January, 1978; Hawkins Interview. 
Figure 3.2. Incorporated Municipalities in 
Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson 
County. 
Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission. 
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the impact of adopted municipal policies on the overall development of. 
the metropolitan area,II28 The fact that five of these cities are 
primarily residential in nature (excepting GoodlettsvIlle and Berry Hill) 
I and have been interested in limiting nonresidential growth coupled with 
the absence of significant Metro development objectives makes the issue of 
freestanding cities within Metro nearly moot. Few problems were created 
. 29 
by the fact that "MPC tended to ignore them,!! Such a comment would 
not be accurate had urban development goals and objectives been a 
serious Metro priority. 
Mention has already been made of the 1964 revision of the 
subdivision regulations. The requirement that subdivision developments 
include sanitary sewer services was an expression of "minimum standard!! 
concerns by the planning staff. 30 The fact that the provision has been 
regularly bypassed or that non-Metro service districts have been allowed 
to expand underscores the absence within the regulations of development 
controls based upon anything other than broad minimum design 
standards. 31 ,32 Dan Grant, in his discussion of predictions regarding 
Metro, noted that continued approval of subdivisions without adequate 
sanitary sewers and with water service through mains less than 6-inches 
28Land Use Policy Plan, p. 12. 
30Hawkins Interview. 
29Horton Interview. 
3lA I . S b b D 1 t 48 na yZlng u ur an eve opmen ) p. • 
32An "Urban Planning Area" was made a part of the Subdivision 
Regulations adopted in 1964, including all but the western reaches of the 
county. It is in this area where, technically, the sewerage requirements 
apply. 
in diameter would prove to be obstacles in any future effort to guide 
urban growth in the suburban and urban fringe. 33 
Capital budgeting during Metro 1 s first years, as with zoning and 
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subdivision regulation. provided little if any evidence of the existence 
of development goals. Although the potential for a capital budgeting 
process to be useful in tlpreparing for and directing urban growth" 
certainly exists in the theories of modern planning, the failure to make 
such use of it in Metro can be attributed to two factors. 34 First, the 
capital budgeting process was frequently circumvented by operating 
35 departments. The acceptance of capital budgeting procedures, let 
alone principles, was minimal throughout Metro. Second, and perhaps 
most important, the resources for capital investments were almost 
entirely committed to projects that either were servicing existing 
development or matching federal funds, such as thoroughfare construction 
grants, which made no provisions for controlling the sequencing and 
timing of development. The capital budgets of the period, as indeed the 
operating budgets, reflected the political priorities of the time--and 
these included servicing developed areas and capturing federal dollars. 
Th f d 1 f . h . d . 36 e management 0 eve opment was not a part 0 elt er conSl eratlon. 
330an Grant, !tA Comparison of Predictions and Experience With 
Nashville and Davidson County," Urban Affairs Quarterly (September, 
1965), pp. 34-54. 
34See David R. Godschalk et al., Constitutional Issues of Growth 
Management (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1977), p. 213. 
35Bolin. pp. 143 ff. 
36Gary L. Wamsley and Lester M. Salamon, liThe Operating Budget as a 
Steering Device," in Blumstein and Walter, Growing Metropolis. 
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It has been previously pointed out that the planning activities of 
the Metropolitan Planning Commission during this period consisted almost 
entirely of functional planning efforts. Reasons have already been 
given for the agency's priorities in areas other than comprehensive 
planning for urban development. Both the Preliminary Land Use Plan of 
1961 and the Land Use Policy Plan of 1970 contained pleas for action in 
preparing comprehensive development pOlicies. 37, The planners' concern 
for such policies was also expressed in the 1965 document, Handbook of 
Standards for Urban Development: 
The growth of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County 
obviously will continue with or without greater- citizen aware-
ness of desirable environmental qualities. However, increased 
awareness and subsequent community choices concerning develop-
ment patterns could allow more meaningful participation in 
development efforts by citizens, developers, designers, public 
officials and other involved persons. Development efforts 
based on more knowledgeable participation might further the 
optimum use of land for a range of urban activities, and a 
greater inclusion of appropriate community services and 
facilities, and promote greater citizen identification and 
pride in community appearance. Urban development in less 
appropriate forms may create additional costs to the community 
in terms of uneven use of land resources, greater costs in the 
provision of services and facilities, increasing traffic 
congestion, and decreased amenities. Overcoming costs such as 
those could consume a great part of the resources of the 
community. 38 
The planning staff response to the outdated zoning ordinances and 
absence of urban development policies was to slowly begin building the 
base for some future time when perhaps the minimum standard framework 
37preliminary Land Use Plan, p. 37; Land Use Policy Plan, pp. 1-5. 
38Handbook of Standards for Urban Development (Nashville: 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1965), p. 3. 
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could be transcended . Initially, this effort consisted of describing 
physical development principles which not only represented the "best 
minimum standards!! but also pointed out the economic and social benefits 
to be gained from better planned urban development. The revised 
subdivision regulations t the Handbook of Standards for Urban Development t 
and the 1970 Land Use Policy Plan each dealt with desirable physical 
d 1 h . t' 39 eve opment c aracterlS lCS. Issues such as density patterns, lot 
development requirements, amenities and land use compatibilities were 
addressed. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the specific 
stress given each development issue, but it is significant to note that 
the staging and timing of urban development was not addressed from a 
recommended policy perspective during this period. Although earlier 
quotes from planning staff studies clearly show a concern for some 
orchestration of development, staff energies were concentrated on 
improving the physical qualities of developments insofar as that could 
be accomplished without any real control over whether the development 
would actually take place--or when it would take place. 40 
As Metro's first seven years came to an end t it seemed clear that 
urban development was taking place with a minimum of guidance from Metro 
itself. Preoccupied with providing services in already urbanized areas 
and responsive to a political climate dominated by investment and 
development interests t planners took their stand by holding out for 
better minimum standards and filling the prefaces and conclusions of 
39Ibid . 40 Salamon and Wamsley, pp. 159-165. 
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their studies with pleas to view Metro's development in a more 
comprehensive, goal-oriented fashion. 
II. DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 1970-1977 
Nothing dramatic occurred in 1970 to change the environment in 
which urban development decisions were reached in Metro. Symbolically, 
the publication of the 1970 Land Use Policy Plan represented an escape 
from the restraints of the principles prominent in the two existing 
zoning ordinances. The policy plan was prepared as a part of a 
staff-citizen effort to create a new Comprehensive Metropolitan Zoning 
Ordinance (COMZO). Practically, the plan was prepared not only to 
provide a land use policy basis for zoning, but also to meet growing 
federal pressures on Metro to adopt a single comprehensive plan. Urban 
planning funds, transportation funds and other forms of federal income 
required a comprehensive planning effort greater than the sum of Metro's 
functional plans and the planners' wishful thinking of the 1960's. 
Metro had been receiving Section 701 urban planning funds from the 
f d 1 .... 41 e era government S1nce 1tS 1ncept1on. Although the Plan for 
Metropolitan Government itself was prepared with 701 money, comprehensive 
planning since 1963 had produced little in the way of the published 
plans expected by federal officials. By 1970, therefore, comprehensive 
planning within Metro was receiving a boost both from the need to 
implement a Metro-wide zoning ordinance and a federal incentive to 




After lengthy discussions and much controversy, the Comprehensive 
Metropolitan Zoning Ordinance (COMZO) was adopted in 1973. 42 The 
regulations and the accompanying map established in law some of the 
broader physical development principles discussed in the 1970 Land Use 
Policy Plan. Particularly significant were the addition of flexibility 
in zoning matters, the encouragement of higher residential densities, 
and environmentally-based restrictions on development, especially in 
floodplains. 43 Performance standards were also introduced as a partial 
replacement for the pure-districting concept underlying the previous 
ordinances. As a regulatory device, COMZO reflected a move toward 
establishing higher standards of development. The fact that earlier 
comments on limited enforcement of zoning principles applied as well to 
the period after COMZO was adopted suggest, however, the COMZO was not a 
vehicle whereby Metro could move beyond the "minimum standard" framework 
for managing urban development. This condition was, and is, reinforced 
by the fact that COMZO, like most current zoning ordinances, is not 
useful in influencing significantly the timing and staging of 
44 development. 
Toward the end of this period MPC staff began a review of existing 
subdivision regulations. 45 While most of the conclusions of the review 
42Bill Number 73-650, June, 1973 (Metropolitan Council); Zoning 
Regulations of Metropolitan Government (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1976). It required nearly ten years to draft and enact 
COMZO. 
43Ibid . 44Salamon and Wamsley. pp. 159-165. 
45A Preliminary Report on Problems and Issues of Land Subdivision 
in Davidson County J (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1977), 
pp. 5-6. 
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dealt with procedural issues and upgraded design standards, some 
attention was given to a new role for the subdivision regulation process 
in influencing the timing of urban development in the suburban and rural 
fringe. 
Premature approval of ~ subdivision causes problems such as 
inadequate access to the subdivision; lack of and pressure for 
public services which will be expensive to provide to remote 
development, and inconsistent with adopted budgets and 
programs; inadequate essential services such as sewers and 
fire protection; and possibly the precedent of an unplanned 
type of development that may be inconsistent with the develop-
ment recommended for the area in the general plan .... The 
present Subdivision Regulations do not contain any specific 
criteria against which subdivision proposals can be judged to 
determine whether the timing of development is appropriate or 
premature. The lack of such criteria leaves the. door open 
for arbitrary decisionmaking which may lead to developments 
that are contrary to the interests of taxpayers, consumers. 
and the local government. At issue is whether criteria 
regarding timing of develoEment should be provided and what 
those criteria should be. 4 
The issue was left open, with the interesting comment that the Public 
Works Department favored the inclusion of some type of timing criteria. 
Although new subdivision regulations may not reflect such criteria, it 
is important, given the concerns of this study. that at least two Metro 
agencies raised the issue of extending the normal minimum standard 
framework for subdivision regulation to include the more long-term and 
comprehensive concerns for the timing of particular developments. By 
1978, MPC staff had developed an initial draft of new subdivision 
regulations for Metro which were intended to upgrade subdivision 
standards to include issues of compatibility with succeeding and adjacent 
46Ibid . 
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development. There is little evidence, however, that the subdivision 
regulations are being revised with a view toward their potential use in 
guiding or managing urban development. Tougher sewer and water 
requirements, for example, are not undergirded by a philosophy of 
manipulating service locations to manipulate development. The tougher 
standards may very well have that impact--but only if service policies 
are based upon such developmental considerations. Also open to question 
is the extent to which new subdivision regulations will be forcefully 
implemented, should they be adopted. 
A review of Metro's capital budgeting process since 1970 suggests 
that, even though modest, some increased attention has been given to the 
fiscal framework for planning urban development. As has been pointed 
out previously, the Charter's requirement for capital budgeting had not 
-led to achievement of the coordinative and developmental objectives 
usually associated with theories of capital improvements budgeting. 






To consolidate and coordinate all the various departmental 
requests with the purpose of reducing delays and coordi-
nating individual improvements programs; 
To establish a system of procedures and priorities by 
which each proposal can be evaluated in terms of the 
public need, the comprehensive plan of the metropolitan 
area, and the interrelationship of projects and cost 
requirements; 
To schedule the proposals over a six-year period according 
to their priority evaluation; and, 
To set forth a financing program for the six-year period 
whereby the Capital Improvements Program-and be achieved. 47 
47Capital Improvements Budget and Program, 1969-70 to 1975-76 
(Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1969), p. 6. 
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Achievement of these objectives required both departmental adherence to 
the capital improvements budgeting procedures and a commitment by Metro 
Council and the Mayor to reply on the Capital Improvements Budget and 
Program in making capital investment decisions. During the early 1970's 
48 some growth in meeting the first requirement took place. MPC staff 
efforts concentrated on the "consolidating and coordinating" of 
departmental requests, leaving each department somewhat free to assign 
its own priorities to proj ects. 49 The absence of a "comprehensive plan 
of the metropolitan area," both in the sense of a planning document and 
in the minds of Metro executives and legislators, continued to 
contribute to the weakness of the Capital Improvements Budget and 
Program to be an accurate statement of Metro development priorities. It 
remained a departmental and planning staff "wish list." 
Although Metro's capital improvements budgeting process failed to 
transcend the policy-impact threshold, better coordination of 
departmental priorities at least allowed MPC staff to project various 
fiscal scenarios given various capital investment options. While 
poli tics in the Council and the Mayor's office tended to often override 
such evaluations, MPC staff gained greater ability to analyze Metro's 
long-term revenue-capacity to finance various capital investment 
packages. This ability was significant in the discussion of the 
various service extension proposals outlined in the next chapter. 
48Th , b .. b d . f 1 b MPC ff 1S 0 servat10n 1S ase upon 1n orma comments y sta. 
49Instructions Manual for the Capital Improvements Budget and 
Program, 1977 (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1977), 
entire volume. 
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Perhaps the strongest indication of a subtle shift toward an urban 
development goal orientation beyond the "minimum standard" framework is 
found in MPC staff writing after 1970. Staff studies and reports 
reflect the decision reached at the end of the 1960's to develop a 
comprehensive plan for Metro. The publication of the Land Use Policy 
Plan in 1970 was followed by documents on developmental problems and 
issues found both in the inner city and on the suburban fringe. 50 These 
inquiries represented the first stage of a planning process designed to 
51 produce Metro's first formal Itcomprehensive plan." In essence, this 
planning effort was recognition of the existing "minimum standard" basis 
for Metro's view of future development since its inception. In 
beginning a process of analysis of problems and issues associated with 
urban development in Metro, the MPC staff consciously addressed the 
possibility that more comprehensive and long-term considerations could 
provide the basis for a development-goal framework closer to the 
"partnership" rather than "minimum standard" type. The preface to one 
of the more significant initial studies in the effort is indicative of 
this: 
For the last several years a major objective of the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission has been the development of 
a unified long-range comprehensive plan for Nashville-Davidson 
County, rather than separate functional plans limited to land 
use or community facilities alone. Because of the nature of 
previous Commission activities and commitments this objective 
50Analyzing Suburban Development; Inner City Blight (Nashville: 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1973). 
5lproposed General Plan for Nashville, pp. 10-12. 
has not been fulfilled . . . . The study attempts to identify 
and analyze the broader social, economic, and physical 
problems and issues associated with suburban development. 
These considerations are frequently overlooked in making 
specific short-range decisions. The report will have fulfilled 
its purpose if it provides some understanding of suburban 
development and presents a useful array of suburban problems 
and issues which may serve as a point of departure for 
generating optimal developmental policies in the future. 52 
A new tension between advocates of "development as usual" and those 
seeking a framework of goals and policies to guide development was 
emerging in Metro. 
Briefly, two somewhat separate efforts to develop the basis for 
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more managed development can be identified. The first was that of the 
MPC staff already referred to. Although federal pressures for 
comprehensive planning were significant, especially during the period 
discussed, the Director of Planning and many of his staff were trained 
in and professionally committed to a comprehensive planning thrust, 
albeit a physically-oriented one. The Director of the Comprehensive 
Planning Division, appointed in 1970, was a recent graduate of a 
planning school with a strong comprehensive planning emphasis. The 
scope of their concern for comprehensive planning included the 
environmental, fiscal, social and economic costs of continued development 
without increased public guidance based upon well-established goals. 
Running throughout their studies of this period are discussions of the 
environmental consequences of unrestrained suburban development, the 
fiscal costs of service demands made by land conversion in rural areas, 




social inequities inherent in certain patterns of suburban housing, and 
the consequences for the Metro and regional economies of continued 
patterns of deve1opment. 53 
A second, more specific thrust toward management of development was 
provided by a Ford Foundation-funded project to " ... introduce into 
Metro a task-focused, interdisciplinary, interfunctiona1, interinstitu-
tiona1 management process to develop the capacity to manage growth and 
arrest pollution. u54 The primary objective of the project was to create 
an "environmental management team" from officials of the MPC, the 
Department of Water and Sewerage Services, the Health Department and the 
Department of Public Works. A special focus was placed on solid waste 
management. Although growth management was included as an objective in 
this effort, the primary thrust became a functionally-oriented study of 
solid-waste issues in the environmental setting of Davidson County.55 
The longer-term connections between the Environmental Planning and 
Management Project and development management in Metro have yet to be 
.realized. 
S3Natura1 Environmental Analysis (Nashville, Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1973); Expanding Urban Services (Nashville, Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, 1972); Social Types in Nashville-Davidson County 
(Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976); Future Economic 
Development in Nashville: Alternative Approaches (Nashville: Metropoli-
tan Planning Commission, 1976). 
S4James C. Coomer and Charlie B. Tyer, Nashville Metropolitan 
Government: The First Decade (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administra-





This chapter opened with presentation of a general scheme for 
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classifying the frameworks within which urban development goals might be 
generated. It was argued that urban development objectives in Nashville 
and Davidspn County up to the time of Metro's birth were produced in an 
environment dominated by private development interests, with public 
officials providing only minimal standards for such development. 
Although only one of several goals, increased public involvement in 
urban development was seen by the founders of Metro as an important 
consequence of consolidated government. The thrust of this chapter, 
therefore, has been to review the general evolution of the framework for 
urban development goal-setting since Metro's birth. The conclusion , 
reached suggests that a subtle shift in this emphasis has occurred at 
the staff-level in Metro, particularly within the Metropolitan Planning 
Commission. No evidence, however, has been given to suggest that 
planning documents which argue for a shift to "partnership" development 
goal~setting will find a receptive audience elsewhere within Metro or in 
the private sector. A fuller discussion of the likelihood of a shift in 
this orientation occurs in Chapter V, where additional discussion of 
MPC's work to develop a comprehensive plan will be offered. 
The purpose of this chapter was to respond to an initial research 
question: was there a framework of Metro development goals toward which 
the urban services district provisions of consolidated government could 
be employed? The response developed in the preceeding pages is: no. 
The existence of a "minimum standardlf orientation toward public 
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involvement in Nashville's development ruled out such use of service 
policies just as it did use other developmental guidance mechanisms. 
The political sense of Metro's designers emerges even more significant. 
In rejecting their hearts' desire for guided metropolitan growth, they 
settled for a government more capable of coping with growth and 
development as it occurred. It is with this view, rather than that of 
managed development, that the following chapter examines in more detail 
the service district concept and the delivery of urban services since 
Metro's birth. 
CHAPTER IV 
URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY AND URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSION 
The backdrop of the previous two chapters places the discussion of 
urban services delivery under Metro in a context of relatively 
unrestrained urban development. The answers to the first two of the 
study's four research questions suggest that the services district 
arrangement for delivery of urban services in Metro was not created 
primarily to manage development, nor did a general framework for even 
partially managing development evolve during Metro's 15 years of 
existence. This chapter, therefore, reviews the delivery of Metro 
services through the services district structure in view of the "minimum 
standard--catch-up and keep-upll service objectives present during this 
time. Such a review permits both evaluation of service delivery 
policies vis-a-vis Metro's limited development goals and consideration 
of service policy potential for serving broader, more comprehensive 
development goals should a new development goal framework be established. 
The evaluation of service extension and the services district concept 
during the first 15 years of Metro centers therefore on the questions of 
service coordination and fiscal benefit with developmental concerns left 
to the speculation contained in the final pages of the study. 
Following a conceptual review of the General Services District 
(G.S.D.) and the Urban Services District (U.S.D.). a summary of Metro 
service delivery since 1963 will be presented. The second half of the 
chapter will then contrast proposed and actual modification of the 
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U.S.D. boundaries and comment upon the patterns observed. The 
concluding discussion considers the potential development impact U.S.D. 
and G.S.D. policies are likely to have in the future. 
I. METRO SERVICES AND THE TWO SERVICE DISTRICTS 
As will be recalled from Chapter II, the Metro Charter established 
two service districts and allocated Metro service delivery and tax 
collection functions among them. l A critical feature of this division 
was the creation of separate budgets and funds to accompany separate 
service and revenue-raising responsibilities. 2 Provided for in the 
Charter were five funds: 
1. G.S.D. General Fund 
2. G.S.D. Debt Service Fund 
3. U.S.D. General Fund 
4. U.S.D. Debt Service Fund 
5. School Fund 
An equitable sharing of the financial burden in providing Metro services 
was the prime reason for the creation of these distinct funds, each 
being tied both to specific service provisions and revenue sources. 
Specifically allocated U.S.D. service functions were: 
1. water and sewerage 
2. fire protection 
1 See Table 2.3, p. 68. 
2James C. Coomer and Charlie B. Tyer, Nashville Metropolitan 
Government: The First Decade (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administration, 
University of Tennessee, 1974), pp. 48-51. 
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S. "increased" police protection 
4. garbage collection and refuse control 
S. storm water control 
6. certain alcoholic beverage regulation and licensing 
7. taxicab regulations and licensing 
The remainder of Metro's service functions were allocated to the G.S.D. 
For both political and administrative reasons, the School Fund was 
created, although public education was a G.S.D. function. S 
The designers of Metro had clearly intended to maintain a 
significant distinction between the G.S.D. and the U.S.D. as long as 
there remained both urbanized and non-urbanized portions of the county. 
As previously suggested, they foresaw extension of U.S.D. boundaries as 
a way to accommodate "both the development of the county" and "Metro's 
capacity to finance and supply the U.S.D. service package.,,4 In April 
1965, therefore, the U.S.D. consisted of an overlay on the county (the 
G.S.D.) with boundaries the same as the City of Nashville at the time of 
consolidation (see Figure 4.1). Within the first year of Metro. plans 
were prepared and adopted to provide the full range of U.S.D. services 
throughout the U.S.D., with the exception of storm sewers. S These plans 
SThe politics of school consolidation were complex; the existence of 
capital investments coupled with public concern over the school budget 
led to special treatment of school matters in the creation of Metro. 
including establishment of the School fund. 
4Interview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December, 1977; Interview with 
Robert Horton. January, 1978; Correspondence from Irving Hand, January, 
1978. 
S Coomer and Tyer, pp. 68-69. 
Figure 4.1. Urban Services District, 1963. 
Source: Metropo 1i tan P 1anning Commi ss ion. 
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were developed individually by the Metro government departments 
responsible for the particular service. (The significant departments 
were Water and Sewerage Services, Public Works, Fire and Police.) In 
the case of the sewer plan, a large engineering consulting firm was 
engaged. 
Problems of consolidating county and city services were pronounced 
throughout the G.S.D. There is general agreement, however, that Mayor 
Briley, with the help of many officials (including the Planning 
Commission staff as noted in the preceding chapter) was not wrong when 
he stated that, during its first year, the consolidation of G.S.D. 
services had: 
1. Saved $1,000,000 in school construction costs; 
2. Permitted establishment of competitive bidding; 
3. Permitted establishment of land acquisition and disposal 
policies; 
4. Permitted the establishment of a motor pool and fleet 
purchasing; 
5. Permitted the establishment of uniform personnel policies; 
and 
6. Permitted the establishment of a central data processing 
unit. 6 
Each of these accomplishments, of course, contains a story unto itself. 
For purposes of this study, it is important to keep in mind that many of 
the service provision benefits claimed to be possible under consolidated 
government did, in fact, occur even though they are not discussed in the 
following review of the extension of U.S.D. services under Metro. 
The stated goal of the founders of Metro that consolidated 
government would bring about a more equitable financing of urban 
6Coomer and Tyer, p. 39; T. Scott Fillebrown, "The Nashville Story," 
National Civic Review (May, 1969), pp. 197-200. 
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services can be evaluated in light of the information in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. Table 4.1 compares the property tax burdens of city and county 
residents before and after Metro. Table 4.2 extends the data on tax 
rates through 1977. From the perspective of the property tax alone, it 
can be seen that all Metro residents (i.e., G.S.D.) assumed a greater 
burden in financing the G.S.D. service package. As will be discussed, 
it should be noted that a major U.S.D. service package, water and 
sewerage, was placed upon a user charge rather than property-tax 
financial basis. 
Table 4.3 presents the growth of expenditures for the G.S.D. 
service package since Metro's inception. Although the service 
"packages" remained unchanged throughout the period, the cost of G.S.D. 
services grew, both as a function of population growth outside the 
U.S.D. and the cost increases of G.S.D. services. Police protection, 
initially "more intensive" within the U.S.D., virtually became a G.S.D. 
f 
. 7 unctlon. The difficulty in distinguishing between police protection 
requirements in U.S.D. and G.S.D. areas led, by 1972, to nearly 98% of 
the police department local fund requirements being allocated from 
8 G.S.D. sources. In 1963-1964, only 59% of local police funds came from 
the G.S.D. The police department was the only Metro department, however, 
which was given the task of performing a similar service at different 
levels of intensity for the areas within and beyond the U.S.D. 
Since the emphasis of this study is upon the extension of urban 
services as related to urban development issues in Metro, attention must 
7Horton Interview 8 Coomer and Tyer, pp. 55-56. 
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TABLE 4.1 
COMPARISON OF RATES OF TAX LEVIES, 1962-1963 AND 1963-1964, 
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY 
City .Tax Rate County Tax Rate Combined 
1962-1963 $3.00 $2.32 $5.32 
U.S.D. Tax Rate G.S.D. Tax Rate Combined 
1963-1964 $2.00 $3.70 $5.70 
(Tax rates are $100 of assessed valuation.) 
Source: Annual Financial Report of Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville and Davidson County, 1963-1964. 
TABLE 4.2 
COMPOSITION OF RATES OF TAX LEVIES, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 
OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY 
General Services District Urban Services District 
Total G.S.D. Total U.S.D. 
G.S.D. General School G.S.D. Debt U.S.D. General U.S.D. Debt 
Fiscal Period Rate Fund Fund Service Fund Rate Fund Service Fund 
1963-1964 $3.70 $1.36 $1.78 $ .56 $2.00 $1.55 $ .45 
1964-1965 3.70 1. 36 1. 78 .56 2.00 1.60 .40 
1965-1966 3.50 1. 36 1. 78 .36 1.80 1.66 .14 
1966-1967 3.50 1.40 1. 78 .32 1.80 1.68 .12 
1967-1968 3.50 1.40 1. 78 .32 1.80 1.60 .20 
1968-1969 3.50 1.40 1. 78 .32 1.80 1.60 .20 
1969-1970 3.50 1.40 1. 78 .32 1.80 1.60 .20 
1970-1971 3.50 1.40 1. 78 .32 1.80 1.60 .20 
1971-1972 4.11 1.71 2.08 .32 1.89 1.60 .29 
1972-1973 4.11 1.63 2.08 .40 1.89 1.57 .32 
1973-1974 4.11 1.63 2.02 .46 1.89 1.55 .34 
1974-1975 4.11 1.63 2.02 .46 1.89 1.55 .34 
1975-1976 4.11 1.63 2.02 .46 1.89 1.59 .30 
1976-1977 4.11 1.63 2.02 .46 1.89 1.59 .30 
(Tax rates are per $100 of assessed valuation.) 
Sources: Annual Financial Reports of Metropo1Han Goverr1.ment of Ntishvi11e an~ Davidson County, 





COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURES IN U.S.D. AND G.S.D. FOR GENERAL FUND AND GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BOND DEBT SERVICES: 1963-1964 THROUGH 1976-1977, 
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY 
Fiscal Period General Services District Urban Services District Total 
1963-1964 $30,073,129 (71%) $12,111,008 (29%) $ 42,184,137 
1964-1965 32,256,977 (71%) 12,597,125 (29%) 44,854,102 
1965-1966 38,863,788 (74%) 13,131,044 (26%) 51,994,832 
1966-1967 37,753,508 (74%) 13,297,791 (26%) 51,051,299 
1967-1968 39,146,600 (74%) 13,382,455 (26%) 52,529,055 
1968-1969 43,630,483 (75%) 14,286,741 (25%) 57,917,224 
1969-1970 42,908,700 (74%) 14,831,946 (26%) 57,740,646 
1970-1971 47,318,561 (74%) 15,977,993 (26%) 63,296,554 
1971-1972 57,048,217 (77%) 16,893,433 (23%) 73,941,650 
1972-1973 64,344,839 (78%) 17,668,691 (22%) 82,013,530 
1973-1974 71,341,449 (79%) 18,912,650 (21%) 90,254,099 
1974-1975 81,573,736 (79%) 22,042,908 (21%) 103,616,644 
1975-1976 87,639,850 (77%) 26,083,372 (23%) 113,723,222 
1976-1977 97,707,949 (78%) 28,090,458 (22%) 125,800,407 
Sources: Annual Financial Reports of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 



















be placed upon those services provided in the U.S.D. and available in 
the remainder of Metro either through expansion of the U.S.D. or through 
extra-U.S.D. arrangements. Much could be said about the evolution of 
G.S.D. services, particularly schools, streets, health care and welfare, 
but this would direct attention away from the main thrust: the 
evolution of the U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinction. It can be noted, though, 
that two traditional "priming services," schools and streets, although 
as developmentally significant in Metro as in other urban areas, have 
been strongly impacted by forces beyond Metro. The Federal District 
Court-supervised school zoning and construction since 1970 has 
effectively removed much basic school facility planning flexibility from 
Metro's hands. 9 Maj or arterial, -freeway and interstate highway planning 
has been a joint state-Metro enterprise, with the state playing a 
predominant role. Additionally, the pattern of Metro's thoroughfare 
system was cast well in advance of Metro's birth. IO As suggested in 
each of the preceding chapters, the developmental consequences of these 
decisions have been felt as much beyond Metro's boundaries as within. 
The same can be said about the court order to integrate Metro's schools. 
To pursue these issues, however, would expand the study to a regional 
focus, an expansion for which there is regretfully not enough time or . 
space. 
9 The court ordered plan was vastly different than the existing 
school plan, Schools for 1980 (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1964). 
10See Interstate Controlled-Access Highway System for Nashville 
(Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 
1955) • 
135 
II. SERVICE PATTERNS 
Water and Sewerage Services 
It has been pointed out that Nashville and Davidson County's 
greatest urban service deficiency has been sanitary sewerage. The 
existence of limestone layers near the surface of the land in the 
otherwise ideal urbanization setting along the Cumberland River has 
plagued both septic tank performance and the efforts to install sanitary 
sewer systems. This problem was instrumental in the organization of the 
Community Services Commission in 1951 and led to the preparation of the 
major sanitary sewer plan by the Advance Planning and Research Division 
of the Planning Commission in 1955. 11 Figure 4.2 represents the 
existing city sewer system in 1955 and the Itproposed system" under the 
"immediate program" recommended in the 1955 report. It can be seen that 
the study identified the need to properly sewer areas within the 
existing city limits and in those areas "urbanized and adj acent to the 
city." Recalling that this recommendation was prepared along with the 
plan for metropolitan government, it should be noted that the staff 
concentrated on the engineering requirements for sewering existing 
development. Governmental and financial arrangements were sketched out 
with the stated hope that Ita single metropolitan government" would 
12 ultimately implement the sewer plan. It was recommended that 
llproposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Nashville 
Metropolitan Area (Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County 
Planning Commissions, 1956). 




Figure 4.2. Sewered Areas, Existing and 
Proposed, 1955. 
Source: Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System. 
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financing of trunk construction be by general obligation bonds and 
11 t t · b b . f 13 co ector cons ruc lon e y serVlce ees. 
Implementation of the sewer plan was immediately caught up in the 
conflicts between city and county. Not only were sewer needs in the 
urban area not met adequately by either government, but several 
counter-productive facilities were nearly constructed, including a 
county prfPosal to construct a sewerage treatment plant just upstream 
\ 14 from the Cumberland River intake for the city water system. 
By 1963, not only had sewer construction lagged within the old 
city, but Metro was faced with the need to sewer the 49 square miles 
added to the city, comprising the initial U.S.D., during the annexations 
prompted by Mayor West (see Figure 2.3, page 71). No plan existed for 
sewering these areas other than the 1955 plan. The Metro Council, in 
its first year, therefore, authorized both the preparation of a U.S.D. 
sewer construction plan and subsequently established a water and 
sewerage fee-basis for financing sewer extension into the planning area. 
In a remarkable effort, sewer extension throughout the U.S.D. was nearly 
completed by 1970, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
This effort to extend sewerage throughout the U.S.D. was planned 
and executed according to engineering and financial considerations 
related almost entirely to the goal of servicing the existing U.S.D. as 
l3proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System, p. 93. 
l4Coomer and Tyer, p. 68. 
(i)'Metro Sewers 
~ Other Sewer Systems 
Figure 4.3. Sewered Areas, 1970. 
Source: Analyzing Suburban Development. 
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determined by the Department of Water and Sewerage Services. IS 
Although consideration was allowed for treatment capacity to service 
future development within drainage areas already undergoing urban growth, 
sewer planning considerations during the entire period since 1963 did 
not include a concern for influencing the staging and timing of 
development .. Where growth was underway, particularly subidivision 
development, and where drainage and other engineering considerations 
were more suited to sewer construction than other areas of the suburban 
fringe, there was a greater likelihood that sewer construction would 
occur earlier. 16 Where expansions of the U.S.D. had not occurred, such 
construction was undertaken by either sewer districts or by developers 
under arrangements whereby facilities were deeded to Metro when Metro 
trunks became accessib1e. 17 With the exception of the modest efforts to 
use subdivision regulations to require sewer facility installation 
within the "urban planning area," these arrangements for providing 
sewers beyond U.S.D. boundaries resulted from decisions to develop based 
on criteria viewed as important by private developers, not any 
consideration of comprehensive planned development. This situation 
contributed heavily to the fact that in 1972, 72% of the developed, 
15patrick Healy and Raymond Bancroft, "Three Mayors Review Their 
Governments," Nations Cities (November, 1969), p. 26. 
16"The Process of Urbanization and Timing of the Provision of a full 
range of Municipal Services," (unpublished memorandum, Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, May, 1978). 
17See A Preliminary Report on Problems and Issues of Land 
Subdivision in Davidson County (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1977). 
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18 non-U.S.D. land was not served by sanitary sewers. The public cost of 
this ordering of priorities included large-scale, low density suburban 
development in areas where ultimate provision of sewer services would 
prove to be very costly; development in areas where other services, such 
as transportation, would be less than adequate; and development which 
would be crisscrossed in succeeding years with construction projects 
providing services to newer developments for which service capacity had 
not been provided. 
A sweet and sour ingredient in sewer service within Metro has been 
the provision for the existence of public and private service districts 
within the G.S.D. to provide "special services" where they are "needed" 
and cannot be provided as a package of "substantial urban services 
C' U S D expans].·on) .,,19 ]. . e . , ••. The revision of the original Metro 
enabling legislation to permit such districts proved beneficial in that 
it provided a means for constructing sewer lines and self-contained 
treatment facilities in rapidly growing and well-established suburban 
fringe areas where immediate U.S.D. extension was not feasible. 
Figure 4.3 indicates the location of these districts circa 1972, prior 
to extensions of the U.S.D. 
At least three significant problems can be related to these 
non-Metro service districts. First, the existence of the districts 
l8Ana1yzing Suburban Development (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1973). 
19Frank I. Michelman and Terrance Sandalow, 1972 Supplement To 
Government in Urban Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1972), 
p. 237. 
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reduced the impact of any attempt to manage Metro development in the 
suburban fringe through subdivision regulations requiring extensive 
service provisions, especially sewer connections. Second, the standards 
used during the installation and maintenance of service facilities 
provided by the districts may well have been below those of Metro, 
requiring Metro, in future years, to undertake large-scale upgrading and 
renovation of services in areas ultimately brought into the U.S.D. 
Finally, U.S.D,. expansion into areas served by such districts raises 
tedious and costly legal issues. Acquisition of assets and liabilities 
of such districts plagues U.S.D. expansion in the same way it does any 
city annexing an area including such districts. 20 In summary, the 
existence of these service districts within the G.S.D. provided 
short-range benefits and long-range problems. From the developmental 
perspective of this study, the latter were more significant than the 
former. 
Much of what has just been said is also true of water service 
throughout Metro since its beginning. Although water service was 
available throughout far more of the G.S.D. than was sewer service, 
much of it was provided through 2-inch mains, which limited both 
fire-protection potential and the capacity for system growth to meet 
new demands. 2l Following consolidation, some 569,340 feet of 2-inch 
20See The Tennessean, March 1, 1978, for a statement by Farris A. 
Deep, Executive Director, Metropolitan Planning Commission, making this 
point. 
2lAnalyzing Suburban Development, pp. 28ff. 
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water line had to be replaced with larger mains within the Iinew ll U.S.D. 
for fire protection reasons alone. 22 Figure 4.4 indicates the extent of 
water service as well as the location on non-Metro water systems. The 
expansion of water service by the private districts raises the same 
developmental issues pointed out in the case of non-Metro sewer systems. 
With the exception of some increased expense in laying water line 
through areas of near-surface limestone, water supply throughout Metro 
has not been plagued with difficult engineering or source problems. 
Shortages in supply have been related to treatment facility capacities, 
not the Cumberland River source. 
As has already been stated, water and sewer services throughout 
Metro have been financed by revenue-bond issues sustained by user 
charges. The service charge system of finance not only separated the 
massive construction effort from Metro's general obligation bond 
structure but it also dealt with the question of equity--particularly 
since such a large portion of the U.S.D. required servicing and 
obviously could not receive services within "reasonable" time had 
ad valorem taxation been used. 23 Politically, the user charge method 
was acceptable as long as'sewer and water service extension was rapid, 
extensive, and generally in moderately dense areas with little 
skip-development. This certainly was the case in the lO-year, 150 
million dollar effort to service the U.S.D. with sewers after 
l 'd . 24 conso 1 at1on. As trunk lines were extended into lower density areas, 
22Coomer and Tyer, p. 69. 
24Coomer and Tyer, pp. 68-71. 
23H k' I . aw 1ns nterv1ew. 
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U.S.D. 
_ Metro Water 
~ Other Water Systems 
Figure 4.4. Water Services, 1970. 
Source: Analyzing Suburban Development. 
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particularly as a consequence of the U.S.D. expansions after 1972, 
residents already receiving U.S.D. sewer services began to resist the 
increased water and sewer charges necessary to fund expansion into areas 
with less revenue potential. Among the solutions promoted were greatly 
increased connection fees. As so many times occurs~ a plan to avoid one 
set of political problems eventually opened the way for another set of 
public concerns. 
The existence of a user-charge financial base for water and sewer 
construction reinforced the potential for such services to be extended 
with little coordination with other developmental considerations. 
Concern for this potential is clear in a letter written by Irving Hand 
and included in one of the first studies of the impact of water and 
sewer services upon urban development: 
With the establishment of Metropolitan Government last 
April (4/1/63), immediate steps were taken to examine the 
entire policy framework and rate structure concerning the 
provision of water and sewer service. This study is presently 
under way, under the auspices of the Water and Sewerage 
Services Department. A third party contract was entered into 
with the Chester Engineering Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
for this work. The Planning Commission is serving in an 
advisory capacity. 
It is important that the policy framework within which the 
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Services Department operates 
be coordinated with the planning considerations of the overall 
community. Even in Nashville, this requires constant 
attention and consideration. We are using the Capital 
Improvements Budget and Program as an additional vehicle to 
effect this coordination. However, this relationship could be 
considerably tighter. 
Water and sewer services are key elements in land 
development in this community. A "bullish" operating depart-
ment can play hell with the urban form. By using revenue 
bonds and service charges, the illusion is rendered that these 
facilities become self-supporting. Perhaps so. But the 
impact on the community can be in terms of other costs of 
significant proportion. 
We generally require the approval of the Metropolitan 
Health Department as to individual water supply facilities •.. 
Lot areas of 40,000 square feet or less, to be served by 
private sewage disposal facilities, similarly require the 
approval of the Metropolitan Health Department. This worked 
for awhile, but developers soon learned to go over that 
minimum for land that did not percolate. As a result, we have 
mile after mile of low density residential development for 
which other community services must be made available. This 
is confronting Metropolitan Government with some very varying 
levels of service to be formulated in relation to varying 
densities of development. Street lights, sidewalks, storm 
drainage, schools and their service areas and parks and 
recreation areas are among those involved. 
I feel that water and sewer extension policies are crucial 
to decisions concerning land development and the urban form. 
I feel that this approach has met with limited success. This 
result is not necessarily the fault of limited use of such 
policies alone but rather the extent to which planning as such 
has not received meaningful application. A strong planning 
program, in all of its aspects, will provide an atmosphere 
within which appropriate water and sewer service policies may 
be formulated and applied. 25 
Each clause in Hand's final sentence emphasized the concerns for 
coordinated and planned service extension shared by planners in the 
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1950's as well as those of the 1960's, and later in the 1970's, as will 
be seen throughout the pages of this study. 
Other U.S.D. Services 
Most Metro observers would probably agree that provision of storm 
sewers throughout the U.S.D. has been the Metro service goal most 
seriously neglected. Even with the construction of new sanitary sewers 
throughout the "new l! portion of the U.S.D., some 340 miles of combined 
25Kenneth B. Kenney, "Public Policy Alternatives Affecting Water 
and Sewer Service Growth in Urban Growth Areas," (unpublished Masters 
thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 198-199. 
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. 26 
sanitary and storm sewers remained in the "old" U.S.D. Planning 
studies of U.S.D. expansion conceded that storm sewer objectives in new 
U.S.D. areas would have to be limited to "major stream improvements" and 
correction of problems were "major nuisances" and/or "major damage" 
. 1 . d 27 Th f . potent1a eX1ste. e act that storm sewer provisions would have to 
have been financed by property tax revenues coupled with the high cost 
estimates of providing storm sewers throughout the U.S.D. supported the 
consensus that the U.S.D. could not afford a massive extension of storm 
sewers. Attention to storm drainage, therefore, was limited to thpse 
areas where serious flooding problems existed or to locations where 
outside funding was avilable, such as urban renewal and urban 
28 redevelopment areas. 
During the same period that sewer and water services were being 
extended throughout the initial U.S.D., fire protection at a Class III 
level of service existed. While 2-inch mains were being upgraded. 
tanker service was available. By 1971. one study pointed out that full 
fire protection services were available throughout the U.S.D. with an 
average !.response time of 3.2 minutes. 29 The extension of Metro fire 
protection into areas of potential U.S.D. expansion. however, was 
26 How Well Is Metro Doing? (Nashville: Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville-Davidson County, Department of Finance, 1976), p. 30. 
t 27Urban Services District Expansion Study (Nashville: Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, 1967), pp. 8 and 13. 
28Ibid . 
29How Well is Metro Doing? p. 24. 
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limited by the availability of water. Figure 4.5, based upon a 1972 
Metropolitan Planning Commission study, indicates fire protection 
provided by non-Metro services as well as areas of deficient water 
1 f f · f' h . d 30 Th . d f f' . supp y or 1re 19 t1ng nee s. e 1na equacy 0 1re protect10n 
outside the U.S.D. became a growing political issue, particularly as 
U.S.D. services became complete toward the end of Mayor Briley's second 
term (1971). The perception in urbanized, non-U.S.D. areas ,that Metro's 
service "catch-up" period in the U.S.D. was ending, coupled with 
periodic fires in the G.S.D. wher~ it was felt that, had Metro responded, 
damage would have been less, gave rise to growing pressure for Metro 
fire protection extension. The tempting political response was to 
promise Metro fire protection throughout the G.S.D., but without U.S.D. 
expansion. This modification in the U.S.D.-G.S.D. service package was 
initially resisted successfullY by Metropolitan Planning Commission and 
others who pointed first to the deficiencies in water supply throughout 
much of the G.S.D. and second to the fact that less than full fire 
protection in the non-U.S.D. areas might threaten the existing Class III 
31 rating in the U.S.D. Although not publicly discussed, planners also 
were concerned that transfer of fire protection to the G.S.D. service 
package would lessen the distinction between the U.S.D. and G.S.D., 
therefore limiting any future efforts to manage urban development 
30Plans for Fire Protection Service (Nashville: Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, 1972). 
3l Ibid . 
) 
U.S.D. 
• Metro Fire Facility 
~ Private Fire Facility 
Figure 4.5. Fire Services, 1972. 
Source: Expanding Urban Services. 
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through control of U.S.D. expansion. 32 Metropolitan Planning 
Commission's major recommendation linked the expansion of Metro fire 
protection to expansion of the U.S.D. The 1972 study of fire protection 
emphasized engine company expansion tied to U.S.D. expansion priorities 
published about the same time. 33 
The political pressures for Metro fire protection throughout the 
G.S.D. grew, however, and when Richard Fulton ran to succeed the 
retiring Briley as Mayor in 1975, he grasped the issue and promised the 
extension of Metro fire protection throughout Metro. Although 
significant expansion of fire protection service was already mandated 
due to expansions of the U.S.D., as noted below, there remained difficult 
fire service planning issues in providing Metro service in areas with 
inadequate water supply. Nevertheless, on July 1, 1978, Metro 
implemented G.S.D. fire protection with a mixture of new fire stations, 
temporary fire stations, tankers and equipment purchased from previously 
.. . d b 1 . f' . d' . 34 eX1st1ng pr1vate an pu 1C 1re serV1ce 1str1cts. This action 
represented the only formal shift in the allocation of Metro services 
between the G.S.D. and U.S.D. since Metro's inception. 
Although trmore intensive" police protection was allocated to the 
U.S.D. in the Metro Charter, it has already been pointed out that both 
32Interview with Robert Paslay, Planning Director, Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, September, 1977. 
33Plans for Fire Protection Service; Expanding Urban Services 
(Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1972). 
34 The Tennessean, July 1, 1978. 
150 
service-wise and budget-wise. Metro police protection has become a 
G.S.D. function. 35 Initial attempts to define U.S.D. police protection 
as including "more intensive traffic patrols, walking patrols and crime 
prevention efforts" were recognized by city officials as less than 
accurate. 36 By the mid-1970's. Metro police protection had become a 
"de facto" G.S.D. service with additional U.S.D. service existing only 
in a "de jure" sense. 
Solid waste collection was quickly extended throughout the U.S.D. 
upon Metro's birth. Both regular garbage collection and residential 
"chipper truckll (yard refuse disposal) services have been provided 
throughout the entire U.S.D. Financed by U.S.D. property taxes. the 
37 services have been performed with relatively little controversy. 
U.S.D. expansion proposals, however, have raised the issue of garbage 
pick up in several ways. The inadequacy of many private garbage 
services has been a rallying point for many non-U.S.D. residents to 
demand U.S.D. services. Second, the legal problems of acquisition of 
private garbage collection investments, upon U.S.D. expansion, have 
posed intricate issues for Metro. U.S.D. expansion in 1975 and 1976 
resulted in at least one lawsuit, finally settled when Metro agreed to 
38 purchase the assets of eight private garbage haulers. Third, 
35Horton Interview; Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 7; 
Expanding Urban Services. p. 7. 
36H I . P 1 I . orton nterv1ew; as ay nterv1ew. 
37 How Well Is Metro Doing? pp. 34-35. 
38The Tennessean, January 21, 1978. 
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increasing costs of solid waste disposal, a G.S.D. function, have 
caused sometimes controversial increases in fees charged to private 
garbage haulers for dumping privileges at Metro land-fill sites as well 
as the Thermal Transfer Corporation facility, a Metro-based solid-
waste-energy production operation. 
The remaining U.S.D. services. such as street lighting and various 
regulatory functions, have posed few problems during Metro's evolution. 
The low relative cost of such services coupled with the speed with which 
they have been extended throughout the U.S.D. minimize their signifi-
cance in the developmental considerations surrounding U.S.D. expansion. 
III. U.S.D. EXPANSION: PLANNING PROPOSALS 
The cumulative impact ,of the preceding comments on the condition of 
U.S.D. services during the first few years following Metro's birth 
reinforces the view that Metro was preoccupied with the !1catch-up" 
service requirements within the U.S.D. Toward the end of the 1960's, a 
condition quite similar to that of the 1950's began to emerge: a 
relatively well-serviced urban area (the U.S.D.) was surrounded by an 
increasingly urbanized area with significant service deficiencies, 
particularly sewer and fire protection. In recognition of these 
deficiencies. MPC, in 1967, published the first formal proposal to 
expand the U.S.D. Prompted by both political pressures to service 
unbanized G.S.D. areas and planning staff recommendations to press on 
with actions to consolidate and centralize service delivery throughout 
the urbanized area (first articulated in the Community Services 
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Commission report in 1952), Mayor Briley initiated the planning study 
in 1966. 
In their first study of U.S.D. extension. MPC staff operated within 
the following U.S.D. expansion framework: 
1. "Most of the urban services now provided in the present Urban· 
Services District are at a sufficient level to permit 
expansion" (with the exception of storm drainage and assuming a 
1970 completion of sanitary sewer expansion);39 
2. Urban Services will continue to follow. not lead development; 
"one of the primary objectives of local government is to 
provide appropriate services to the urbanized sections of the 
community ... unfortunately, areas become urbanized and have 
need of services well before government is able to supply 
them II. , 
3. A continuing issue of U.S.D. expansion will be service and 
revenue equity--both within the expansion area and between the 
expansion area and the existing U.S.D.; and 
4. Some reasonable variation in the level of U.S.D. service 
delivery can be related to the type and extent of development 
b . d 40 e~ng serve • 
The same planning issue-areas thus faced MPC in 1966 as faced the 
framers of the original U.S.D. concept: financial, legal. administrative. 
39Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 2. 
40Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 14. 
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political and engineering priorities had to be ranked and distilled into 
a recommended plan of action. As concluded in the second chapter of 
this study, the U.S.D. concept was conceived from a mixture of financial 
and engineering considerations accompanied by administrative reorgani-
zation (consolidation) and adequate doses of legal and political savvy. 
The first attempt to implement U.S.D. extension carefully dealt with the 
financial, engineering, administrative and legal details contained 
within the four-point framework, but fell short in consideration of the 
political details. 
The first point of the expansion framework was the conclusion that, 
at least by 1970, and with the exception of storm sewers, the existing 
U.S.D. was to have been adequately serviced. The preceding pages have 
summarized the basis for this conclusion. One implication of this 
conclusion was that financially, the U.S.D. could be expanded within a 
context of predictable debt service. Administratively, Metro had 
consolidated service delivery throughout the U.S.D. into the appropriate 
agencies, such as the Department of Water and Sewerage Services. From 
an engineering perspective, provision of services throughout the U.S.D. 
had partially raised Metro's capacity to expand services. Although not 
fully adequate, sewerage treatment and water supply capacities had 
increased significantly between 1963 and 1967. 41 Legally, the issue of 
equity between existing and proposed U.S.D. areas was diminished. 
Finally, it appeared logical to assume that political opposition from 
41U b S . D' . E . S d 18 19 r an erVlces lstrlct xpanslon tu y, pp. - . 
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existing U.S.D. areas would be minimal, given the relative high levels 
42 of satisfaction with Metro services that were continually reported. 
Not fully entered into the political calculus, however, was the 
potential impact of U.S.D. expansion upon tax rates and user charges. 
Several planners and engineers would certainly liked to have 
reversed the second expansion assumption, but recognized the futility of 
pursuing the notion that ~U.S.D. expansion policies might significantly 
influence future development patterns. There was certainly no political 
mileage in this perspective, and there were strong fiscal and legal 
arguments to support the "foHowingll strategy. 
The final two issues, those of equity and service variation 
received much attention. The legal consequences of U.S.D. expansion 
based fiscal and physical service provision criteria was a continuing 
43 Th .. f . ... h h f' d d f concern. e t1m1ng 0 serV1ce prov1s1on W1t t e 1rst ue ate 0 
new taxes was of concern. Although less pressing, the timing of 
user-free financed water and sewer services was also significant. 
Although it might be said that legal concerns for service and tax 
inequities would also involve political and administrative considera-
tions, such is not necessarily the case. MPC's general methods in its 
first attempt to plan U.S.D. extension made this quite clear. 
42See Robert E. McArthur, The Impact of Metropolitan Government on 
the Rural-Urban Fringe: The Nashville-Davidson County Experience 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1971); Dan 
Grant, "Opinions Surveyed on Nashville Metro." National Civic Review 
(July, 1965), pp. 375-377. 
43Urban Services District Expansion Study, pp. 16-17. 
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The method used by MPC in the 1967 U.S.D. expansion study can be 
roughly outlined as follows: 
1. Identification of urban service need by documenting stage of 
urbanization and service provision in relatively large planning 
units adjacent to existing U.S.D.; 
2. Combining of areas in need of urban services according to 
drainage area and fire service (engine company) criteria; and 
3. Recommended sequencing and timing for inclusion of areas into 
U.S.D. according to fiscal, administrative and legal criteria. 
Phases one and two resulted in a list of 11 areas recommended for 
inclusion in the U.S.D. (see Figure 4.6).44 Phase three led to an 
outline of a "fast schedule ll (four year) and a "slow schedule" (eight 
year) of expansion. Following a review of the fiscal impacts of each 
schedule, the study concluded that the three (3¢) cent increase in the 
U.S.D. property tax rate projected from the IIfast schedule" was a small 
price to pay for the more rapid servicing of the existing development 
adjacent to the U.S.D. at that time. 45 Table 4.4 summarizes the 11 
proposed expansion districts according to the characteristics developed 
during each phase of the expansion study. 
It is important to underscore the point that in this first U.S.D. 
expansion study the MPC staff was not responding to some hidden political 
agenda. They simply explored the various U.S.D. expansion alternatives 
44Urban Services District Expansion Study. p. 25. 
4SUrban Services District Expansion Study. pp. 37-38. 
Figure 4.6. Recommended Annexation Areas, 
1967 Study. 





























URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSION AREA CHARACTERISTICS, 1967 PROPOSAL, 
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY 
D.U. per Gross Proposed Year Proposed Year 
Dwelling Units Acre on of Inclusion Cost/Revenue of Inclusion 
Eer Gross Acre Sel2tic Tanks (Fast Schedule~ ImEact (Slow Schedu1e~ 
.34 .67 1970 $-241,600 1974 
.38 .63 1970 -154,900 1974 
.72 .94 1970 -204,300 1973 
.68 .98 1969 -183,250 1971 
2.11 2.00 1967 -215,350 1967 
.74 1. 20 1968 - 90,200 1969 
.94 1.35 1968 -171,800 1969 
.70 1.07 1969 -149,800 1972 
1.33 1.05 1969 - 54,750 1972 
.66 .51 1969 -225,550 1970 
.71 .71 1968 + 42,600 1968 



















within the existing service and development framework-that of servicing 
already urbanized areas. In this context, the staff only loosely held 
to the "packaging" of their recommendation implied by the sequencing of 
expansion according to a Itfast" or "slow" program. The study, however, 
was not received with the same flexibility.46 The Metropolitan Council 
member from the Inglewood area opposed the expansion and was able to 
block the proposed Inglewood inclusion into the U.S.D. His action, in 
response to his constituents' concerns over the potential U.S.D.-caused 
tax increase, was generally interpreted as blocking further action on 
the remainder of the proposed extensions. As one planner involved in 
the issue stated, "there was no organized force actively pushing 
extension, tl so the misperception of the "packaged" nature of the 
proposal was allowed to block any further action once the initial 
47 obstacle had been encountered. . With no real force in the Council to 
bolster the MPC recommendations, the plan died with the defeat of the 
ordinance tied to the Inglewood expansion. The Mayor, whose general 
interest in extension of urban services had prompted the initial study, 
was unwilling to spend any specific political capital to press for 
particular extensions once the Council had defeated the first proposal. 
Thus, because of the political forces (or lack of them) which surfaced 
in the first attempt to extend the U.S.D., the boundaries were not 
changed. 
46Interview with Joseph R. Haas, Director, Research Division, 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, June, 1978; Paslay Interview. 
47H I . aas nterv1ew. 
159 
In 1971, several things did change. The need for urban services, 
especially sewer and fire protection, in the belt around the existing 
U.S.D., emerged as issues in Council and Mayoral elections. Acting on 
general campaign promises, the reelected Briley again requested MPC to 
prepare an expansion study of the U.S.D. In March 1972, MPC produced 
its second such study, Expanding Urban Services. In conveying the study 
to the Council, Briley was forceful: 
.. A similar expansion program was prepared five years ago, 
and an ordinance putting that program into effect was unsuc-
cessful. The fact that no appreciable expansion of urban 
services has occurred since the inception of Metropolitan 
Government is most disappointing. The backlog of need for 
urban services continues to grow, making the delay in Urban 
Services District expansion less tolerable. 48 
In preparing the 1972 study recommendations, MPC both relied on updated 
census and land use data and altered its strategy of presentation. 49 
The more recent data increased MPC's perception of the extent of service 
need in the urban belt around the U.S.D., leading to enlarged expansion 
areas, particularly Bordeaux, Parkwood, Old Hickory and Hermitage. 
Figure 4.7 presents the 1972 expansion study recommendation. Table 4.5 
describes the areas recommended for U.S.D. expansion. It should be 
noted that the "percent developed'! refers to gross land development. No 
consideration is given to the "developable" portion of each area. It is 
diffioult to determine the extent to which undeveloped but developable 
land was to be included in these extensions. 
48 Letter, Mayor Briley to Vice-Mayor David Scobey, March 27, 1972. 
49Expanding Urban Services, pp. 1-2. 
Figure 4.7. Recommended Annexation Areas, 
1972 Study. 
Source: Expanding Urban Services. 
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TABLE 4.5 
URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSION AREA CHARACTERISTICS, 1972 PROPOSAL, 
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY 
Percent Gross 
Percent Residential Acres/ Residential 
Area Code Developed Develo12ed Acres P012ulation Densit~ 
Bordeaux 1 36.3 29.8 11 ,905 1. 33 
Parkwood 2 39.2 34.0 11,745 1.41 
Pages Branch 3 54.0 39.8 5,478 2.94 
Inglewood 4 72 .6 66.7 18,967 7.96 
Madison 5 63.4 50.5 20,943 3.24 
Old Hickory 6 . 49.2 24.3 4,554 1. 73 
Hermitage 7 22.8 16.9 9,592 1.11 
Donelson West 8 61.1 47.2 16,192 2.64 
Donelson East 9 49.6 41.9 6,174 2.21 
Crieve Hall-Tusculum 10 55.5 49.7 29,653 2.65 
West Meade-Brookmeade 11 77.2 60.3 12,368 1.89 



















MPC's altered strategy of presenting its recommendations is 
partially reflected in Table 4.5. No attempt was made to "package" the 
sequence and timing of extension. Further, revenue projections from 
increased U.S.D. tax collections were not explicitly included in the 
report. The staff view was that a large area of urban, primarily 
residential, development existed, and was growing without adequate urban 
, t' 1 1 f' 'd b 11' 50 serv~ces, par ~cu ar y sewerage, 1re protect1on an gar age co ect10n. 
They wanted the 1972 report to simply be a breakdown of this area by 
sewer drainage and fire service criteria with no overt suggestion of 
sequence of expansion. liThe differences in need were not as great as 
51 the need to get started." They, in effect, gave the Council a 
"shopping list," hoping that political realities might produce a buyer 
(or two). In fact, pressures in Bordeaux, particularly, had been 
building for solutions to septic tank failures. 52 It is perhaps more 
than ironic that the map makers started their numbering of the expansion 
areas with Bordeaux. After receiving assurances that U.S.D. tax 
supported services could be extended within one year after the first 
taxes fell due, as required in the Charter, and being exposed to the 
Water and Sewerage Services Department I s need to expand into new 
revenue areas, the Council backed the Bordeaux representative's request 
for inclusion and, on December 24, 1972, "Bordeaux-Haynes" became the 
first major addition to the U.S.D. (see Figure 4.8).53 
SOH I . aas nterv1ew 5l Ibid . 
52 Paslay Interview. 53Metropolitan Ordinance 72-308. 
Figure 4.8. Urban Services District Expansions, 
1972-1978. 
Source: Metropolitan Planning Commission. 
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As a proposal for extension of the U .S.D., the 1972 study in many 
ways was an ongoing extension of the urban services reports going back 
to the Community Services Report of 1952. It was a "minimum standard'! 
document outlining already developed areas, primarily residential, where 
urban services were deficient. Politically, the planners had to wait 
for the proper mixture of public concern for service problems and 
willingness to pay both additional property taxes (the U.S.D. rate) and 
water and sewer charges. The mixture was influenced by the residents' 
perceived offsets from these taxes and charges caused by previous 
private and service-district charges, higher fire insurance rates and so 
on. From the Council's perspective, Council members with substantial 
U.S.D. constituencies had to be certain that political, as well as legal, 
equity in service delivery would exist after expansion. This was 
particularly important since few, if any, of the proposed expansions 
would pay their own way.54 In the case of Bordeaux-Haynes, the critical 
mixture was finally reached. 
IV. U.S.D. EXPANSION: ACTUAL 
Figure 4.8 and Table 4.6 present the growth of the U.S.D. in the 
five years following the publication of the 1972 study and the first 
significant expansion of the boundaries since Metro's birth. Ultimately, 
the expansion doubled the area of the U.S.D. and increased the 
population by some 50%. Pressure for expansion emerged in much the way 








Name Code ExEansion Date (1970 Census) 
Bordeaux-Haynes 1 Dec. 24, 1972 14,551 
Crieve Ha11-Tuscu1um 2 Nov. 21, 1973 37,260 
Golden Valley 3 Aug. 20, 1975 15 
Beacon Square 4 May 7, 1976 311 
North of Bordeaux 5 June 24, 1976 1,322 
Madison-Inglewood 6 Jan. 1, 1977 28,743 
Donelson 7 Jan. 1, 1977 24,981 
Hillwood 8 Jan. 1, 1977 13,898 
Opry1and 9 Dec. 29, 1977 27 
Summary of U.S.D. Growth 
U.S.D. Area Prior to 1972 
Area Added by U.S.D. Expansion 
U.S.D. Area, Jan. 1, 1978 
72.0 square miles 
78.7 square miles 
150.7 square miles 
U.S.D. Population Prior to 1972 (1970 Census) 
Population Added by U.S.D. Expansion 





resulted from particular concerns over fire service in the area. The 
area was also the location of rather active subdivision development 
along with apartment complex construction. Existing and potential 
health and safety problems were perceived by a significant segment of 
the residents to create pressure for U.S.D. extension. The near absence 
of fire protection and the continuing performance problems of the First 
Suburban Utility District (water and sewer) were of greatest concern. 55 
As with the Bordeaux addition, the Department of Public Works and the 
Fire Department provided guarantees of services within a year after the 
first U.S.D. tax payments were due (which worked out to be 1975). The 
Department of Water and Sewerage Services was still in a search for 
revenue and indicated a capacity to upgrade and expand the limited 
sewerage service provided by the First Suburban District. 
The remaining U.S.D. extensions can be lumped into three categories. 
First, there were three relatively "little extensions" after the Crieve 
Hall-Tusculum addition. The Golden Valley and Beacon Square additions 
resulted from developer requests for urban services to serve proposed 
apartment complexes in each area. Given the likelihood that U.S.D. 
extension would ultimately occur, the developers saw fit to press for 
the timing of services with development to permit high density housing 
for which there were no existing sanitary sewers or fire protection. 
Subdivision development in the North of Brodeaux area provided similar 
pressures for U.S.D. extension there. It is interesting to note that in 
55An 1 . S b b 0 1 31 a yZ1ng u ur an eve opment, p. . 
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all three cases, absence of critical services at even a "minimum 
standard" level for high density development forced the developers to 
seek Urban Services District boundary modification before proceeding 
with their plans. The potential revenue impact of such extension was 
appealing to the Council, especially given the fact that adjacent low 
density residential areas either had or would soon have U.S.D. services. 
If there were any concerns for "managing" such development, they 
certainly didn't surface before the Council. 56 
The second group was typical of the type of annexation recommended 
in the 1972 study and was begun in the case of Bordeaux: relatively 
well-developed residential areas with varying overlays of relatively 
poor urban services. The ultimate boundaries of each of the three 
expansions were determined by the general boundaries ~n the corresponding 
1972 recommended areas modified by the "normal political zig-zagging and 
line-drawing" by Council members as they responded to various constit-
uent interests. 57 The Madison-Inglewood area did not extend as far 
north as initially projected in 1972, but the Donelson and Hil1wood 
(West Meade-Brookmeade) additions generally did conform. Some Metro 
sewer services already existed but septic tanks were predominant in each 
area. Metro water supply existed in most of the areas, with the 
exception of that portion of Madison-Inglewood supplied by the Madison 
Suburban Utility District. Private fire services were scattered 
throughout the areas. 
56H I . aas ntervlew. 57Ibid . 
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Positive Co~ci1 action on the three extensions was facilitated by 
the continuing view that service extension into these areas was needed 
and, perhaps more significantly, could be provided by Metro without 
negatively impacting the existing U.S.D. Indeed, as Table 4.2 (page 132) 
outlines, U.S.D. tax rates were not increased as a consequence of these 
annexations. (This should not be taken to mean that the extensions were 
self-supporting; the previously-mentioned shift to increased G.S.D. 
expenditures combined with new non-tax U.S.D. revenues from fees, 
federal funds and state tax allocations contributed to the stability of 
58 the U.S.D. rate. Although precise data has not .been found, it is 
generally accepted that only the midd1e-to-upper inc·ome area of Hillwood 
provided a net increase in U.S.D. property tax revenues, as first 
suggested in the 1967 U.S.D. expansion study.) 
The third, and most recent, U.S.D. expansion category is occupied 
solely by the Opryland extension. Of all the U.S.D. extension proposals, 
this became the most controversial. Beginning in the late 1960's the 
northwestern portion of Pennington Bend had been undergoing development 
as a theme park-tourist complex, primarily by the National Life and 
Accident Insurance Company in the Opryland Complex. Claiming that it 
had been assured that the area would remain only in the G.S.D., National 
Life provided its own internal fire protection, sewerage and solid waste 
59 disposal systems. (Opryland was excluded from the 1972 West Donelson 
58Horton Interview. 
59Interview with staff attorney, National Life and Accident 
Insurance Company, March, 1978. 
169 
U.S.D. extension area.) By 1975, however, the revenue potential of 
including Opryland in the U.S.D. combined with a desire not to have a 
non-U.S.D. island should the Donelson area be brought into the U.S.D., 
placed pressure on both planners and Council members to include Opryland 
in the U.S.D. 60 Opryland was therefore included in the package to be 
brought into the U.S.D. on January 1, 1977. Upon favorable Council 
action, National Life attorneys filed suit, claiming that the 
"annexation" was "unreasonable," in that Opryland already provided the 
services that were a part of the U.S.D. service package. 6l The suit was 
filed pursuant to Tennessee's annexation law, which, as will be recalled 
from Chapter I I, governs the basic ,procedure for expansion of the U.S.D. 
The Tennessee law is very much oriented toward the municipality (in this 
case, the U.S.D.), and any doubt over "reasonableness" is decided in 
favor of the annexing city or town. It was not at all surprising, then, 
when the court ruled in favor of Metro and Opryland was ordered to 
become a part of the U.S.D. on December 29, 1977. 62 The same law which 
extends the city an advantage in annexation, however, also declares that 
while an annexation case is undergoing adjudication, any taxes 
associated with annexation cannot become due, nor can they become due 
until one year following judicial settlement of the issue, as required 
60H I . aas nterv1ew. 
6lNational Life and Accident Insurance Company Interview. 
62The Tennessean, December 30, 1977. 
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in the normal arrangement for a schedule of services. 63 In the case of 
Opry1and, as with the other U.S.D. extensions, this schedule of services 
was actually an amendment to the six-year capital budget document 
listing and scheduling the appropriate capital investments required to 
service the area. It seems fairly clear that National Life's suit was 
filed primarily to save at least one year of U.S.D. tax payments, not to 
attempt to remain outside the U.S.D.64 
V. CONCWSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed the evolution in Metro of the delivery of 
those services contained in the initial U.S.D. service package. The 
approach taken has included both an examination of specific services and 
a discussion of proposed and actual extensions of the U.S.D. boundaries. 
Two conclusions drawn from the former form the basis for the conclusions 
made from the latter. The first is not surprising, given the contents 
of the preceding two chapters: delivery of urban services in Metro has 
been a continual case of following and trying to catch-up with 
development in the urban-rural border area. Even the review of the 
U.S.D. service most widely available prior to or concommitant with 
development, water, suggests that (1) little or no coordination between 
water line location and other planning concerns existed, and (2) the 
63Victor C. Hobday and Eugene Puett, Annexation Handbook for Cities 
and Towns in Tennessee (Knoxville: Municipal Technical Advisory Service, 
1975), pp. 25-26. 
64This conclusion has been drawn by the author from the interviews 
cited above. 
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bulk of the water mains put down beyond city or U.S.D. boundaries were 
inadequate for fire protection services. For other U.S.D. services. the 
time lag between development and service delivery was significant. 
The second conclusion to be drawn from the review of services is 
that only modest coordination of service planning and delivery has 
existed within Metro. Using Irving Hand's terms. the capital budgeting 
process has "tightened up" only a little and the primary planning for 
water and sewer extension has been carried out almost entirely by the 
Department of Water and Sewerage Services with the assistance of 
engineering-oriented, third-party consultants. Even where MPC had been 
active in attempting to relate service extension to a range of urban 
development issues, political considerations intervened. Such was the 
case with the recent decision to extend Metro fire protection countywide. 
The pattern of relatively non-coordinated service extension 
following urbanization logically meshes with the way in which U.S.D. 
boundary extension issues have evolved. A "rationally-prepared" plan 
for U.S.D. expansion failed for lack of significant political interest. 
Only when a second version of the plan was incrementally relevant to 
political interests of both residents and service-supplying departments 
did extension take place. As one of Metro's designers stated, "I was 
disappointed that U.S.D. expansion was not handled in a more positive 
65 way." His view was shared by another participant in Metro's birth, 
"the biggest failure of Metro has been the failure to expand the U. S. D. 
65Hawkins Interview.· 
66 until just recently. In both cases, the views expressed were not 
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based on an idealized vision of "growth management" in Metro. They were, 
rather, built on the initial hope that "U.S.O. expansion be used to time 
and coordinate the extension of urban services in order to save money 
67 and raise the standard of urban development." What appears as a 
rather simple statement contains within it all the issues which have 
been struggled with by Metro-oriented planners since 1952 and which 
reflect the tension between a planning dream of seriously influencing 
the shape and efficiency of Metro's physical development and yet working 
within an environment where few political resources for such a 
perspective exist. 
66Interview with Dr. Lee S. Greene, January, 1978. 
67H k' I . aw 1ns nterv1ew. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE 
EXPERIENCE: MESSAGES FOR PLANNERS 
As is often true in drawing conclusions from a case study. two 
levels of summary are in order. The first. and more obvious. considers 
the interplay of consolidated government. the Urban and General Services 
District distinction, and the evolving framework for urban development 
in Metropolitan Nashville. The second. and more difficult, relates the 
conclusions drawn from the Metro study to the broader interests of 
planners in the management of urban development with which the study 
opened. The planning issues raised in this context include the possible 
ways in which consolidated government, urban service delivery and urban 
boundary adjustment might be a part of efforts to influence the type, 
rate, location, timing and quality of urban development. The final 
pages of this chapter and study will search for possible messages for 
the planners and others who share such interests. The first part of the 
chapter. however. will address the need to summarize and speculate on 
the Nashville story. 
Four research questions were initially provided to give focus to 
the study of urban service delivery in the Metro setting: 
1. Was the creation of these service districts based upon (to any 
extent) a planning concern for the coordination of service 
provision with development objectives? 
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2. Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as a 
vehicle for coordinated service delivery consistent with 
development objectives? 
3. Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have 
potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future 
development objectives? 
4. Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and 
the service district concept provide planners with evidence of 
the validity of such arrangements for the implementation of 
development objectives in the metropolitan area? 
The summary of the study of Metro is organized as a response to the 
first three of these questions, with the fourth providing a transition 
to the broader final comments. 
I. THE URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT CONCEPT 
In the final pages of Chapter II, it was argued that the 
the U.S.D.-G.S.D. concept was created essentially as a financially, 
administratively and politically sound way to assist consolidated 
government in meeting Davidson County's massive backlog in providing 
urban services to urbanized areas, particularly sanitary sewers and fire 
protection. To'argue that Metro's service district concept was born 
from some embryonic scheme to use urban services provision to guide 
urban development would simply deny the historical circumstances 
encountered first, by those who convened the Community Services 
Commission and, later, by the many forces active in bringing about 
consolidated government. 
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The first research question also makes reference to the existence 
of "development objectives" toward which service delivery arrangements 
might have been directed during the designing of Metro. As conceptually 
developed in the pages following the historical review, such "objectivesll 
were found to exist almost entirely within the private development 
sector, dominated by developers, investors, home buyers and so on. When 
translated into public demands, these objectives became rapidly 
increasing needs to service urbanized areas which, in many cases, 
received little more than two-inch water lines in the way of commonly 
accepted urban services. In a way quite typical of their sense of 
realism, the early planners of Metro invented the U.S.D. and G.S.D. as 
servicing and political, much more than as planning, tools. Servicing 
rather than shaping urban development was an important distinction. 
Their recognition that the existing service needs of urbanized areas 
effectively prevented the allocation of near-future Metro fiscal and 
political resources towards any effort to manage new development was 
fortified by their knowledge that the extension of the transportation 
system and other shaping factors would heavily influence metropolitan 
growth in and beyond Davidson County. Nevertheless, the context of 
consolidated government coupled with the hope that the service backlogs 
could eventually be reduced at least allowed some anticipation that the 
U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinction together with the expandable nature of the 
U.S.D. boundaries might become useful in some future setting where the 
management of development would receive some level of community support. 
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II. URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT PERFORMANCE 
The implementation of Metro's service district concept has been 
reviewed both from the perspective of the general frameworks for 
development which have existed in Metro since 1963 (Chapter III) and the 
accounts of actual U.S.D. service and boundary extensions. The first 
perspective was required by the study's research interests in the 
developmental consequences of public policies, including those 
influencing the distribution of the services allocated to the U.S.D. 
package. The presentation of a typology for classifying the varying 
impacts of public policy-making upon urban development was used to 
suggest that during Metro's first years, few public decisions were made 
to consciously influence the character, direction, staging or timing of 
Metro development. Where such decisions were made, they generally fit 
the "minimum standard" pattern and experienced varying degrees of 
successful implementation. It is not unexpected, then, that any 
conclusion regarding the impact of U.S.D. service policies and boundary 
extensions is preempted by the absence of any significant public effort 
to influence development beyond the "minimum standard" level of action. 
Within the setting just presented, the discussions in Chapter IV 
shifted to a more specific review of the evolution of U.S.D. service 
delivery and U.S.D. boundary extensions. Delivery of the package of 
U.S.D. services was undertaken by functional Metro departments with 
relatively little coordination. This was seen as a function of both the 
aggressive strength of such departments, especially Water and Sewerage 
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Services, and the absence of an early and persuasive comprehensive 
planning effort receiving strong political support. 
Recent studies continue to illuminate the consequences of the 
absence of planned, coherent U.S.D. service extension. One study, which 
sampled several developed areas with initial development dates ranging 
from 1953 to 1972, concluded that minimal water was generally present at 
the time of development but that average time between initial development 
and supply of other U.S.D. services was 11 years for sewers and 19.5 
f f
' ,1 years or 1re protect1on. Another report mentions that development in 
Metro continues to absorb far more land per capita than the median for 
cities of the same size (231 acres per 1,000 persons for Metro as 
2 compared with 67 acres for cities over 250,000). Service problems are 
not diminished through such land-intensive development. In its recent, 
and first, effort to develop a comprehensive plan, the Metropolitan 
Planning Commission cited "disruptive and inefficient development 
processes" and "the inability of local government to provide adequate 
services" as two of the seven major problem areas facing Metro. 3 
From 1960 to 1970, 37,397 acres of land were developed for 
residential purposes outside the inner city portion of 
Davidson County. The low level of existing public services 
l"The Process of Urbanization and Timing of the Provision of a full 
range of Municipal Services, If (unpublished memorandum, Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, May, 1978). 
2Untitled Staff Draft Memo (Metropolitan Planning Commission, July, 
1978). 
3proposed General Plan For Nashville (Nashville: Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, 1977), p. 12. 
in outlying areas together with the high cost of improved 
services placed constraints upon the intensity of suburban 
development. As a result, a dispersed and sporadic pattern of 
suburban development has prevailed in the county with a 
resultant detrimental effect on the efficient and timely 
provision of public services. However, when services, particu-
larly sanitary sewers, are finally provided in suburban areas, 
a significant demand for higher density development occurs. 
Subsequent higher density development proposals submitted 
after suburban areas are serviced by community facilities 
frequently generate significant conflict among long estab-
lished neighborhood residents desiring to preserve low 
densities and land developers desiring more intensive develop-
ment . . . . a major problem facing Metropolitan Government 
regarding the provision of community facilities and services 
is the lack of adequate fiscal capacity to meet even current 
needs . . . . There are currently several areas throughout 
the county where extension of urban services has not kept pace 
with the level of development. As a result local government 
has not realized the savings in public expenditures possible 
with the installation of public utilities during the initial 
stages of the urban development process. It now will become 
necessary to disrupt relatively mature areas in order to 
provide public facilities long after these facilities were 
originally needed. Furthermore, other areas have reached the 
development stage that makes urban services feasible and would 
create effective long-term costs savings, in addition to 
promoting further development. 4 
Although perhaps lengthy for a concluding chapter, these recent 
'observations have been included to stress the point that many of the 
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developmental issues faced by Metro in 1963 remain in the late 1970's. 
Urban Services District services are still being extended into urbanized 
areas and significant urbanized areas remain outside the existing U.S.D. 
boundaries. 
The existing U.S.D. boundaries themselves only came into existence 
after awareness of the previous failures to expand reached political 
proportions~ Although the mechanisms for U.S.D. expansion and the 
4proposed General Plan For Nashville, pp. 12-13, 21-22. 
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maintenance of a U.S.D. package of services existed within the Metro 
Charter, previous discussion has shown that political support within the 
Metro Council for expansion was late in emerging and that the "package" 
was diluted, first with the placement of sewer and water services on a 
user charge basis, then with the allowance of continued non-Metro 
service districts, and, finally, the extension of Metro fire protection 
throughout the G.S.D. 
Lest the opinion remain that, even within the context of limited 
public participation in development decision-making, the failure of 
U.S.D. service policies to impact development patterns be attributed to 
inadequate management of U.S.D. potential, several additional concluding 
points need to be made. First, it seems obvious that one goal of the 
U.S~D.-.G.S.D. concept has been achieved-to the possible detriment of 
objectives associated with managed development. The goal achieved has 
been the relatively even distribution of G.S.D. services throughout the 
county. Much of the unevenness in schoOl, road, police, parks and 
recreation, health and welfare services common prior to consolidation 
have nearly disappeared. Although fiscal burdens upon the G.S.D. have 
gro~n accordingly. the developmental consequence has been to make 
urbanization beyond the U.S.D. more attractive relative to urbanization 
in the county prior to 1963. The erosion of the U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinc-
tion combined with accessibility improvements in the county fringes will 
continue to lessen the incentives for development in the existing U.S.D. 
Also contributing to some lessened impact of development control 
has been the continuing existence of the seven satellite cities. 
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Conventional wisdom regarding the presence of incorporated municipalities 
within a consolidated form of government tempts one to overestimate 
their role in Metro. With the exception of Goodlettsville and the 
semi-commercial island of Berry Hill, these cities are low-density, 
residential areas whose primary objective is to capitalize on the 
political bargain which created them and use zoning controls to keep 
nonresidential development out. As parts of the G.S.D. and able to 
contract with Metro for U.S.D. services, the cities provided a strong 
attraction for development beyond the U.S.D. boundaries. Presently, 
however, little undeveloped developable land remains in these areas--and 
where it does, its zoning is generally compatible with approaching Metro 
policies (especially Belle Meade, Oak Hill and Forest Hills). The only 
existing issue of consequence between the satellite cities and Metro 
development is the refusal of Goodlettsville and Berry Hill to allocate 
the discretionary half of their state sales tax allocation to the 
Metropolitan Board of Education. As a matter of policy, Metro and the 
other five satellite cities commit all of their state sales tax 
allocation to education. 
A final caveat in discussing the impact of U.S.D. policies on Metro 
development concerns the impact of the transportation network, both 
within Metro and regionally. There is little doubt that the pattern and 
sequence of suburban-residential as well as industrial and commercial 
development has been influenced by the extensions of the seven radial 
transportation corridors out from the center of Metro. Although a full 
discussion of this influence is beyond the scope of this study, it is 
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certainly recognized that transportation decisions have had significant 
shaping influences upon Metro. The conceptual emphasis on the "minimum 
standard" framework in which development of Metro occurred perhaps 
obscured the point that, although private interests may have been a part 
of the decisions, nevertheless the commitment of federal, state and 
local resources to expand the streets and highways within Metro not only 
impacted upon internal development, but contributed to the phenomena and 
issues of regional growth raised by Dan Grant in the remarks presented 
in the final pages of Chapter II. Again, the issues are complex, but 
they need to be noted, even though the general conclusion is still 
valid: the potential for use of the U.S.D. service package and boundary 
extension to influence development in Metro remained latent. 
III. URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT POTENTIAL 
A unique opportunity currently exists to engage in some speculation 
about the possible impact of U.S.D. service policies and boundary 
extensions on future development in Metro. As mentioned previously, the 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, around 1970, began to undertake its 
first truly comprehensive planning effort. Although other planning 
priorities have intervened on occasion and slowed the comprehensive 
planning activity, the staff released, in July 1976, three "general plan 
options!! for Metropolitan Nashville. S At the same time it was announced 
Sproposed General Plan For Nashville: Economic Development 
Alternative (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976); Proposed 
General Plan For Nashville: Residential Livability Alternative (Nashville: 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976); Proposed General Plan For 
Nashville: Public Economies Alternative (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning 
Commission, 1976); Proposed General Plan For Nashville. 
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that the three plan options would be placed before citizens, groups, 
organizations and institutions of Metropolitan Nashville for discussion 
and refinement. Following this period, it was suggested that there 
would be a period of aggregation and incorporation of this public 
discussion into the options. The Planning Commission would then select 
from or combine features of the options and officially adopt Metro's 
6 first general, comprehensive plan. As of this writing, no formal 
action of plan adoption has occurred. However, as a basis for 
considering the potential roles U.S.D. policies may play in influencing 
Metro development, the activities associated with this comprehensive 
planning thrust offer at least two opportunities for speculating about 
the future. The first is provided by the technical discussions in each 
of the plan options which assess potential U.S.D. service roles. The 
second is broader and probes at the heart of Metro's capacity to 
influence its future development: of the three options, two propose a 
much greater public role in managing the sequence, timing, location and 
quality of Metro'S physical development. Using the terms introduced in 
Chapter III, these two options, "Residential Livability" and "Public 
Economies" clearly require a "partnership" between public and private 
development interests as an ingredient in the environment which would 
support their implementation. The third option, "Economic Development," 
assumes an urban development environment not too different from that 
found throughout Metro's history. 
6Interview with Robert Paslay, Planning Director, Metropolitan 
Planning Commission, September, 1977. 
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It is beyond the purposes of this study to fully explore each of 
these plan alternatives. For the reasons stated above, however, it is 
useful to briefly review the approach toward the urban service-
development relationship taken in each alternative. If one assumes that 
the "economic development" alternative is basically an incremental 
extension of Metro's past framework for development, then the contrast 
between its treatment of the U.S.D. and that of the other two altema-
tives offers some commentary on the range of potential relationships 
between urban service policies and development in Metro's future. 
The three alternatives were prepared from a common review of seven 
problem areas found to be significant in examining Metro's history and 
future need. Two of these problems relate directly to issues developed 
in this study and have already been mentioned: "disruptive and 
inefficient development processes," and lithe inability of local 
government to provide adequate services." The other problem areas 
include lack of housing opportunities, lack of a balanced transportation 
system, adverse impact of transportation upon residential areas, 
inadequate educational and recreational opportunities, and environmental 
degradation. 7 Each of the alternatives addresses these problems--with 
transportation, environmental, educational, and recreational policies 
varying little among them. The shape, quality, location, timing and 
sequencing of urban physical development along with urban service 
policies, however, vary considerably. 
7proposed General Plan For Nashville, pp. 12-24. 
The "economic development" alternative seeks the "maximum 
development of economic activities and employment opportunities" by 
encouraging "sufficient flexibility in the development process to 
8 enhance private investment opportunities and to stimulate growth." 
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Accordingly. "the overall pattern of residential development in Davidson 
County under this plan will be continued decentralization. although most 
growth is expected to occur in concentrations of development rather than 
in a dispersed manner. A residential development strategy is proposed 
which is designed to accommodate the bulk of new growth stimulated by 
economic development and to assure an adequate level of essential public 
services in both existing and emerging residential areas.,,9 Although 
recommendations are made. as in the other options. for more mixed 
densities, more d:lverse low and middle income housing opportunities. 
better development design standards and so on, the essential feature of 
the lIeconomic development" option is the promotion of relatively 
unrestrained residential development which will accommodate the growth 
requirements of an expanding economy and not place significantly 
increased financial demands upon the private sector. 
Accordingly, the "economic development" alternative contains the 
recommendation that U.S.D. expansion should occur "in areas which have 
urbanized sufficiently to be serviced without requiring a major increase 
in the U.S.D. taxes."l0 In addition. it is recommended that fire 
8 ProEosed General Plan For Nashville. p. 27. 
9proEosed General Plan For Nashville. p. 29. 
10 ProEosed General Plan For Nashville, p. 80. 
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, 'b d d 'd 11 protect~on serV1ces e exten e COuntyw1 e. This, as discussed in the 
preceding chapter, has already taken place. In mapping out projected 
U.S.D. expansion areas, those identified were already developed areas in 
need of U.S.D. services, primarily Bellevue, Madison, Antioch and Old 
Hickory-Hermitage. 12 The essence, therefore. of this alternative's 
vision of the U.S.D.-development relationship is one of continued 
"catching up" with the hope that "keeping up" may ultimately occur. The 
heart of the "economic development" approach to development planning is 
the assumption that basic urban service planning (as embodied in the 
U.S.D. package) should facilitate the implementation (albeit at a high 
level of minimum standards) of development objectives determined by 
private interests. 
The "residential livability" and "public economies" alternatives 
are based upon a different planning assumption. They assume, in 
differing degrees, that a public interest in urban development exists 
beyond the simple establishment of minimum development standards, and 
that some means must be established to reconcile this public interest 
with sometimes competing private interests. One way of conceptualizing 
this process of reconciliation has been the transition from "minimum 
standard" planning for urban development to "partnership planning." The 
"residential livability" alternative assumes a public interest oriented 
toward lithe achievement and maintenance of a highly desirable 
11 Proposed General Plan For Nashville: Economic Development 
Alternative, pp. 90-91. 
12 Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 81. 
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residenti~l environment. illS The flpublic economies" alternative is based 
upon a more demanding sense of public interest: "cost effectiveness in 
the provision of public facilities and services (through) . . .. 
defining t~e least expensive way of accommodating growth within the 
communi ty while still maintaining acceptable levels of service. ,,14 
Both of these options propose the use of the U.S.D. service package 
as an important means for implementing development patterns consistent 
with the public interest portion of Metro's future development goals. 
The "residential livability" option recommends that. 'once the backlog of 
servicing developed areas is met, the "full-range of services. including 
U.S.D. expansion" should be provided "to desired grow~h areas. illS The 
areas programmed for U.S.D. extension are more extensive than in the 
"economic development" alternative. including. eventually, all land 
within Metro where residential growth is to occur. 16 Of crucial 
importance is the timing of U.S.D. extension. It is proposed that 
extension of services will precede or accompany growth. Although the 
issue is now moot. the alternative proposes that fire protection not be 
extended countywide since "it is felt that (this) would detract from the 
service package incentive proposed by the plan strategy. This would 
weaken the directed growth incentive proposed by the alternative.,,17 
lSproposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 27. 
l4Ibid. 
IS General Plan For Nashvi lle, 87. ProEosed p. 
16 ' Plan For Nashville. 84. ProEosed General p. 
17 Plan For Nashville. 87. ProEosed General p. 
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Whereas the "residential livability" alternative assumes a greater 
increase in the U.S.D. tax rate to finance its capacity to extend 
desired residential services, the tlpublic economies" alternative assumes 
that a desire to reduce public expenditures will modify demands for 
desired residential patterns. It, too, proposes tightly controlled 
extension of the U.S.D. area together with the regulatory devices 
necessary to prevent development where such services are not available. 
Its mo.ti ve, however, is the containment of public expenditure. "Further 
expansion is tied to service capabilities and financial ability to 
schedule expansion. Areas held in reserve and not scheduled for 
expansion have regulatory controls applied to discourage development 
until extensive development becomes economical to serve. 1I18 The fiscal 
evaluations of urban service extensions would become primary criteria in 
decisions to "open up" certain areas for development. Under this 
alternative, development decision-making would fall near the line ., 
between the Itpartnership" framework and that of "management," where the. 
public sector is dominant. 
Although these reviews of the development options currently before 
Metro have been brief, they have suggested two basically different roles 
for U.S.D. policies. As a link between this study's review of the 
history of these policies and the need to at least comment on the 
potential for certain future policies, the real choices offered between 
the alternatives are significant, particularly if a distinction is drawn 
l8proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 83. 
between the technical capacity for U.S.D. policies to influence 
development and the political likelihood that the requisite U.S.D. 
policies will be implemented. 
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There is little question that continuation of the U.S.D. service 
package combined with guided boundary modification, perhaps even in 
small, block-by-block increments, could influence the nature of urban 
development in Metro. Although the extension of fire protection 
countywide has somewhat diminished the differences between U.S.D. and 
non-U.S.D. areas in terms of services delivered and taxes due (which 
impact market values and holding costs), the tight control of U.S.D. 
services together with interrelated building codes, subidivision 
regulations, zoning requirements and capital improvements scheduling of 
other services could significantly impact development decision-making. 
The real issue, however, is the extent to which there will be political 
resol ve wi thin Metro to engage in any form of "partnership" planning 
whatsoever. That is the critical distinction between the "economic 
development" alternative and the other two alternatives. It's the same 
distinction which has been raised throughout this study. In 1952, as in 
1978, planners, faced with Metro's problems, have had to weigh technical 
judgments against political realities. Where their insights, skills, 
and sense of timing led to some form. of synthesis of these perspectives, 
progress was achieved. Where a critical mass for action did not exist, 
problems simply accumulated. In the current age of diminishing resources, 
environmental consciousness and public outcry against perceived 
governmental costliness, it may be easier to achieve consensus on a 
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public-private partnership for Metro's development. Both the 
"residential li vabili ty!! and "public economies" al ternati ves are built 
on this hope. 1£ one extends a trendline through the pages of this 
study's particular'focus on Metro's experiences with the U.S.D. concept~ 
howev~r~ the future of service extension and its impact on Metro's 
development would appear to be more closely linked to the scenario 
portrayed in the "economic development" alternative. 
IV. MESSAGES FOR PLANNERS 
This study evolved from the issues surrounding the perceived need 
to manage or guide development in many urban areas. In particular~ it 
has drawn on Metropolitan Nashville's·experien~es with consolidated 
government~ urban service packaging~ and urban service boundaries to 
develop a case study which might be of interest and utility to planners 
and other interested persons struggling with the problem of urban 
development. It is appropriate J therefore J to conclude the study by 
returning to the initial .concerns of the opening page,s! the potential 
for consolidated government and controlled urban service packages and 
areas to become productive components in efforts to manage urban 
development. 
The Nashville story 'offers planners a complex message. As a 
response to the three questions about consolidated government posed in 
the first chapter~ the experiences of Metro suggest that: 
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1. The "political feasibility" of consolidation is dependent upon 
a "critical mass" of consistent planning, consistent leader-
ship, publicly perceived problems, public support, and 
patience; 
2. The "metropolitan" problem is not solved by consolidation; and 
3. Consolidated government does not necessarily bring about 
"efficiencies" in the deli very of urban services although many 
economies do result. 
The combined impact of these observations is that consolidated 
government may conceptually exist as a means for better influencing 
urban development, but the obstacles for bringing the concept into 
reality are formidable. The proper conditions for implementing 
consolidated government finally fit together in Nashville only after 10 
years of work by a remarkably consistent group of planners and community 
leaders. Still, it required a public reaction to the decision by the 
City to proceed with annexation before consolidation was ratified. A 
. -
number of events could easily have prevented Metro's birth. If the 
planners associated with the Advance Planning and Research Division had 
left Nashville after the defeat of first referendum; if school 
integration had been the issue it became only several years later; if 
the allocation of federal funds had penalized metropolitan governments 
as they now do; if any number of factors had changed, Metro might never 
have come to exist. 
Metro has never been a metropolitan government. The scope of this 
study has not permitted a full evaluation of the impact of the extensive 
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suburban ring which exists beyond the Davidson County boundary. 
Regardless of any future success in managing its own development, Metro 
will be faced by the fact that only through the complex and difficult 
procedures and politics of regional councils, state government, and 
federal agencies will truly metropol1tan pr0b1ems be addressed. On the 
other hand, planners should not miss the fact that Metro has jurisdic-
tion over a significantly greater portion of the metropolitan area than 
would have been the case had Metro not been formed. Regardless of how 
Metro has used its own authority to influence development, it's 
important to note that the countywide extension of the G.S.D. removed 
school, transportation, health care, and other service issues from the 
areas of inter-governmental combat. 
Finally, planners need to recognize. that consolidated government 
has not meant "coordinated" government in the case of Metro. In this 
study's examination of Metro's experiences in use of the U.S.D. to 
influence development, it has been seen that service coordination within 
the U.S.D. package was not generally achieved. The absence of a strong 
comprehensive planning effort coupled with at least one aggressive 
service-providing Metro department contributed to the lack of coordinated 
service delivery and extension. This observation does not deny the 
significant economies and levels of coordination which have been 
achieved by Metro in many areas, as cited in earlier pages. Is is 
simply intended to show that consolidated governments are as subject to 
internal conflicts and inconsistencies as are any other forms of 
government. Although in Metro, the conflicts have not been geographical 
\ 
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and citizen support for Metro has been generally consistently high 
across neighborhood areas, the arguments for "polycentric local 
government" seem as valid as do those for "consolidated government." 
Using Metropolitan Nashville as an example of consolidated government, 
it could probably be argued that certain examples of federated local 
governments have been more successful in achieving the efficiencies and 
coordination of service delivery required for strategies aimed at 
influencing development. Planners need to pay attention as much to the 
boundaries between departments, agencies and commissions as they do to 
those between cities, towns and counties. 
A second group of messages is,based upon the experiences of Metro 
in packaging and extending urban services within the framework provided 
by the Metro Charter. The evolution of the Urban Services Dist~ict and 
the General Services District can be summarized with the message that 
the original ingredients hypothesized to be necessary in the effective 
use of urban service policies remain valid. Technical skill, financial 
resources, the proper governmental framework. and political will are 
required if urban services are to be used as a means for influencing 
urban development. From the initial Community Services Commission 
report in 1952 until the present documents on Metro's comprehensive plan 
options. there has been Ii ttle question of the technical competence of 
Metro plans for service policies and extension. There has been little 
disagreement over the technical status of Metro services planning or of 
the validity of forecasts for future need. The issues in conflict have 
emerged from differing goals toward which forecasts and'projections 
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should be made. On a relative basis, technical competency has not been 
a Metro problem. 
The tremendous cost of servicing the underserviced developed areas 
has certainly limited the flexibility with which U.S.D. service 
extension was planned, regardless of political considerations. As 
reflect·ed in earlier statements, the very thought of using U.S.D. service 
extension to influence urban growth when significant areas of the 
existing U.S.D. were not being fully serviced raised serious questions 
of political and legal equity. Even the ambitious Itresidential 
livability" alternative for a comprehensive plan stresses the need to 
\ service existing areas of development before engaging in a program of 
selective U.S.D. expansion. The reason is, and has been simple: Metro 
has been forced to spend valuable resources simply to catch up with 
service demands. Technical competence and money are important. Metro 
has had the former and lacked some of the latter. The partial message 
is to discount neither. The full message, however, requires a look at 
the final ingredients in a process of planning urban services and 
development: governmental arrangements and political will. 
It has already been suggested that Metro's consolidated form of 
government has not prevented the emergence of problems in attempting to 
manage urban service delivery. The regional issue and departmental 
independence have been cited as problems. The key feature in Metro's 
governmental arrangement has been the division of urban services 
between the U.S.D. and the G.S.D. The initial wish of the designers of 
Metro was that the two service packages would remain 'distinct until such 
,r--:, 
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time as the entire county became urbanized. As discussed at various 
points throughout this study, the reasoning was that a package of urban 
services suited to highly urbanized areas and attached to an urban 
services district together with its own revenue-raising authority would 
not only solve problems of service equity, it would also provide a 
coordinated means for extending urban services. In their hearts, Metro 
planners hoped that this packaging of services into an expandable 
district might eventually become a tool for influencing urban develop-
ment. (The "residential livability" and "public economies" alternatives 
might also be considered "plans from the hearts of planners.") The 
message for planners is that the Metro test of the urban services 
district model should bea warning that pressures can emerge which will 
dilute the service package, both through assignment of services on a 
coUntywide basis (like fire protection) or through placement of services 
on a user fee basis permitting service extension beyond the district. 
Allowing the existence and expansion of "special service districts" has 
the same effect. To be effective, the service package must be 
distinctive, predictable and its absence from an area should be an 
effective deterrent to development. 
It is not just coinGident that the final message and comment of 
this study deals with "political will. II Regardless of the formal 
arrangements for delivery of urban services, their capacity to influence 
the nature of urban development will ultimately depend upon the mixture 
of political willingness within the urban area to permit such an impact. 
As a recent review of a series or urban growth management systems 
concluded, the "capacity to execute" a growth management plan is 
meaningless unless that capacity includes a political capacity.19 In 
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many ways, the story of Metro is a story of "capacity-in-waiting." In 
the 1950's, planners, engineers, lawyers and others proposed a solution 
to Nashville's service problems. They then both worked hard and were 
lucky. Ultimately, only the politicians and the voters could give life 
(to their plan for metropolitan government. The use of the U.S. D. to 
influence development didn't fare so well. The potential was there, but 
received little political support. The environment of the "minimum 
standard" was too pervasive. It may well be that the tool has now lost 
its usefulness. Nevertheless, Metro planners, true to their predecessors, 
have again put forward a plan. \Vhether they will be as successful--and 
lucky--as the earlier planners were, only some future study will be able 
to say. The message offered by this study is that only when the 
citizens, interests and officials of an urban area are willing to accept 
a greater role for local government in influencing the development of 
their urban area will proposals to use urban service policies to such 
an end be successful. The extent to which planners can help bring this 
political consensus into being obviously varies from city to city. In 
Metropolitan Nashville, even though the odds for success may not be 
great, there exists a legacy for making the effort. 
19Robert Einsweiler et al., Urban Growth Management Systems: An 
Evaluation of Policy-Related Research (Chicago: American Society of 
Planning Officials, 1976). 
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